Self-education between everyday conduct of life and biographical sense

Konstanze Wetzel

Abstract
In public debates on education the term “education” is often associated with school education, which due to episodically recurring debates on the results of international pupil’s performance comparison studies as for example “Programme for International Student Assessment” (PISA), “Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study” (TIMSS), is not surprising. However, the reduction of education to abstract learning processes due to the one-sided scientific orientation of the school curriculum is not uncommon. Furthermore, the term education is in part generally rejected with regard to the so-called “idealistic” tradition of “classical” German educational theories or their supposed deployment as an elitist instrument of power. In contrast it is assumed here, in the sense of a verifiable and revisable perception, that education a) refers to people, persons, individuals, subjects, the self – obviously in a societal context; resulting in the context of a twofold story: the individual-biographical history and the societal-epochal history; b) and that it has something to do with “developmental fact” (Bernfeld), that is, how the specific human potential of personal ability to act, reflect, experience and enjoy, results gradually in the perspective of responsible, or emancipated economical, governmental and cultural citizens. How this can be done is dealt with in three aspects, which I consider to be of exemplary importance for a critical social work: (1) Education and corporeality: self-education as an emancipatory sensuality; (2) life management in the area of conflict between generalized and restrictive capacity for action; (3) education and biography: sense - education.

Keywords
biographic sense-draft, everyday conduct of life, existential education, psychosocial conflicts, sense-education, self-education

1 This is a translation of my publication from 2015.
Introductory remarks

In public debates on education the term “education” is often associated with school education, which due to episodically recurring debates on the results of international pupil’s performance comparison studies as for example “Programme for International Student Assessment” (PISA), “Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study” (TIMSS), is not surprising. However, the reduction of education to abstract learning processes due to the one-sided scientific orientation of the school curriculum is not uncommon. Furthermore, the term education is in part generally rejected with regard to the so-called “idealistic” tradition of “classical” German educational theories or their supposed deployment as an elitist instrument of power.

In contrast it is assumed here, in the sense of a verifiable and revisable perception, that education

a) refers to people, persons, individuals, subjects, the self – obviously in a societal context; resulting in the context of a twofold story: the individual-biographical history and the societal-epochal history;

b) and that it has something to do with “developmental fact” (Bernfeld), that is, how the specific human potential of personal ability to act, reflect, experience and enjoy, results gradually in the perspective of responsible, or emancipated economical, governmental and cultural citizens (see Klafki/Braun 2007 chapt.: 7.2, Klafki 19965, 49 et seq.). How this can be done is dealt with in three aspects, which I consider to be of exemplary importance for a critical social work:

1. Education and corporeality: self-education as an emancipatory sensuality; (2) life management in the area of conflict between generalised and restrictive capacity for action; (3) education and biography: sense - education.2

1. Education and corporeality: self-education as an emancipatory sensuality

Firstly, I would like to classify the self-education concept within the approaches to life surroundings3, as it was historically developed in the context of the

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2 In doing so, some argumentation of Braun/Wetzel (2011: Chap. 2) are included and furthered, deepened or supplemented.
3 Another theoretical historical context results from the relationship between the concepts of the “self” and those of “education” in the context of classical German philosophy (and pedagogy) as they had evolved between 1770 and 1830 (see Taylor
phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl understood it as an alternative to the predominantly technocratic and instrumental self-conception of modern (European) sciences. He criticized their single-minded orientation towards the scientific, in particular the common self-conception and the associated irreconcilable distance to the everyday life experiences of the people, which ultimately resulted in the elimination of the subject from the field of research in modern science.

“Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.” (Husserl 1992: §2: 4) This represented the abandonment of questioning the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole human existence. Husserl saw this as one of the causes of the enforcement of German and international fascism and the destruction of European culture and its humanistic traditions (see. Husserl 1992, §§ 8-13).

This critical temporal diagnostic component has often gone unnoticed in the reception of transcendental phenomenology and its life-world approach. More seriously is the fact that an integral part of this life-world approach, that of corporeality (cf. ib., §§§ 28, 47, 60 and 62), has largely been disregarded. This is all the more astonishing, as the subject of this approach is particularly clear. For corporeality is, so to speak, the mediating medium between the physicality and the sociality of man and his lifestyles. 4

We understand corporeality to mean the psychophysical constitution and the behavioral potential found within the human being (brain/nervous system, skeleton/muscles, organs/tissue, skin/sense organs, digestive system and gnomic information), as they have evolved in historical anthropogenesis through the successive transformation of the faunal organism-environment context to the specifically socio-historical human-world context (cf. Rittelmeyer 2002, Chap. 1 and 4 - 6, Schurig 2011: 114 et seq. and Chap. 2.2).

This insight is not fundamentally new, as in the context of experiential pedagogy, this connection has been thematised in many ways. Surprisingly however, these debates have so far only influenced life-orientated social work in a very limited way. For this reason, here are some concise considerations:

Experiences are first to be understood as a direct sensory reference to the world of events. Thereby the sensory reference to the world of events is twofold

a) Experiences as a sensory perception of objective reality.

b) Experiences as spontaneous, emotional assessments of aspects of reality.

1996).

4 Compared to the pedagogical relevance of the concept of corporeality Meyer-Drawe (2001) and Rittelmeyer (2002), a reference should also be made to the articles in Bilstein/Brumlik (2013), even if the concept of the “body” there was favored, but which show a high level of overlap with the corporeality used in my sense.
N.B. a) Sensory perception is the medium of our immediate contact with reality. With it I enter into a relationship with nature and society and myself, as a child and adolescent, but also as an adult and older person. Thus, for example, I perceive the rising and falling noise level during a football game, or I can see how my perception of space changes when scaling a climbing wall.

These senses, tracing back to the sensitivity of the sense organs, are always directed towards a significant division of the world and self, according to my location and my perspective, I perceive its figuration and its outlines, and at the same time spontaneously produce references (e.g. between the nature of a white water and the characteristics of a mountain range). In this respect, our orientation is holistic – without our being conscious of it or making a conscious effort to achieve it. Thus, all immediately relevant aspects are perceived in their reciprocal references (if, for example, I cross a canyon on a rope bridge).

The difference between sensuousness and reflexivity as the key dynamics of an emancipatory sensuousness is therefore never absolute, because it always depends on the knowledge of what I perceive (e.g. I observe interpersonal conflicts in a youth center differently if I know something about gender-specific socialization processes and forms of communication). However, perception and cognition are never identical: I cannot explain certain perceptions at first, they challenge my thinking (e.g. if I observe a solar eclipse for the first time); and conversely, I can anticipate perceptions in the cognitive imagination, before I actually do so in the context of events (e.g. I imagine the sound of music of which I only so far know the musical score).

N.B. b) In every perceptual process, spontaneous evaluations are a measure of our needs and our currently dominant emotional condition (e.g. what I find “cool” within a youth group and what I find “absolutely lousy”). At the same time, our immediate, emotional relation to reality creates our sensuous - vital needs, simply by the necessary need of bodily self-preservation to overcome certain conditions of deficiency. Thus, for example, hunger can be satisfied by a snack in a mountain hut, or by an 8-course menu at Siebeck’s, thirst quenched by pure spring water or by a Rothschild wine vintage 1975, the need for protection against extreme heat or cold by a bunk in an old barge or a fully air-conditioned suite on a cruise ship, etc. In deliberate contrast to my everyday life, I can choose specific deficit or luxury situations – within the possibilities/limits of my own

5 This relationship was controversially discussed in phenomenology from the outset: while Merleau-Ponty (e.g. 2003: 28ff) radically assumed a priority of perception against thought – in the tradition of Kant, Cassirer advocated the contrary thesis of the perception through the concept (cf. the discussions between Cassirer and Husserl Möckel 1998: §12); in contrast, Husserl (1992: §§ 25-3. and 56) adopted a “middle” position – in direct confrontation with Kant.
specific material, social, cultural situation, in order to satisfy my needs and not just an extraordinary experience, but building on this to experience something special.

Contrary to some misinterpretation, luxury also has experience potential, because the good life is not identical with that which is bare (it is, for example, both a luxury and a lifetime experience for children from a “district with special development needs” to fly with a glider or airplane during their summer camp). The opposite of luxury is not poverty, but the common (Coco Chanel).

Vitality, of course, includes sexual needs as a specific moment of interpersonal closeness, familiarity and intimacy, and so a truly emancipatory, in some ways “complete” sensuousness. This insight is often not acknowledged and given the importance it deserves in experiential pedagogy, and also within the profession and discipline of social work.

2. Life management in the field of conflict between generalized and restrictive capacity for action

The idea of emancipatory sensuousness also contains a normative perspective, which can only be fractionally implemented under the conditions of domination and class. I would like to outline here which psychodynamic constellations are thus relevant for life-orientated social work.

2.1. Psychosocial conflicts and ways of dealing with them: psychodynamic processing vs. defense

People do not react to everyday experiences with the same feelings, stimuli, attitudes, expectations, opinions, findings, etc. towards the same conditions (e.g. unemployment of parents, poverty), (as an example: some feel sympathy, others are encouraged to better school performance, others are “cranky” towards their...

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6 Cf. subject-scientific reasoning of the conceptual pair generalized vs. restrictive action capacity and its differentiation conception vs. interpretation, “internalized force” vs. inwardness, Holzkamp 1993: Chap. 7.5, cf. on the general meaning of the critical psychological inter-subjectivity concept for (life-orientated) social work, Braun (2012).
7 Cf. here detailed Holzkamp-Osterkamp (1976: Chap. 4.3. "The nature and origin of motivated and forced life of man", as well as Chap. 5.5. “Reinterpretation of the Freudian concept of the ‘super-ego’ and the identification by the development of the critical-psychological conflict mode: infantile socialization as a process of transformation and defense”), cf. the meaning of this psychosocial conflict model for social-pedagogical action – subsequent to the understanding-concept of Dilthey - Braun/Braun/Gekeler/Wetzel (1989: Chap.2.2).
parents, because they cannot provide them with enough, etc.). Social conditions as such, do not say anything about the psychological processing by the children and adolescents as well as their parents, friends, etc. At the same time, however, their attitudes, expectations, and moods are also not independent of these conditions and thus the chances of social inclusion.

The connection between material and social conditions and the mental state is therefore neither clear nor arbitrary. Rather, it is about analyzing these complex and contradictory interrelationships and making them the guidelines for pedagogic learning and support processes.

First of all, it is necessary to understand the internal, mental processes as a more or less accurate interpretations of the outer, social milieu. They say something about the practical relationship of people towards these conditions, which aspects seem important and beneficial, and which they experience as restrictive and causing anxiety. This subjective-scientific approach is objected to, even today, in parts of the field of social work, the objection being that children and adolescents cannot adequately estimate their emotional condition or the range of their subjective interpretation, and would thus, more or less, need professional help to be socially included. Since this is in their own interest, even if they cannot yet see this at their current stage of development (e.g. in relation to certain requirements of scholastic teaching content and performance assessment procedures). It is already a logical contradiction that one wants to force a person into something that is supposed to be in their own interest – and of course the suspicion arises, that this form of social constraint results in the opposite effect, namely social exclusion, which is concealed by superficial and ostensible adaption processes in certain cases (e.g. striving for improvement in scholastic learning culture, is sometimes replaced by a mere “checking off” of performance requirements).

This basically authoritative, sometimes also openly authoritarian approach cannot be sustained even from the perspective of general psychology or anthropology. After all, children and adolescents are, like all humans, first of all “aimed for society”, they turn to this society voluntarily, want to know what is happening in it, why it happens and what this means for them (e.g. where and why are there wars, which people are rich, and which poor, and why are there such differences?).

The less children and adolescents grow up in a sheltered space, the more they are confronted with ecological and social problems, even catastrophes – whether through the mass media, or through the stories of others, or even through their own concern (e.g. the increasing social indifference in our society). In such cases, general psychological conflicts arise: as a child or adolescent, I turn towards society, which I am curious about, which I want to influence, because I
depend on it. At the same time, I realize that such an influence is very difficult, that many events that I hear, see or experience, frighten me because I feel threatened by them, and at the same time I only have little hope that the causes of anxiety (e.g. the extreme work stress of my parents that they and I suffer from) can be alleviated any time soon, or can be overcome. In this respect anxiety is not somehow “irrational”, but the true negative emotional assessment of a life circumstance and situation, in which I feel or know I am objectively threatened.

The psychical development thus always unfolds in the polar tension between joy and fear, between confidence and suffering, between hope and despair. In other words, social inclusion within the conditions of a pluralized class society is not an easy, smooth process, but is confronted with numerous obstacles. Thus, this results in psychological conflict dynamics with the following alternative constellation:

On the one hand, I know what I would like to be and to have, what I would like to do, what is important for me, and I also know some ways that I can achieve this (e.g. how I can enjoy school lessons more, how I can improve my performance and so can perhaps fulfill my wish to learn a certain profession – like a pilot or designer – and later get a job). On the other hand, I know from my own experience and that of others that the realization of my interests and needs is difficult, and will be confronted by many obstacles (e.g. that ways to improve the atmosphere when learning in school are full of conflict, that they may meet the resistance of certain teachers who then “have it in for me”, that training places on offer are rather confusing, and the future of the labor market is quite unpredictable).

These obstacles thus threaten my developing needs and anxiety arises. In the state of anxiety, however, I am quite incapable of acting or deciding and feel blocked. When faced with these difficulties and in order to remain socially included, I am confronted with the alternative of either sticking to my developmental needs and expectations of happiness and keep looking – despite failure – for new ways to implement and reach them in spite of all obvious and hidden obstacles; or, this is all too much for me, too difficult, too dangerous, too exhausting and I quite voluntarily give up. I then look for goals that are not so demanding, that are simpler, reachable with less conflict, I “make do” with less, become “modest” and “realistic”, so that I do not end up ultimately empty-handed – and console myself precisely in order to justify my lack of commitment to my own interests and needs, to myself and others - why I therefore prefer the many “small solutions” to the one “big solutions” (Andersch).

In this context, the following facts are of particular importance: it is part of the essence of childhood and adolescence to be particularly dependent on adults and their world, to be in need of their protection and support in order to
increasingly relativize this dependency, and finally abolish it. The interactional relationship between children and their parents, between pupils and their teachers, between the members and the (older) leaders of a youth group in an organization or club, etc., form a development framework that must be appropriate for their individual interests, needs, competences and readiness. And which must constantly change, so that the adolescents can finally become fully-fledged responsible, economic, and cultural citizens.

This, however, is opposed by diverse resistances - conveyed in a societal-structural and institutional way – by various groups of adults. Thus, in an authoritarian parental home a girl especially is constantly burdened by being called on extensively to do housework, and so she not only neglects her school work, but also her friendships and becomes increasingly socially isolated, and as a consequence feels misunderstood, not taken seriously, and lonely. At the same time, she loves her parents, even though they overhear and ignore her “complaints”. So, the girl faces the difficult psychological alternative of either insisting on increasing independence and so risk losing the emotional affection of her parents and perhaps be perceived as an “ungrateful daughter”. This triggers anxiety. She can then, however, also look for friends of the same age and/or adults, who are understanding towards her growing requirements, who support her emotionally and provide an emotional cushion, comfort and encourage her to remain true to herself. Or, the girl forgoes these wishes for greater independence and increased social inclusion, tries to adapt herself to the existing interactive development frame, to relativize her own needs and interests (“This is not so important to me”) and to give in, in order to minimize conflict, to “soft-pedal”, because otherwise she must realistically fear that her situation may become more stressful and possibly unbearable. Here, it would be necessary to ask if the empirically frequently established sociality of girls is not the expression and result of such restrictive adaption processes.

In the first case, we talk about conflict processing, because the conflict in its severity is cognitively and emotionally perceived, individual interests and needs and their justification are further acknowledged, and ways are sought for their demanding and realistic realization. The opposite of this can be found in the second case, conflict resistance: here I give in; I deny my requirements and perspectives even though they are really important to me. And, at the same time, I make an attempt to persuade myself and others into believing that it is much better for me this way, and that “you have to be realistic and forget your childhood dreams”, etc. In this case, it is quite clear to me as the person affected that I do not believe this justification myself, it is only an excuse, I only want to comfort myself, but in reality, it is a lie. It is exactly this psychological state of uncertainty that cannot be maintained for a longer period. It leads to a clear
limitation of the ability to act, to reflect, to be ready and able to enjoy, and leads to psychosocial insecurity becoming dominant.

Therefore, as an additional alternative constellation, the possibility arises that I am either more aligned to my acknowledged needs and looking for new ways of realizing them; or, I tighten the process of resistance and after a certain time no longer am aware or conscious of what I originally wanted, why I did not deal with this conflict and why I withdrew.

This transition from the preconscious to the unconscious psychological conflict of my everyday life and biography involves not only the systematic suppression of my former interests and needs, but also the psychological suffering about the fact that I have now abandoned a higher level of self-determination and social inclusion. In this context, to talk about psychodynamic conflict defense makes sense, because it “goes deeper”, and at the same time is not external to the person concerned, although they know little about this. The particular difficulty and challenge of processing a pedagogical – dialogical problem, results from the fact that these unconscious processes are something like psychological processes of “another”, a “third person” within me. These are the psychodynamics of the self-alienation processes. This also results in the development tension that the affected people, the children and adolescents, can only know themselves which problems they actually have, but they themselves do not (sufficiently) know, because otherwise these problems would lack such severity.

The authoritarian tendency of some pedagogues to act in an interventional way instead of dialogically, because of allegedly “better knowledge” or because of supposed “life experience” or even because they have the authority to do so, can also always be interpreted as an escape from this challenge to a deeper understanding of the psychodynamics of socially induced suffering. In this sense, Burkhard Müller characterized the “black pedagogy” as an expression and result of uncontrolled closeness in the pedagogic context (cf. Müller, 2006. 143).

3. Education and biography: sense-education

3.1 Everyday conduct of life in the field of tension between everyday routine and “real life”

The living environment is at first centered on everyday life, and this is the foundation of world and self-reference of the subjects; at the same time, the self-socialization process always contains more or less developed forms of self- and world - drafts. This tension between reference and view constitutes the core of
sense education and thus personal social integration for the following reasons (cf. also Braun, 2003):

a) It has already been intensively referred to by Husserl (1992: §§ 28f and 34) that the life surroundings of the subject are self-evident; however, this unquestioned intimacy is a *secondary naturalness*, because it is based on a complex subjective work of construction. Everyday life particularly requires,

- that the diversity and inconsistency of societal requirements (e.g. of work, family and school) “bring about” a cyclical recurring everyday life and therefore build correlating *structures of relevance* (“What is important?”) and develop time budgets (“How much time do I need for this?”).
- This also needs a corresponding *level of coordination* of people with whom I share my everyday life (e.g. parents, siblings, and friends) and a group identity based thereon.
- All this is to be consolidated into *practical routines* and intersubjective obligations that become more and more natural, but at the same time reproduce collective forms of life (social problems always occur at this level when complex coordination efforts [cannot] be – sufficiently – performed anymore).
- The uniformity of everyday life indeed *relieves* the need for permanent decision-making, but also creates the feeling of *boredom* (“Is that all?”) and its *timelessness* is broken by the limitation of individual life by death. To the extent that the irresolvable tension of *world time* and *life time* (cf. Blumenberg 2001: 86 et seq. and 257 et seq.) is cognitively experienced and emotionally admitted to, the actual search for sense as an open educational process and transcendence of the ordinariness of the life surroundings begins. This means on the other hand, that social problems (can) also arise, that people are so busy coming to grips with their everyday life, that they (apparently) cannot afford the “luxury” of essential questions, and thus are in danger of “becoming hollow on the inside” and therefore possibly susceptible to being manipulated (e.g. by consumerism as a replacement for sense or esoteric tendency or right-wing populist interpretations and movements).

b) Individuals can in fact not leave their own everyday life, but they can exceed the range of its interpretation and the interaction zone of its pattern of behavior by placing themselves in a conscious relationship to this
everyday dimension of the world of life, learning to question the secondary naturalness step by step, and so becoming increasingly conscious of the necessity of the cognitive and emotional - motivational justification of their own actions (Husserl 1992: §§ 38, 40 and 49). In this way, they gradually establish their own biographical life plan, which at the same time interlocks the individual biography with the collective life forms and establishes relations to the overlapping structures of the objective world and so to the time of the world. – Or, in other words: the living environment is characterized by its half-transcendence, in which everyday life (in the sense of a naive “normality”) superimposes with the normativity of a more successful life in a just society.

For this reason, sense-education as the core of social inclusion is a two-sided process of personal and collective development and learning, through which the self- and world-consciousness expand; in this respect, the living environment is closed and open, obvious and dubious and its rationality is measured by the extent to which it suggests and supports a post-traditional self-identity. – Social problems arise, if these sense plans are either removed from social and personal reality, become hardened and dogmatic, thus making people insecure and helpless in the face of the dynamic of social change (although they should promote the exact opposite, namely orientation safety and decision making ability); or if the patterns of personal action become increasingly random and arbitrary, and people try to adapt in an opportunistic way to a wide range of systematic and life-world requirements and expectations, and are still able to maintain a balance of capacity for action and the joy of life.

Cf. Habermas (1988; 190 et seq.197 and 205 et seq.), in terms of the “internal context between structures of the living surroundings and structures of the linguistic image of the world…, language and the cultural heritage take, in a certain way, a transcendental position against all that can become part of a situation. Language and culture neither agree with the formal cosmic concepts with which all communication participants define their situation together, nor do they appear as something internalized. Language and culture are as such constitutive for the living surroundings. Neither do they build one of the formal worlds, which the communication participants assign parts of situations, nor do they meet as something in the objective, social or even subjective world. The communication participants move by acting out or understanding language use so much within their language that they cannot bring a current utterance as something intersubjective before them in a way as they would experience an incident as they would meet a behavioral expectation as something normative or a wish, would experience or categorize a feeling as something subjective. The medium of communication remains in a strange half transcendence.” (Habermas 1988:190)
3.2 Existential education: the search for the sense of being human and for one’s own life

The increasing self-evident nature of everyday behavior causes the real illusion of timelessness, of the “keep it up” and so also of one’s own “immortality”. However, at the latest stage in the transition from childhood to adolescence the tension between everyday routine and the biographical claim to the realization of “real life” (classical: the claim to happiness) comes fully to bear:

“From the character of everyday cyclicality as a vehicle of elementary life security, it is clear that everyday life cannot be the whole life for me. Although it is the basis for everything else, through it my existential anxiety is repressed, in other words it has got my back: The ‘real’ - productivity, intoxication, happiness, sense fulfillment, joint struggle - is, however, perhaps somehow in its creases, but quasi vertical to the cyclicality of the way of life: in this way, the everyday troubles of that which is always the same are bearable, indeed, they are pushed to the edge by the consciously filling breadth of ‘real life’. This may be a dynamic in the direction of the real transgression of everyday life, defiance of its regulations, ignoring its daily requirements – with the risk of perhaps not finding the way ‘back’ again and so losing the elementary basis from which the ‘real’ can yet grow. On the other hand, the monotony of ‘everyday drabness’ (...) can for me consciously gain breadth, and so the resigned to despairing question imposes itself on me, why, what should I get up for every morning, because (...) life is really only a ‘burden’ for me.” (Holzkamp 1995: 845)

This charged relationship can intensify in the phase of adolescence when I learn biographically about the temporal limitation of my existence and thematize my own mortality. Thus, I become aware of the fact that not only the “human as such” is mortal, but that I, in my own unique existence will die, and that with my death my personal microcosm will cease to exist. As a result, the cognitive and emotional challenge results in treating my lifetime in a meaningful, reasonable, conscious way. In other words: everyday life with its synchronicity and cyclicality is almost timeless, it is reliable because nothing crucial changes and so it relieves me of a constant pressure to make decisions (e.g. I don’t have to decide every morning if or when I get up, if and what I eat for breakfast, if and when I go to school). To this extent, it is timeless – and yet this timelessness is a real semblance, because it conceals not only the subjacent societal and social changes that also refer to my everyday life (e.g. new requirements in school or new educational pathways after school), but also that with my death my everyday life simply expires. Individual death is a significant challenge, it is a, if not “the”, central source of meaning, for nothing is more boring, more “deadly”, than immortality. Because then I could do everything at any time, I would never miss
anything, I could always make up for it (e.g. start a relationship, learn a new profession, emigrate, move back home, etc.). This would also abolish the spatial-temporal integration of everyday life as well as the view of one’s self and the world.

In summary, I would like to conclude:

Self-education and learning processes are realized within the field of tension of mental-linguistic, bodily and personal-biographic situatedness. Education takes place in the context of the individual biography – always as a penetration of the overall social interdependence of my individual life and livelihood – in the field of tension of the past, the present and the future, whereby the present is perceived in the field of tension of biographical past and future, of experiences and expectations, and the past as the future past, and the future as the future past. This biographical situatedness demonstrates the necessity of developing personal relevance structures with regard to the educational and learning processes to be subjectively pursued on the basis of subjective decisions. (Cf. Holzkamp 1993:263 et seq.).

The inter-subjectivity or reciprocity of such an understanding of education is inherent, and this is a thoroughly social concept:

“It is only through the personal situatedness of others – by being the other for the others, we recognize each other as subjects, whose principles of action are fundamentally mutual to each other – also my situatedness is that of this particular individual, in the way in which “I stand here”. From this perspective, personal situatedness is, precisely because in this case my own condition in the world is brought into the concept in its possibilities/limits – because the mutual constitution of my world – and self-experience by which the other is compulsorily included – a genuine social concept.” (Holzkamp 1993: 264)

Bibliography


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