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A critical social psychological contribution to (global) citizenship education: Seeing oneself through the eyes of the 'other'

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Abstract
Taylor (2004) argues that the Western moral order is characterised by three key forms—the market economy, public sphere, and self-governance. These forms entail contradictory tendencies for the concept of selfhood and our relations with each other. We do endorse an autonomous and free self, who should pursue her goals, but is also expected to act ethically towards others through mutuality, equality, and collectivity. However, we are concerned with being authentic, i.e. being true to 'ourselves', as well as with recognising the needs and differences of the 'other'. This moral order is based on notions of political equality, democracy, freedom, human rights, and privatised economic prosperity. Moving 'with Holzkamp beyond Holzkamp' (Teo, 2016), in this paper, we present a method to foster the skill to step out from one's moral matrix, the invisible normalised moral order, and view oneself through the eyes of the 'other'. Focusing on food practices, we developed a method for social self-clarification (Holzkamp, 1995). The skill to see oneself through the eyes of the 'other' is necessary in realising one's entanglement in a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably produces severe inequalities.

Keywords
global citizenship education, morality, values, moral reasoning, perspective taking, discourse

The Global Institutional Order and Western Moral Order

In the new epoch of globalisation, we are witnessing unprecedented movements of people, money, food, and information across boundaries. This global interdependence extends across various scales (local, regional, national, and global) and is marked by an unparalleled increase in the speed as well as spread and density of networks. Globalisation entails serious contradictions. On the one hand, we witness processes of global economic and civil integration through supranational networks (e.g., the World Trade Organisation, World Bank, and United Nations) and the emergence of transnational social movements. On the other hand, an increase in political, ethnic, and religious divisions is evident (Ramonet, 1997). While processes of economic integration and standardisation generate more opportunities for global resistance and cross-cultural encounters (Slater, 1998), globalisation reinforces deep inequalities within and across nations. As global connections unfold around the centre of Western powers, i.e. the Global North[1], a hegemonic order is constituted and reproduced through discourses that create an *invisible normality.* On the one hand, dominant discourses are reified through an asymmetrical institutional order, for example, through the implementation of laws and institutions, and, on the other hand, through a symbolic order such as the moral and value systems shaping the collective consciousness (Foster & Tillner, 1998). At the level of everyday actions, individuals draw on this moral order to organise societies, interpret the world, give meaning to their lives, and interact with the 'other'.

Taylor (2004) argues that the Western moral order is characterised by three key forms—the market economy, public sphere, and self-governance. These forms entail contradictory tendencies for the concept of selfhood and our relations with each other. We do endorse an autonomous and free self, who should pursue her goals, but is also expected to act ethically towards others through mutuality, equality, and collectivity. However, we are concerned with being authentic, i.e. being true to 'ourselves', as well as with recognising the needs and differences of the 'other'. This moral order is based on notions of political equality, democracy, freedom, human rights, and privatised economic prosperity.

[1]We do not define 'the West' or 'the global North/South' strictly in geographic terms. Our aim is not to treat them as essentialised singular categories. We rely on the definitions of the terms by Mohanty (2003) and other post-colonial thinkers (e.g., Dirlik, 1996) to draw attention to a series of systematic effects resulting from the assumption of 'the West' with its complexities and contradictions as the norm in the symbolic order. We also highlight the pathways of global capital. Correspondingly, we use the term 'global South' to refer to communities of people who are economically and politically marginalised in the context of global labour markets.

The discourses of capitalism, enlightened rationalism, Judeo-Christianism, and psychoanalysis contributed to the idea of self-governing people capable of freeing themselves from internal or external normalising forces without recourse to transcendent principles. Introspection is the practice through which the 'free' self can be understood and achieved (Foucault, 1988, 1997). In these discursive constructions of selfhood, individual thoughts are considered the vehicle that enables us to be authentic, reveal the 'truth' about ourselves, and repair ourselves from deficiencies and shortcomings. This view constructs a fixed self that we can master at will. Human self-determination is essentialised and viewed as the accomplishment of inner humanity. However, this type of self-creation creates a group of isolated individuals (Arendt, 1963), who strive for the impossible, namely to be authentic moral agents. The act of any ethical activity is located in the solitary mind and one's own will, and holds the individual responsible. Furthermore, it reduces opportunities to problematise one's perspectives, experiences, and actions through engaging in a dialogue with concrete others.

The recognition of uniqueness and differences, as rooted in Judeo-Christian moral principles, provides the foundations for discourses (e.g., human rights, development discourses) that appeal to common humanity and universalism. Such imaginaries are problematic, as they rest on essentialist assumptions about commonalities and differences. They support the idea of a universal model for relating to one another, which defines oneself and the 'other' before entering the realm of social relations (Infinito, 2003). These practices of self are not dialogical and prevent us from understanding the link between our perspectives and wider historical and social arrangements, as well as the power structures that subjugate us. In the context of a global institutional order that reproduces uneven power relations and disparities between the global North and South and ultimately undermines everyone's ability to make choices regarding their lives, the following challenges emerge. a) How can we[2] broaden our understanding of subjectivity and borders in unique but communal terms that challenge hegemonic discourses? b) How can we expand our understanding of agency not as an innate potential, but as shaped by the contingent circumstances of our existence that requires the presence of others and is attentive to mutuality, co-responsibility, and co-implication? This understanding can contribute to more specific but expansive visions of solidarity.

[2] We refer to those who grew up in Western contexts and continue to enjoy affluent living standards.

Our aims

Moving 'with Holzkamp beyond Holzkamp' (Teo, 2016), in this paper, we present a method to foster the skill to step out from one's moral matrix, the invisible normalised moral order, and view oneself *through* the eyes of the 'other'. Focusing on food practices, we developed a method for social self-clarification (Holzkamp, 1995). The method was piloted with undergraduate students in the UK and the Netherlands and is generally suited for Western subjects. The skill to see oneself *through* the eyes of the 'other' is necessary in realising one's entanglement in a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably produces severe poverty and inequalities. According to conservative estimates, 46% of humankind live under the poverty line (World Bank, 2016). However, the calculations of critical scholars indicate that the actual amount is higher if one does not use a poverty line "which is neither meaningful" or reliable nor "adequately anchored in any specification of the real requirements of human being" (Pogge & Reddy, 2007, p. 1).

We selected food practices as the theme of a perspective-taking exercise, because hegemony is here internalised, reproduced, and resisted at the level of common sense. In addition, food production and consumption represent grounds for ethical and aesthetic self-constitution (Taylor, 2004), which is linked to an unequal global institutional order. We draw inspiration from moral intuitionism (Haidt, 2001, 2012, 2013) to acknowledge the importance of intuition in moral reasoning and moral judgements[3]. On an individual level, most would be hard-pressed at any moment to articulate moral principles; however, we constantly act on implicit moral evaluations, hunches, intuition, and sentiments. On a collective level, the concept of intuition represents the invisible forms of specific moral orders. Our goal is to disrupt these invisible moral orders by providing counter-narratives grounded in a dialogue with the 'other'. Our exercise aims to elicit conflicting moral intuitions through an exchange of moral judgements between oneself and the 'other' to clarify the social and historical conditions that shape he moral matrix and judgements about the 'other'. The aim is to reveal that one's moral matrix is not the only exclusive and valid one. We claim that seeing oneself *through* the eyes of the 'other' includes positioning oneself as a historical subject, which involves viewing oneself through the concepts of geography, territory, and time. We believe this is an important requirement to a) liberate us from being trapped in a single perspective and open new forms of dialogue with oneself and the other; b) help the subject understand how certain perspectives perpetuate the oppression of oneself and the exploitation of the 'other'; and c)

[3] We do not consider intuition as the primary source of moral reasoning as Haidt (2001) argues and return to this issue later in the paper.

forge bonds of political solidarity. In other words, this enables us to realise our action potential in a global world.

The Legacy of Holzkamp

German Critical Psychology emerged in a particular context. It emerged (1) in Berlin, a city on which the general political zeitgeist of the Cold War had left a strong imprint; (2) at the Free University, an institution founded by students, scholars, and scientists with the support of US-Americans after World War II; and (3) amidst scientific battles and student movements that took place before the reunification of Germany. In this context, Holzkamp highlighted the shortcomings of mainstream psychology and advocated a new emancipatory psychology that started with people's everyday conduct, experiences, and agency. For him, psychology from the standpoint of the subject must analyse how psychological concepts justify and stabilise power constellations in a socio-economic historical context—the bourgeois society—and help individuals understand their Handlungsmoeglichkeiten, their action potential in bourgeois life conditions (Holzkamp, 1985).

The individual's relationship to the world is mediated by societal meaning structures. As a result, humans' relationship with their societal world is never direct and immediate. For Holzkamp (1985), meaning from an evolutionary perspective is a 'determinant of activity' for humans, while on a psychosocial level, it is a *possibility* for activity or action potential. In our everyday lives, we make moral judgments, wherein we routinely define ourselves in terms of the things that matter to us and our communities. These judgements are linked to the question of the meanings we draw on and subscribe to that make our lives worth living. As such, our understanding of ourselves and the world is tied to systems of moral beliefs, which—despite being individually expressed—are social and historical in nature (Taylor, 1989). Based on this premise, we have an inherent need to feel connected to what we think is and 'ought' to be 'good' for us and our communities. Furthermore, we construct our identities in relation to our positioning towards this sense of 'good'. A vision of the 'good' becomes available in any society and is expressed through symbolic systems (Taylor, 1989). As these visions bring us closer to what we think is 'good', they obtain further power and potency to form an invisible moral matrix. However, while dominant narratives, immediate situations, and pressing social demands bind our perspectives and actions, we have the ability to distance ourselves from dominant narratives (Vygotsky & Luria, 1930/1994; Gillespie, 2012; Valsiner, 2000). Here, human agency becomes a form of psychological distancing from

immediate perspectives to reconfigure the meanings we attribute to ourselves and others.

The concept of meaning-making as 'a possibility for action' is central in Holzkamp's conceptualisation of the psyche and psychology. It reflects the following three features of meanings. "First, meanings are relational; they are the psychological aspect of our relationship to the world. Second, they are societal and historical; they do not exist outside of culture and its symbolic systems; rather, meaning constructions are the very essence of human culture. […] Third, meanings are not deterministic triggers of action; they are not physical, chemical, or biological stimuli or constraints, but rather they indicate or signal a range of possibilities for action" (Brockmeier, 2009). In *Grundlegung der Psychologie (1985)*, Holzkamp invites us to rethink the issue of meaning-making from a historical and evolutionary viewpoint. A perspective on meaning highlights the human abilities of action as integral to the human condition. These abilities are linked to the concepts of agency and subjectivity (Brockmeier, 2005a, 2005b, 2009). The 'action potential' opens for subjects the opportunity for an epistemic distance between themselves and their moral matrices. It creates a distance that enables them to step back and explore the historical, geographical, and societal specificity of their perspectives, relations, and consequences on the 'other'.

'With Holzkamp beyond Holzkamp'

Holzkamp's demands must be understood in the context of the contemporary global institutional order. Many political and economic changes across nations and groups of people have occurred over the past three decades, producing major scaling effects and creating new challenges for people in the Global North and South. The economic and political self-governance of poor nations has weakened, while the roles of supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), governing bodies such as the European Union, and non-profit corporations have intensified. In 2015, 69 corporations—not countries—scored among the world's top 100 strongest economies (Green, 2016).

During the past 20 years, the wealth of the top 1% globally has increased by 60% (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018). The poorest people in high-income nations are richer on average than the richest quintile in low-income nations (Milanovic, 2016). Income inequalities within countries and in traditionally low-inequality countries from the Global North such as Germany, Finland, and Sweden have also been rising (Sassen, 2014). Over the past two decades, the number of displaced people, mostly in the Global South, has

increased. These people are moving to urban slums, destroyed villages, and smallholder farms, and losing access to fertile land (UNHCR, 2016). The increasing confluence of interests between governments and private industry, which use surveillance, policing, and imprisonment as solutions to social, economic, and political problems is fuelled by the creation of a threatening 'other' such as the 'immigrant', 'criminal', and 'terrorist'. This is accompanied by an increase of the world prison population by approximately 10% since 2004, even though the crime rate has dropped. Women and girls are over-represented in these trends with a 50% increase in their imprisonment between 2000 and 2017 (Huber, Rope, & Sheahan, 2017). The United States leads in the number of incarcerations with a 500% increase in prison population over the last 40 years. Today, more than 60% of those in American prisons are people of colour (The Sentencing Project, 2016). These developments pose profound contradictions and challenges for the lives of everyone worldwide, especially those from economically marginalised backgrounds.

Non-standard and precarious forms of employment have become the norm in poor countries and are increasing in rich nations. This form of flexible capitalism leads to lower wages, fewer rights, and less access to social protection. It requires that workers know how to conduct themselves to be of value to the economy, and adversely affects mental health, especially that of those lacking economic family support (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Carrieri., Di Novi, Jacobs & Robone, 2014). Young people, women, and low-skilled migrant workers are more likely to be employed in these types of jobs (Organisation, 2007). In addition, more women are migrating for work from the Global South, constituting half the world's legal and illegal migrant workers, who provide labour as sex workers, domestic workers, nurses, and nannies (Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003). The uneven flow and distribution of information, capital, and labour across borders and between nations is not just an economic process. Religious fundamentalism and conservative nationalism that draw on racial, ethnic, and gendered ideologies are also increasing. At the same time, the increased economic, racial, ethnic, and religious divides of the global capitalist hegemony have created more opportunities for the international resistance and transnational movements to become more prominent in the 21st century (Sassen, 2014).

These processes and conditions are often accompanied by self-serving and exclusionary understandings of selfhood versus the 'other'. Narratives about undesirable 'others' reinforce their demonisation and marginalisation, or focus on the lives and struggles of people from the Global South, constructing them as homogeneous 'powerless victims'. These narratives mobilise essentialist categories of class, capital, race, and nation, reinforcing monolithic Western

conceptualisations of power, autonomy, and self-determination. Such discourses reinforce the distinctions between us and them. They clarify the difference between the local (defined as self, nation, and Western) and global (defined as other, non-Western, and transnational), and circumscribe ideas about experience, agency, and resistance. Finally, they fail to understand the particular in relation to the universal. The normalisation of a global capitalist order ultimately influences the ability to make choices about the daily lives of economically marginalised and economically privileged communities globally. We consider the global institutional order a series of 'conjunctions and connected and entangled histories' between nations and communities, rather than a Western process (Bhambra, 2007). This view destabilises the West as the centre and enables the exploration of differences in their historical contexts, including their mutualities, complications, and contradictions. Contextual knowledge of oneself and the 'other' is essential to demystify and make visible the various and overlapping forms of subjugation in people's everyday lives and their link to the macro-politics of the global institutional order. It also creates a space for more expansive but specific forms of solidarity and visions of global justice.

Common struggle for the historical subject

Paramount in German Critical Psychology is the questions: 'How do the general limitations of our own thinking and action affect others and our relationships with them? Consequently, can we jointly overcome the conditions disempowering us all?' (Osterkamp, 2016, p. 171). Helping people overcome restrictions in their lives is not about advising them on the best way to live their lives. The aim is to expose the different ways in which we defend our perspective as the only right and valid one, while rejecting others. In this context, agency emphasises the development of an understanding of how distant conditions determine our views and actions beyond the narrowness of everyday life situations (Osterkamp, 2016)). Agency is not understood solely as an individual's responsibility, but as Osterkamp argues, also 'includes … the societal conditions and the possibilities open to others to overcome the restrictions in their lives'(Osterkamp, 2016, p. 170).

To challenge the constricting condition, we must openly address the tensions that emerge from our involvement in them, rather than seeing ourselves through binaries, as victims of oppression or fighters against it. Second, we must openly deal with our active entanglement in suppressive structures (including how we may benefit from inequality producing structures both personally and financially), and not consider this entanglement a 'personal failure'. Third, this involvement should not be considered a personal failure, but a common struggle, a universal problem that can only be tackled through

concerted action. The skill to see yourself through the eyes of another is a necessary requirement in realising your entanglement in a global institutional order that foreseeably and unavoidably produces inequality, exploitation, and severe poverty (Pogge, 2008), from which many living in industrialised/formerly colonising countries benefit personally and financially.

Disrupting the moral matrix through an exchange of moral judgements

We developed a method to overcome these limitations. Our method is dialogical and involves a discussion of seven questions on transgressions of moral standards regarding food practices. Before elaborating on the content of these questions, we provide the rationale thereof.

Perspective-taking is defined as 'intuiting, as accurately as possible, another person's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, interests or concerns in a particular situation' (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006, p. 873). Since the 'other' exists in our imagination, perspective-taking is inherently inter-subjective and emphasises our natural capacity to put ourselves into another's mental, emotional, and psychological state to recreate their mind, motives, and intentions. However, perspective-taking is not necessarily dialectic, meaning that we are not necessarily willing or able to accommodate multiple perspectives (Gillespie, 2012; Tsirogianni & Sammut, 2014). We claim that the ability to accommodate multiple perspectives is linked to the ability to distance ourselves from our intuitive, readily available perspectives. Morality is an integral part of social imaginaries, which involve perspectives about how we envision our existence and relate and fit with others in carrying out common practices (Taylor, 2004). Such ideas are both descriptive (i.e. how things are) and normative (i.e. how things ought to be). Thus, social imaginaries entail images of moral orders that delineate visions about ourselves and our becoming (i.e. what kind of people do we want to be and what is the status of our society and world?). Furthermore, what kind of society do we want to live in? We often exclude or reject others who draw on moral frameworks that are different from ours (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Lakoff, 1996). As moral frameworks underpin our concepts of the 'good life', they imbue our everyday life practices such as our food, dress, and how we flirt with meaning and legitimacy. In this sense, moralities are not abstract standpoints outside the world, but have real effects and can therefore be considered *social facts* (Pogge, 2002) towards which people have to position themselves. While moral beliefs are subjectively expressed, they are inter-subjectively constructed, socially selected and transmitted, and form cultural traditions (Luckman, 2002).

At particular times in history, each culture constructs constructs its own discourses about moral orders, which validate particular perspectives about oneself, others, and visions about the world. These moral values are embedded in a shared social consciousness and become part of common sense, forming an intuitive matrix that often remains unproblematic. However, the matrix can be disrupted and potentially dismantled when confronted by an alternative that challenges and violates its structuring principles and norms. Ruptures to one's moral matrix provide the opportunity to reflect on and reconstruct one's perspective. Hannah Arendt notes that through the breakdown of judgment, we come to examine its nature (Vetlesen, 1994). We see these ruptures as inevitable features of human existence and human societies, which have the potential to become creative forces that force us to distance ourselves from our immediate perspectives and reflect on alternative views (Valsiner, 2003) that do not deny the subjectivity of the 'other'.

A method to imagine oneself through the eyes of the 'other'

The aim of moral transgressions, which are accompanied by extensive (self) reflective and group discussions, is not to encourage participants to only engage in intra-personal dialogue, imagine another person's world, and imagine themselves in the shoes of the 'other'. Rather, by adding another layer of complexity, we aim to inspire participants to engage in *intra-inter*-personal dialogue to develop the skill to see themselves *through* the eyes of the 'other'. To see oneself *through* the eyes of the 'other' first requires putting oneself in the shoes of the 'other', i.e. to imagine another person's intentions and perspective. This must be performed to, second, turn the gaze onto oneself through the eyes of the 'other'. In other words, we use the imaginary moral judgement of the 'other' and project it onto ourselves to obtain a potentially new perspective. Even though this is not the same as experiencing the social situation of another person through an exchange of social positions (Gillespie, 2012), the process prompts a moral perspective exchange, which differs from merely imagining the perspective of the 'other'.

This new perspective aims to dialectically disrupt powerful binary categories and moral principles, on which the subjects often draws without conscious awareness, to think about herself and construct the 'other'. We selected food, as all people can relate to this everyday and universal topic with symbolic significance. As such, we encouraged participants to view themselves through the concepts of geography, territory, and time, and learn to see

themselves as historical subjects embedded in a particular moral matrix. Analytically, we aimed for the following two realisations among our participants:

A) To make them realise how social norms that underpin a specific moral matrix are socially constructed, not set in stone, and that in a different context, these could have been constructed differently.

B) We wanted them to realise the power of the moral matrix, how it has been instilled in them, how what they consider universal and objective moral principles or conventions are a socially constructed aspect of the matrix, and how they can re-imagine and re-establish alternative relations with them.

We developed the seven questions to create a story that prompts participants incrementally to see themselves as historical subjects, see their own entanglement in a hegemonic order, and how this order has influenced their moral and emotional worlds. Second, it prompted them to see how their intuitive moral judgements about the 'other' are reproduced and help sustain an oppressive order in which they enjoy a privileged position. The reflection process throughout the exercise elicited strong emotional reactions, which are integral for moving towards realising points A and B above. The reflection on emotions accompanying the realisation of A and B is important, as participants are supposed to learn for the future how to examine, rather than distrust, their moral intuition. These intuitions are powerful forces often based on principles, which are part of the moral matrix that concurrently helps to sustain a hegemonic order from which they benefit and others suffer. Our method aimed to disrupt participants' moral matrix and the notion of a hegemonic, universal, singular, and ahistorical identity. We focus on this individual positioning, in other words, on how people construct their social identity in a web of conflicting, opposing, antagonistic, or mutually reinforcing codes in the 21st century (Näcke & Park, 2001). The answer to the question 'Who am I?' (identity) refers to fragile and heterogeneous stakes in the political and cultural struggle surrounding hegemony and is key in the debate on the political capacity to act.

Moral intuition and moral reasoning

Traditionally, moral psychologists assumed that moral judgment involved a deliberate process of reasoning and reflection. According to this rationalist approach, emotional reactions associated with moral judgments are caused by moral reasoning and can be changed by altering one's reasoning (Piaget, 1932/1999). Adherents of the intuition-based model advocate something different. Haidt (2001) posits that most judgments and behaviours are formed automatically and with little intention, awareness, or effort (for reviews of the

debate see (Bargh, 1994); (Greenwald, 1995) (Wegener & Bargh, 1998). Furthermore, conscious reasoning is the consequence of these unconscious behaviours and judgments, not the cause thereof. Epley and Caruso (2004) add that 'people reason in ways consistent with what they want or expect to see' (Epley, 2004:179). A growing body of research highlights the complex interplay between automatic/affective and explicit/cognitive mechanisms in moral reasoning, which is contingent on various factors such as consciousness of accountability (Lerner, 1998), motivation to be accurate or unbiased (Kunda & Spencer, 2003), inducement of harm through direct action or omission (Cushman, 2006), and focus on intentions or consequences (Greene, 2017). An on-going debate among psychologists and philosophers, which we do not cover here, is on whether emotions trigger or cause moral judgements. However, we agree with the research that affect and emotions do matter for moral judgements (Chapman, 2013; Damasio, 1994; Horberg, 2011; Prinz, 2007; Tangney, 2007).

Reflection on emotional states or intuition is important, as they are a form of information processing (Lazarus, 1991; Damasio, 1994) that involves a complex synthesis of schemas, memory, sensations, and retrieval of conceptual knowledge. We do not have to view emotions as fully explicit beliefs or clear processes of reasoning to appreciate their cognitive role (Mohanty, 2000). Emotions are what 'we see the world in "terms of" and they encourage specific interpretations or evaluations of the world' (De Sousa, 2001). We maintain that intuition cannot be dismissed as clouding reasoning. Intuitive responses are experienced as 'gut feelings' or a 'sense', for example, something strikes as right or wrong, or it 'feels' like a good time to do something. Given the amount of sensory information we encounter in everyday life, it would be impossible to consciously deliberate everything. Moral intuition includes an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike) that arises effortlessly and has an authority we cannot ignore even when unable to articulate or reason their origins (Haidt, 2001; Railton, 2014). These reactions are based on an assessment of what is good and bad, right or wrong from one's perspective. These automatic egocentric evaluations are then considered valid representations of reality, while opposing viewpoints are considered self-interested distortion (Epley & Caruso, 2004: 178).

The most basic and important decision one can make is deciding whether to approach or avoid a stimulus. Especially in the presence of a personal threat, the functional benefits of rapid responses are obvious (Fazio, 1989). Therefore, the human neural system, which quickly and efficiently evaluates virtually every stimulus encountered, was fashioned through evolution. For example, fear, a basic evaluative response, can occur before neural activation in the centres of higher-order cognition via a direct neural pathway through the amygdala. Epley and Caruso (2004) claim, 'The mere process of perceiving a stimulus entails an

evaluation of that stimulus' (p. 176). This strong link between emotions and moral action explains why people's affective reactions linger, even after their thoughts have changed substantially. Thus, moral judgements comprise two elements of cognition: intuition and reasoning. Moral intuition is powerful, but often so rapid and effortless that it becomes subtle and difficult to identify and understand. However, if accompanied by strong emotional reactions, intuition can surface consciously. At this time, we can weigh, re-interpret, and re-evaluate varying intuitions in relation to our situation, which could re-define our perspectives.

In his description of the phylogenetic and socio-genetic reconstruction of psychic development, Holzkamp examines the relationship between human subjects and the world, and studies the process of meaning-making through an analysis of evolution, history, and culture (Holzkamp, 1983). Similarly, drawing on evolutionary theory and anthropological evidence, Haidt and Joseph (2004) developed the 'universal first draft of human nature', which comprises five universal moral principles found in all cultures. However, different groups and cultures, at different points in history, draw on different principles to define their notions of good. The five moral principles have evolved to address five universal problems of the human condition and evoke different emotional reactions[4].

1. The **care/harm** principle has evolved to respond to the challenge of taking care of vulnerable people. It makes us sensitive to seeing children and others in distress or suffering and relates to norms about care. We condemn violence and cruelty.
2. The **fairness/cheating** foundation has evolved to address the need to maximise the benefits of a relationship with non-kin without being exploited. We are keen to find the best partner who conforms to the norm of reciprocity. We dislike and want to punish people who cheat and exploit others.
3. The **loyalty/betrayal** foundation developed from the need to form and maintain group relationships and coalitions. It makes us identify with our group; trust and praise our in-group members; and hurt, exclude, or kill those who betray us.
4. The **authority/subversion** principle evolved to address the issue of forming relationships that would advance us up social hierarchies and grant us more privileges. We become sensitive about hierarchies, ranks, status, and symbols that showcase one's position in society.

[4] Rather than assuming a singular and universal correspondence between an emotional reaction and moral principle, we consider the above taxonomy useful, as it provides the basic elements to explore the moral concerns and emotions activated in certain circumstances when reasoning about different situations.

5. The **sanctity/degradation** principle developed to help omnivores survive in a world of pathogens and parasites that could spread in physical proximity. It involves the immune system, which also makes us sensitive to different sights, smells, or other sensory reactions that signal the presence of a dangerous pathogenic subject or object. It extends to symbolic threatening objects or subjects such as immigrants, refugees, and homeless people. This foundation prompts us to protect our kin and ourselves from parasites and pathogens as well as threatening subjects. We feel disgusted with people who threaten important group values.

Intuition has evolved from these five adaptive challenges. We react through intuition when any of these principles are violated. In other words, 'we are born to be righteous' (Haidt, 2012). The challenge is how to understand one's righteous nature, as one's moral principles are not necessarily right and notions of right or wrong, moral or immoral vary across geographies and histories.

Eating and food practices: Sanctity and disgust

We structured our exercise around food practices for two reasons. First, today, food is a real and symbolic battleground linked to the global institutional order. The global food and agricultural system raises many ethical issues regarding the status of consumers, producers, animals, and the environment. Physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets dietary needs has worsened in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and South-eastern and Western Asia. In total, 80% of the world's chronically malnourished people are from low-income countries, live in rural areas, and cultivate at least 70% of the world's food (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, & WHO, 2017). The lives of rural farmers in the Global South are undermined by international aid, free trade, restructuring programs, and large-scale land acquisitions.

Second, from birth eating is one of the first activities we engage in. From that moment, the way we interact with people and objects shape our relationship with food. Our family, schoolmates, neighbours, religion, and culture become sites of acculturation into norms and expectations about food preferences and practices. Food is a source of energy that fuels our bodies and minds and satisfies our hunger as well as a source of pleasure. Food and eating are central to our sense of self and subjectivity. Furthermore, different rules and conventions in a socio-cultural system imbue eating practices with meaning and legitimacy. According to Levi-Strauss (Levi-Strauss, 1970), food encapsulates the binary of nature/culture, raw/cooked, food/non-food, and clean/dirty. Food is the transformation of the raw, natural, and pure, and is always dirty in preparation, at

which time it is only hours or days from rotting, (for example, spoiled meat, mouldy bread, and rotten vegetables), threatening to harm our bodies. As such, food is like human flesh, sacred and susceptible to decay (Lupton, 1996). By eating, we transform our bodies and ourselves, engaging in techniques of caring for the self (Foucault, 1985). Food choices and practices are inherent in social groups and tied to cultural identities. Food production, cooking, distribution, and eating are moral processes of the ethical self.

Disgust is linked with food and is a central component of the moral matrix of many cultures (Haidt, 1992). All cultures have food taboos, for example, cannibalism or eating fish or pork, which are among the strongest moral restrictions. In addition, the emotion of disgust acts as a guardian of the soul's purity, protecting sacred values and objects (Rozin, 1990). The sanctity foundation makes it natural for us to consider some things as 'untouchable': in a bad way, because they are dirty and polluted, and in a good way, because they are sacred, which means that we want to protect them from sacrilege. Moral disgust is a major force that triggers strong emotional and behavioural reactions. It can be used to form, maintain, and regulate social cohesion in societies or abused to discriminate, exclude, stigmatise, and hurt outgroups (Curtis, 2011).

In reviewing empirical evidence on the nature and moral significance of disgust, Kelly (2011; Kelly & Morar, 2014), similar to Haidt, claims that it has two functions: health and social. Disgust is a complex emotional response that evolved to protect us from parasites and pathogens, and works through two mechanisms: pathogen avoidance and taste aversion (entanglement thesis). Pathogen avoidance is associated with experiencing nausea and accompanied by physiological responses, facial expressions, immediate retreat, and moving away from the source. Taste aversion is called 'core disgust', and is a cognitive and behavioural approach that involves distancing oneself from the source of contamination and its potential to contaminate.

In addition to the health function, disgust has evolved to also fulfill societal functions. It regulates social interactions and roles related to social norms and group membership. Both individual experiences and social learning influence what people find disgusting, and this flexibility gives rise to the diversity in what different individuals, groups of people, and cultures reject and find disgusting. As a moral intuition, disgust motivates us to comply with social norms that protect sacred values and objects. If we transgress, we feel guilt and shame. If others transgress, we become angry and punish or ostracise them. Violators are perceived as polluted. Our disgust is then directed at the cuisine and invisible markers of potential contamination as well as at the people who embrace these conventions. The violation of these conventions elicits the moral emotions of disgust, anger, and guilt. Disgust plays a major role in political controversies

including abortion, homosexuality, homelessness, and burning flags (Haidt, 2012). In a world in which we are increasingly exposed to different food cultures and movements, food becomes a site of moral restriction.

Seven questions on moral transgressions

In this exercise, we adopted a Socratic approach in our conversations with students to discuss the seven questions on moral transgressions. Through dialogical moves, we used enquiry as a tool for introspection to highlight assumptions underpinning their perspectives without pointing them out. Enquiry opens the dialogue and prompts an evaluation and examination of one's judgements in light of others available. To activate participants' moralities, we asked them seven questions structured around dilemmas and moral judgements, which incrementally built a story. Some were inspired by Jonathan Haidt's research and others constructed by us. In consecutive steps, the questions guided participants from an intra-personal dialogue to an intra-inter-personal dialogue with an 'other', enabling them to see themselves *through* the eyes of the 'other'. The questions were as follows:

1. Would you eat your pet dog if it were randomly killed in a car accident?
2. Is it more ethically justifiable to order a hamburger at McDonalds or a bucket of chicken wings from KFC?
3. Would you eat maggots, rats, or guinea pigs?
4. How do you think Muslims feel about you eating pork?
5. How do you think Hindus feel about you eating beef?
6. How do you think vegans feel about you wearing leather shoes?
7. Imagine the following scenario. An 11-year-old Tibetan girl only recently learnt that some people in other parts of the world wear leather shoes and eat meat. Since then, she cries and prays every night that people one day realise that animals also have souls, as do humans. She decided to go on a pilgrimage to make her prayers heard. How do you think she feels about you?

In questions 1 to 3, the active subject is oneself, i.e. the subject judging, and participants are engaging in an intra-personal dialogue. In questions 4, 5, and 6, the focus changes, and the participant becomes 'passive', becoming the one judged by an 'other'. Thus, an intra-inter-personal dialogue is engaged in. Here, the questions aim to prompt participants to reflect on how others perceive them. Finally, question 7 projects the judgement of the 'other' and prompts participants to reflect on how they feel about the judgement of the 'other'. The challenge is to judge one's ethical self through the eyes of an 'other'.

Method

We carried out the exercise with our students in the UK and the Netherlands as part of our courses on social psychology in two countries. The group in the UK consisted of 35 students and in the Netherlands, 17. Students were all in their final year of their B.Sc. in Psychology. The mean age was 20.34 (SD=3.32). Of the 52 students, 17% (n=9) were male and 83% female (n=43). Regarding ethnic identity, 92% (n=48) identified as white, while the remaining 5 students identified as Chinese (n=1), Caribbean (n=2), Afghani (n=1), and Native American (n=1). The majority of students were born (77% n= 40) and/or raised (71%, n=37) in the UK and the Netherlands.

The procedure consisted of three stages. First, we split the class into small groups of three to four people and then posed one question at a time to them to discuss in their groups. We allowed two to four minutes' discussion for each question. In the second stage, after the groups had discussed all the questions, we discussed each question with them, so that they could justify their answers. As a result, a dialogue took place between the students. As the discussion unfolded, we provided them with information on how the meanings they attach to different food practices have been impacted by geography, territory, and historical conditions. Insofar as the aim of this paper is to present our method and the rationale thereof, we do not provide a rigorous analysis of our findings or assess the impact of our method. Next is a short explanation of the aim of each question, and a discursive summary of students' key justifications for their moral judgements and the historical information we provided in our discussions with them.

	Aims	Moral Principles	Dialogical level
Oneself as active: Doing the judging			
1. Pet dog	To trigger the emotion of disgust and create moral outrage	Sanctity Authority	
2. Burger/KFC Chicken	Contextualisation of the same object: To realise that 'objects' have different meanings in different contexts	Authority	
3. Maggots, rats, guinea pigs	To make tangible the arbitrariness of the social construction and contextualisation of the same object	Authority	Intra-personal
Changing the focus: Oneself as passive, i.e. imagining being judged			
4. Muslims 5. Hindus 6. Vegans	To make tangible the historical and functional elements that shape moral principles	Social convention violations from a different perspective	Intra-personal Inter-personal
Ethical Self: Judging one's own actions through the eyes of the other			
7. Tibetan girl	To probe one's ethical self with regard to a social convention	Link between moral intuition triggered in Q1 and Q7	Intra-personal Inter-personal

Aim I: To trigger the emotion of disgust and create moral outrage via a 'harmless' taboo violation

Q1: Would you eat your pet dog if it were randomly killed in a car accident?

The aim of the first question was to trigger the emotion of disgust and cause moral outrage about what seems to be a social convention. An event is judged as a social convention, rather than a moral obligation, when it does not intrinsically harm others (Turiel, 1983). Eating an already dead animal does not cause intrinsic harm. However, from a Western perspective, participants judged it as morally outrageous and disrespectful to eat a pet, even if it was dead. Most constructed the pet dog as a 'family member', ascribing it a human status, rather than perceiving it as an animal. It is 'som*eone* not somet*hing* you love'. Thus, the idea of eating the dog violates the principles of sanctity and authority (Haidt, 2013), and triggers the strong emotional reactions of disrespect and disgust. Only entertaining the idea of eating one's pet dog was reported as 'repugnant' and 'repulsive'.

Aim II: Contextualisation of the same object to realise that objects may be ascribed different meanings in different contexts

Q2: Would it be more ethically justifiable to order a hamburger at McDonalds or a bucket of chicken wings from KFC?

Here, the authority principle is activated and a social hierarchy formed. While the pet dog is construed as a family member, laying the foundation for the application of the sanctity principle, most students objectify animals they regularly eat. As cows and pigs get 'reduced' to beef or pork, eating and ignoring their 'murder' becomes a social convention rather than violation of the sanctity principle. Students argue that this is 'something most do, as you do not know the cow personally'. In other words, contextualisation of the same 'object', a breathing mammal, means it can be ascribed a different moral status (e.g., moral inferiority), allowing oneself to engage in acts of omissions that would be outrageous and morally condemned in a different context.[5] However, in this context, eating meat is constructed as a social convention.

Aim III: To make tangible the arbitrariness of the social construction and contextualisation of the same object

Q3: Would you eat maggots, rats, or guinea pigs?

[5] Most answers to this question begin with an omission and an unspoken disclaimer: 'The crucial difference is that you do not know these cows and pigs'. This form of discursive manoeuvring allows them to point out the difference without naming the elephant in the room. The way in which they explain the differences implicitly confirms similarity and maintains a state of denial (Cohen, 2001).

Initially, students find the idea of eating maggots and rats 'disgusting', as they associate them with 'corpses' and 'death', and rats with 'diseases' and as 'carriers of germs'. However, guinea pigs are referred to as 'cute pets'. Students reject the idea of eating guinea pigs on the basis that they would barely provide any meat, meaning their slaughter cannot be reasonably justified: 'It would not even be a decent portion'. Here, the authority principle is activated. Using different arguments, students rejected the idea of eating these animals based on hierarchy. Rats are ascribed an inferior moral status on the hierarchy of species and viewed as sources of contamination and disease. However, guinea pigs are considered pets and constructed as superior to the rats. After their initial reactions to these questions, we provided information that in terms of protein levels and texture, maggots are not that different from seafood, prawns, oysters, lobster, or shells. Actually, many cultures consider them as delicacies. Rats, which did carry germs in Europe during the Black Death, are not necessarily 'deadly'. In certain African countries, where rats are a rare delicacy, they are hunted in the countryside through concerted, high-energy group action, as they are difficult to trap. In certain Latin American countries such as Peru, guinea pigs are delicacies and eaten in the same manner as quails in Europe. By providing this information, we prompted participants to reflect on the following three elements. 1) Their initial emotion of disgust is due to their construal of these animals, which are bound to their matrix of cultural norms and customs, and there is no true essence to the animals. 2) While certain social conventions fulfilled a particular function at a particular point in history, today, they are arbitrary. We demonstrated to the participants that we do not question these conventions and cling to them. 3) Their initial moral intuition might be diverting them.

Intra-interpersonal dialogue: Shifting the gaze and seeing one's ethical self through the eyes of an 'other'

Aim IV: To make tangible the historical and functional elements of the social construction and contextualisation of the same object

Q4: How do you think Muslims feel about you eating pork?
Q5: How do you think Hindus feel about you eating beef?
Q6: How do you think vegans feel about you wearing leather shoes?

In these questions, we switch the focus and prompt students to reflect on how the 'other' would judge them on issues constructed as social conventions from their perspective (Questions 2 and 3). We wanted them to realise that in different historical times or different circumstances, different principles or social

conventions serve different purposes. This pertained to the empowering realisation that the world might have been constructed differently. For many students, questions 4 and 5 were difficult to answer, as they had never considered these topics before. They were astonished to learn that Muslims may consider their action 'disgusting' or that Hindus might find it 'awful', as they consider cows holy. However, the majority of students assumed that Hindus and Muslims would not hold strong views about these issues. After their initial reactions to questions 4 and 5, we provided historical information about the prohibition of pork in the Middle East and in Islam. We explained that initially, the ecological argument held. Although pigs were domesticated, they were not suited to dry environments. As the climate changed and became drier, it became too expensive to feed, grow, and sustain pigs, as they ate the same grains as humans. Other animals like sheep, camels, chickens, and cattle ate grass. Thus, ecologically and economically, it made sense to ban pigs. The ban was introduced by Judaism and adopted in Islam. For those Christians in the Middle East who continued the tradition of eating pork, this became an 'identity issue' used to distinguish themselves from other religious groups (Winzeler, 2008). Regarding the prohibition of beef in Hinduism, we also provided information on how practical reasons led people to treat beef as sacred and eating it as a taboo. Cattle are considered sacred in many religions including Hinduism. The ban of beef goes back to milk and other dairy products, which were precious resources. People used dried cow dung as a fuel and fertiliser. For practical reasons, cows were constructed as caretakers, and given a maternal and divine status. People referred to milk cows as *aghnya*, which translates into 'that which may not be slaughtered'. This pastoral emotion towards cows led to their sacredness.

Regarding question 6, participants realised that what may represent a social convention for them (i.e. wearing leather shoes), violates a moral principle for another person if the animal is constructed as having a soul and is killed to produce leather shoes. During the discussions, students acknowledged that 1) they engage in a behaviour that could be condemned outright if one applies different moral principles and does not objectify animals, and 2) they unintentionally violated principles important to others[6]. In imagining the

[6] Students engaged in an 'ethics of intention' rather than applying 'ethics of responsibility' (Weber, 1919). Ethics that focus on individuals' intention upholds the self-image of an ethical self, as it can defend every single action in all circumstances. During the Nuremberg trial, the Nazis defended sending Jews to the gas chambers with reference to themselves as not having had bad intentions. However, an ethics of responsibilities requires the evaluation and judgement of one's own actions by their consequences and effects on others. Essentially, the act is not judged from what came at the beginning (intentions), but by its outcome (consequences).

perspective of vegans, students constructed them as people who refuse to wear leather products based on ethical motivations. From this point of view, the act of wearing leather shoes can only be condemned. However, most students speculated that while vegans have strong ethics, they are not judgemental and therefore do not have strong views against them.

Overall, through arguing about others' judgements of themselves, students acknowledged the different perspectives, but were not willing to accommodate them. As a result, their ethical self did not feel challenged.

Aim VI: To probe one's ethical self regarding a severe violation of a moral principle and link the emotions triggered in Q1 and Q7.

Q7: Think of a 12-year-old Tibetan girl who cries while praying every day for people in the West after hearing that some eat meat almost daily, hoping they realise that animals have souls too. How do you think she feels about you?

Most students did not know how to answer this question, which triggered much silence. Only one or two students could clearly articulate their thoughts: 'From her perspective, it is as if we are eating our pet dogs'. A pet dog was earlier constructed as a 'family member', as someone 'loved' and 'identified' with, who had a soul, and to whom the sanctity principle could be applied. Many participants were shocked by the scenario in the question of the young girl, who views them as engaging in unethical behaviour, eliciting her tears and moving her to pray for them. This is a new perspective for them, as the strong emotional reaction of disgust they felt through the pet dog question still lingered. Bearing in mind their outrage regarding the initial idea of 'eating a family member', we hope that they integrate this emotional experience into their deliberations on the differences between their own and the Tibetan girl's moral matrix and into their reasoning about why the girl morally condemns them.

Discussion

We argued that perspective-taking should not only be understood in terms of imagining the intentions and world of the other, which ultimately silences and suppresses differences. We must also understand how the other evaluates our moral principles and judges our actions, and the implications thereof for our concept of the ethical self. Using a circular approach, we lead the final discussion with participants so that they would ideally realise that seeing themselves

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The effect that a 'focus on intentions' has is as a self-immunised discursive move that no-one could challenge.

through the eyes of the other means that they violate severe moral principles they constructed as universal and natural. Drawing on theories that emphasise the importance of our intuition in moral judgements, the first question aimed to trigger a strong emotional reaction including moral outrage and disgust, which they would remember when the last question was posed. Viewing themselves *through* the eyes of the other, from whose perspective they may not hold an 'ethical self', and realising that they unknowingly and unintentionally sickened others 'down to their stomach', was a new experience for the majority of students. We used this to disrupt their moral matrix, make it visible, and hopefully trigger new intuitions they could draw on in the future to question the purity of the meanings of right and wrong they ascribe to different 'objects', events, and behaviours.

The 'other' is a source of confusion regarding everyday practices. In a global society, we are increasingly exposed to differences; thus, everyday interactions result in interactional breakdowns and meanings are negotiated and experienced on the ground. The goal is not to avoid breakdowns in human relations or overcome our intuition. For us, it is important to learn the skill to handle these breakdowns more intentionally by learning how to suspend and question the automatic intuition we use to understand and judge ourselves and the 'other'. In other words, we must realise how our identities and moral intuitive judgments are embedded in a hegemonic matrix that helps maintain an oppressive order, which ultimately oppresses us. As different groups with different interests and structures worldwide claim their own visions of liberation and contest the dictate of homogenisation that marginalises their subjectivities and sustains an unequal status quo, self-understanding requires the decentralization of one's perspective. This decentralisation is meaningful as a critique of essentialism and an unsettling of universal visions of emancipation that aggregate and reduce plurality to homogeneous identities structured around binaries (left versus right, east versus west, religious versus secular, etc.).

Our exercise aimed to empower participants to enact their 'action potential' through learning how to drop moralism, or their sense of moral superiority, and disrupt the power of the dominant categories that inform their identities and shape an invisible normality. We wanted to show them how this normality is historically, geographically, and socially constructed, and how it encroaches on their everyday lives and practices including food choices. Through this process, the task is to investigate and uncover how their understandings about their identities and everyday morality are interwoven in contradictions of the official societal discourse, so that they can be understood as a specific phenomenon of fundamental societal constellations (Holzkamp, 1994). Our method is a tool that creates pathways to empower subjects to experience their identities as contingent,

coincidental, and changeable. Ultimately, it probes their 'action possibilities'. The skill to step back and explore one's entanglement with one's own perspectives through the concepts of history, geography, and territory can open new forms of dialogue with oneself and the other and develop new forms of solidarity. This solidarity views universality as 'an opening to radical contingency' (Žižek, 2015), grounded in common struggles against the global institutional order.

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