What we can learn from Karl Marx on (child) competence or: On the relation between childhood studies and Critical Psychology as subject science

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Abstract
Against the everyday education furor, Childhood Studies have advanced the idea of child competence, a concept which Critical Psychologists – from a Marxist, subject-science perspective – have related to the contradictions of capitalist society and the “pathology of the normal” (“Till you’re so fucking crazy you can’t follow their rules,” John Lennon). Referring to the concept of agency, which draws attention to the power-mediated relation between abilities for and obstacles to action, this paper will discuss how contradictions of development or of action can be understood from the standpoint of the child and how, instead of setting limits, solidarity of action can be developed across generations in common processes of learning and change.

Keywords
childhood studies, Critical Psychology, subject development, education criticism, agency

1. Setting Limits: The concept of the educandus and his a-social nature

About 25 years ago, in the first issue of the Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie, Rolf Oerter (1987: 20) presented the child as “educandus,” that is as someone to be educated. Oerter used the male form, but girls—who, as we all know, can also be unruly and thus require education—were certainly meant, too. In any case, Oerter found that children as those to be educated were objects insofar as they were the “objects” of “pedagogical efforts”; they only became
subjects as a result of these efforts. This was a dialectic contradiction that could not be resolved “in favor of the subject relation (“Subjektbezug”).”

In the following, I will show that it is a fallacy to think of humans as objects, even if one strives to influence them, and even if those other humans are children. To be clear, I am not trying to deny important differences between adults and children, especially young ones, with respect to their cognitive abilities or their agency in the world—but these differences are not ones between subject and object.

While the type of pedagogical psychology promoted programmatically by Oerter thinks of the child as a being to be educated, Honig et al. (1999: 16) advance a Childhood Studies perspective—as a “turn from an understanding of the child as and educandus […] to an understanding of the child as a person with her own right” (my translation), a turn that was “paradigmatic” in concerning the foundation of thinking about children.

Oerter’s idea of education is not only marked by the idea that a newborn child has to learn quite a lot; this is as clear as it is undisputed. What is at the bottom of this confrontation, I think, is rather the idea associated with pedagogical thinking, but also popular far beyond the discipline, that children have to be taught a certain social usefulness against their supposed pre-social or a-social nature (whether that nature is romanticized or vilified). The structural functionalist Talcott Parsons thus approvingly reported the idea of newborns as an invasion of barbarians: “What has sometimes been called the ‘barbarian invasion’ of the stream of new-born infants is, of course, a critical feature in any society” (1951: 208) – although he conceptualized socialization as a lifelong task (in relation to role expectations). That social existence is a struggle against human nature, which turns into close combat in education, was also the belief of the Marxist Gramsci: “In reality each generation educates the new generation, i.e. forms it, and education is a struggle against instincts linked to the elementary biological functions, a struggle against nature, to dominate it and create the ‘contemporary’ man of the epoch.” (1999: 284). Here, too, being educated is conceptualized as lifelong attendant circumstance of human existence. As much as both authors differ in their perspective – functioning within society vs. its fundamental transformation – they are united in their notion of the child as educandus to be restrained; a notion also shared by psychoanalysis and its idea of an un-social nature of drives.

The current, everyday and “how-to” guidebook version of this notion is articulated in the expression that developing children need to be set limits. But if one observes development from the—assumed—perspective of the child: does not their entire existence amount to a liberation from paternalism, from
protection, which always also involves control—and thereby also to the necessary resistance to “limit-setting”?

2. Development to the pathology of the normal

Change of scenery. Charles Bukowski once wrote that (almost) everyone is born a genius and buried an idiot (1969: 161). Is this development to be seen as the result of constant limitations? Bukowski is not at all alone in his position. The reform pedagogic Berthold Otto thought:

“No child, every one without exception, is a genius up until age six. In a sober psychological examination, all criteria of the genius return in every child,” namely: “the suddenness of insight, the volatility of thought, the inability to steer the mind into certain mental channels, […] the sovereign independence of thinking, which through various interferences with the conventional world order gives rise to our lament over ‘outrageous misbehavior’ (“Ungezogenheit”), over the ‘incredible obstinacy’ of children.” (quoted after Honig 1999: 36, my translation)

Whereas Otto seems to conceptualize limit setting as an interfering variable of development, John Lennon, in his song “Working Class Hero,” directly addresses the consequences of limit setting and fencing in: “As soon as you’re born they make you feel small,” with the aim “till you’re so fucking crazy, you can’t follow their rules.”—“Fucking crazy”: Lennon addresses (the attempt at) the idiocy of observing rules that, following Bukowski, we carry to our grave; the idiocy of normalcy, so to say— or, more elegantly put, in psychoanalytic terms: the “pathology of normalcy” (Leithäuser & Volmerg 1988: 16), the suffering of adaptation, which however is contradictory, as it is also meant to secure success. To once again quote John Lennon: “There’s a room at the top they are telling you still, but first you must learn how to smile as you kill, if you want to be like the folks on the hill”—implying that, if you want to get ahead, you have to adapt to the vermin up there, to bend over. Against this pathology of normalcy, Leithäuser and Volmerg argue, the cognitive interest of psychoanalytic social psychology has to consist in “examining social institutions and their complex relationship, which serve to prevent the outbreak of sociopathic dysfunctions or to promote it” (1988: 17–18, my translation).

Summing up the positions I reviewed, we can conclude: Whether education is a close combat against nature, the disruption of the development of a genius (in which Honig sees an “almost lyric child cult” [1999: 37]) or the repressive adjustment to the pathology of the normal (deviations of which are again
pathologized [Ulmann 2008] or medicalized [Wolf-Kühn 2010])—it will be hard to claim that competence can develop beyond the attendant contradictions. But what is, then—against this background and abysses—“competence,” what is, in these contradictions, “child competence,” which has to or should be assumed as possible, if one wishes to take children seriously, as both Childhood Studies and Critical Psychology intend?

3. Competence—in the contradictions of the capitalist society of competition

In that way, I have come closer to my topic, what we can learn from Karl Marx on competence. This is because the name of “Karl Marx” stands for the analysis of societal contradictions in which we move, and which also show through with Bukowski, Otto and Lennon. The reference to Marx stands for the perspective of a free development of everyone (as the condition for the free development of all) and the critique of conditions in which man is a despicable being. In capitalist society, marked by competition, “competence” means not only but also to assert oneself against others at their expense (the free development of one as the bruises of the other). Competence moves between smart coping in the jungle of competition and the—solidarian—engagement with it. What are the attending psychological effects of each? But above all: how do children relate to this alternative? If one therefore wants to take children seriously, take into account child competences and promote them, one has to be aware of these contradictions—in common processes of learning and change of children and adults.

From a formal or general point of view, competence can be seen as “readiness and ability of subjects to self-organize processes of learning and development” (Bescherer & Wille 2010: 1375); but it does not realize itself in a vacuum, it encompasses active adaptation to requirements also set by others—despite an expected personal responsibility. Competence can mean functioning in conditions as well as the understanding of social contexts; as such, it has to be the object of political reflection (Bürgin 2013: 67 and 100ff).

Moreover, competence is a term that at least today, as Reutter puts it, “condemns” the individual “to incessant pursuit.” “He has the chance of developing throughout his life; but he has no prospect of completing the development processes, in a certain manner he remains infantile” (2009, quoted after Bescherer & Wille 2020: 1376; my translation). This means: the development of competence finds no (natural) biographic end, and it is also not child specific; more so, from this perspective our entire life suddenly appears as
“childhood.” For our purposes here, this is remarkable because in Childhood Studies papers there is often talk of understanding children not (only) as “becoming” but also as “being” (cf., Greene & Borkowski 2008: 51), while Honig et al. (1999: 14) note that this is not necessarily a “depreciative phrase.”

In any case, for proponents of Childhood Studies, the point is to understand children as members of society and as participants in it, not as individuals who do not yet belong. Nonetheless, I consider this programmatic statement problematic, since in our existence and being-as-we-are, thus as “beings,” we are always also “becoming.” Even more, especially in our intergenerational relationships, we are challenged in our being adults as those becoming. From a Critical Psychology perspective, another point is to be added: pinning people down to a being generally carries the danger to interpret their actions as the result of characteristics, thereby pinning people down to this, instead of trying to discover, together with them, their specific reasons for their action in the specific situations of their lives (Holzkamp 1985).

But this very intention, to understand actions as situation-bound, is part of the Childhood Studies program, which in the following I will take up in the facets that seem important to me, and which I will relate to psychological, or rather critical-psychological, also developmental-psychological ideas, in an effort to achieve or promote a productive discussion.

I will advance the argument that, first, the core demand of Childhood Studies for the participation of children in concrete historical situations is compatible with Critical or subject-science psychology both theoretically and methodologically. Second, I will present some ideas from subject-science developmental psychology, which may be useful to Childhood Studies research. Third, I will sketch out how a subject-science approach is generally opposed to the idea of an “educandus.”

4. Research from the standpoint of the subject - with adults and children

It is a general demand of Childhood Studies research not to research children but with them, that is, to bring to bear their perspective (Honig 2009). I think this not only applies to children but should apply to all humans that are or get involved in psychological research: Critical Psychology research sees itself as psychological research “from the standpoint of the subject,” in a literal sense: Individual subjects are not to be researched, but participate in the research themselves. The object of research are not (other) individuals, but the world as it is experienced by the individuals, instead of asking how the world affects the individuals, which would mean thinking of them as objects.
Such research from the standpoint of the subject includes that the relationship between those involved is as symmetrical and equal as possible. Against this background, we call those not professionally involved in the research process “co-researchers.” This relationship between “researchers” and “co-researchers” is in no way static, since the respective competences shift during the research process—and have to, since and to the extent that “co-researchers” and “researchers” have to qualify themselves (Markard 2009:247ff): the professional “researchers” by, for example, getting to know the living circumstances of the “co-researchers” that are relevant for the problems at issue. The “co-researchers,” for example, by engaging with thematically relevant concepts, if they want to use the research for their life practice. For the ideas and theories developed in the course of such research are to serve for the self-reflection of those involved, that is: they are meant to contribute to a better analysis of the problems in their lives and to a possible resolution. Insofar, this type of research is action research, which relates its insights from the interrelation of recognition and change in everyday practice.

This alone creates the necessity of another theoretical-methodological demand, advanced by both Childhood Studies and Critical Psychology: The scientific inclusion of the concrete living circumstances of those involved: Critical Psychology insists that living circumstances do not simply consist of the relevant situation, but also of societal structures in which such situations are embedded: Thus, in school classes, there are individual situations between children and between teachers and children; but an understanding of the arising dynamics cannot (only) be developed by looking at the concrete situation; rather, we also need to know the school system and its function in the social structure. “Structure” here means the system character of societal life (re)production that in general is independent of the individuals, their actions and the concrete situations. We therefore have to take account of the specificity of human existence by not only considering or deciphering situations but also the societal structures in which the situations are embedded: Without the analysis of societal structures, the “situations,” too, will remain uncomprehended (cf. Markard 2009: 152, 162).

5. Analysis of conditions, meanings, premises and reasons

Starting from this relationship between situation and structure, Critical Psychology proposes to distinguish between conditions, meanings and premises: conditions refer to the objective-economic life circumstances, meanings point to the extent to which these conditions create opportunities for and obstacles to
action, while premises finally mean those aspects of meaning that an individual accentuates for herself for her specific reasons. This takes account of the fact that the individual cannot “directly relate to ‘society’ … as a ‘whole’” (Holzkamp 1983a: 196, my translation), but only with the sections available to them, such as their position in an intergenerational relationship, their job, household, “free time”, romantic relationships, education, “hobby,” work in associations or parties. The individual person is not only working a specific job or is being out of work, he is also single or not, has children or not, a sick grandma or not, is “head over heels” or not, etc. If one wants to think about real sensitivities and opportunities for or obstacles to action, these aspects cannot be left out. This is why the—interdisciplinary—social theory analysis of life circumstances is indispensable for psychology, “while its concrete psychological meaning has to be proven from the standpoint of the subject” (Markard 2009: 151).

It is obvious that such a psychological perspective has to rely on interdisciplinary references, since the analysis of societal contexts cannot be achieved with psychological research and methods. This also means becoming involved with competing sociological, economic, political science approaches and to differentiate the “sociological perspective in Childhood Studies” (Hungerland 2008, my translation) by whether this perspective is critical or rather affirmative—as Dörre et al. (2009:12) point out, when they seek to “promote” the “return of critique to Sociology.”

6. Agency and restrictive arrangements: Grasping contradictions

Against this background, I will now refer not to the concept of competence, but with the wider concept of agency, which focuses more on the relationship of opportunities for and obstacles to action, in particular with respect to how these relate to relations of power and dominance, or rather how these societal constellations of dominance and power “enter” into the pores of individual life praxis—whether the individual realizes this or not. This raises the question what if can be subjectively functional to renounce the expansion of possibilities for action and to arrange oneself with limiting circumstances. This means deciphering how and why those involved to not seize opportunities for action, which risks they are avoiding, to which extent the dangers that resistance implies seem greater than the perspectives it might open up, which previous experiences make them come to this conclusion. Which ideological offers are available to them? How are unruly impulses for action warded off? Which social support or constraints are present? Which compromises are made, at whose expense? Which experiences led to which resignations? Do I prefer the bird in the hand or the two
in the bush? Which emotions do I feel to be overwhelming, which do I feel I need to control, which are considered (in)appropriate by others?

In this respect, it is interesting to note that Marx, when in 1844 he used the phrase of “loveliest appearance” (“liebenswürdigsten Schein”) with which others are “conned” (“geprellt”) to analyse the specificity and ambiguity of emotions in capitalism (547), asked questions that are still relevant. Examples for such analyses are those by Ottomeyer (1976) on “empathy,” in the “capitalist” (197ff) and the “late-capitalist reproductive process” (218ff). In 1983, Hochschild published her analyses of emotion management (using the example of stewardesses); also in 1983, Holzkamp summed up the emotional aspects of “instrumental relationships” (“Instrumentalbeziehungen”, 1983a: 402ff). What these analyses with their different categorical references have in common is the question of the psychological cost of the “loveliest appearance,” the question of how and whether emotions should or have to be advertised or hidden, definitely controlled, in professional or private settings, and to which extent individuals understand the relevant ambivalences (with respect to their societal dimension) (Kaindl 2008; see also Markard 2009: Ch. 11).

I find those types of question interesting as research questions, because they—in specific ways—relate to both children and adults.

And because this is the case, child competence or agency, too, has to be seen as more or less contradictory and fractured. I want to illustrate this with an example of Beatrice Hungerland (2008: 86): “Children have their own way of expressing themselves, and the point is to accept this: They are not worth less just because they have had less time in life to learn how one gains an advantage in the most clever way” (my translation). The discussion that could follow here is what it would mean to “gain one’s advantage in the most clever way,” at whose expense this is done, and which possibilities for solidarity are left out. Put differently: This demonstrates how children’s ways of acting and thinking are also confronted with societal traps. For example, if someone gets good grades in school she also gets them because she doesn’t cheat by helping others in forbidden ways; getting along in school always also means getting along in circumstances that are also marked by selection and competition.

This is why we cannot simply and seamlessly counter the contradictions in our society with a progressive intention, attitude or practice, and therefore also not with a seamless support of children (Holzkamp 1983b). This would be the illusion that wrong life could be lived rightly (“Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen”, Adorno 1951: 42). But that does not mean that there is nothing that is right or reasonable. Progress, reason and humanity rather consist of realizing the contradictions of society, of one’s own practice, or in the lives of children (and to draw the consequences). To use Gramsci’s words: “The philosophy of practice
[i.e. Marxian philosophy, MM] does [...] not aim at peacefully resolving the contradictions existing in history and in society, but is, to the contrary, the theory of these very contradictions” (1995: 1325, my translation)—a crucial aspect of what we can learn from Karl Marx on child competence—or, more generally, on agency.

7. Subjective necessity of control and child-specific premise situations

Children, just like adults, seek to make their life circumstances disposable, to become able to act and in that sense “free.” Psychologically, this expresses itself mainly as the “experience of the limitation of agency, which is tantamount to the subjective necessity of overcoming this limitation” (Holzkamp 1983a: 241, my translation).

Against this background, development can be understood as the alteration of a condition experienced as problematic, in the direction of expanding one’s power of disposition. It follows, also, that agency is not a goal of development that is eventually reached or completed, but has to be understood as a permanent process.

However, from an external perspective, we cannot determine what the subjectively necessary step of another person, also of a child, is. Children and adults may even be unsure about this themselves. As a rule, psychology has to deal with the fact that in critical situations, the reasons and consequences of our actions are not obvious, but that we have to figure them out against superficialities, self-deception, etc. Intersubjectively, that is, between adults, between children and between children and adults, the aim in such situations can only be to contribute to understanding and clarifying given contradictions between reality and possibilities, with the goal of developing the subjectively necessary next step for the individual person concerned.

This includes figuring out or developing the premises (as explained above, as subjectively accentuated meanings of action). In this way, strongly development-psychological considerations come into play: What do the premises of small children look like?

On the physical level, let us first consider the infamous colic of newborns, which are abominable not because they involve terrible pain, but because to a newborn, who does not know their temporary character and therefore cannot anticipate their passing, they must appear as its mode of existence, an atrocious moment of helplessness, which is related to a “not yet” of development-psychological relevance.
Further, I want to use the example of the power outlet to explain the problem of child relations to meanings / premises (see also Ulmann 1987: 151–152). If somebody said the meaning of a power outlet was to look like a stylized pig’s nose, we would understand this as a joke. (Take the cartoons of pigs standing before power outlets, saying: “Come out, coward!” or “Who walled you in, you poor bastard?”) This is because we know the meaning of a power outlet, to the extent that we know its function, that is, to the extent that we know what it is made for. Power outlets have a (societal meaning) resulting from the fact that they substantiate, if you will, specific human intentions. In everyday life it is immaterial how deeply we have internalized the electric functional relations; it is enough that we know that a blender will work and will only work if we plug it into an outlet—but not if we plug it into a button with big buttonholes: and: We know that we should not play around in an outlet with knitting needles.—At a certain age, children do not know that yet—and we certainly prevent them from making an experience with the knitting needles in the power outlet, which they will never be able to repeat, as Gisela Ulmann likes to say (see also Ulmann 1987:100). Of course, power outlets can still also be used as a target for knitting needles, even though they are not made for that. We could also say that this is an unspecific (and in this case fatally dangerous) use of power outlet holes.

Children at first experience societal meanings in such an unspecific or unspecified way, and they therefore cannot understand why they are kept away from power outlets. In a way, this can be compared to a situation where we encounter objects of a foreign culture, of which the sense objectified in them is not accessible to us.

As to the power outlets, there are two levels in which children do not understand adult prohibitions: first, as a blind fact: as an early crawler, I am somehow removed from certain corners of the room; to the extent that I have started understanding that humans differ from other circumstances by the fact that they have intentions, I can also experience the prohibition as a specific injury, because I cannot yet understand the reasons that adults have for their prohibition. This also means: the interpersonal relations are not symmetrical in that I cannot yet guess the objective content of the prohibition and therefore also cannot know the difference between arbitrariness and factual reason; I have to experience everything as arbitrary, as long as I cannot understand the sense of object meanings.

In the biographic development of children, specific contradictions therefore arise from the fact that a child’s efforts at expanding her power of disposal meet limitations, which result from/ are limited by the fact that it cannot understand the actions of others or, rather, the meanings relating to them. It can react aggressively, but also keep its aggressions to itself, in order to retain the favors of
the adults experienced as arbitrary. Possibly, a child will already develop a sense of guilt from reacting aggressively to the also “kind” adults, which would mean that preforms of restrictive entanglements can develop (which were hinted at above in relation to the contradiction of adaptation). The preform character of the restrictiveness lies in the fact that the child has no real alternative of changing the conditions yet. It can neither understand the interpersonal situation, not can it extricate itself from the framework of dependency; even if—as in cases of extreme neglect—it can leave the familiar framework, it will enter new (institutional) conditions of dependency, which also demonstrates that specific power relationships between adults and children cannot be disputed. They are part of overarching power relationships and, so to say, given as a matter of fact. It is our task to constantly reflect on this aspect of the relationships between adults and children.

8. Development contradictions from the standpoint of the child

With these few examples, I intended to show, firstly, that we encounter specific problems when we seek to comprehend the reasons for action of children, and, secondly, what kinds of biographic burdens children may carry onwards (cf. Holzkamp 1983a: 495ff). Thirdly, I want to indicate where considerations of developmental psychology that address a “not yet” of child opportunities could be useful for all involved, where they heighten the sensibilities of adults for children’s plights, which result from the fact that their own premises for action are unspecific in relation to societal constellations. This has nothing to do with sequencing etc., but with the effort of understanding development contradictions from the standpoint of the child. They result from the discrepancy between the possibilities of disposal that are objectively given in societal reality and the limited capacity for their realization in the child. Woodhead (2009) also pointed this out when he showed that, also in developmental psychology—e.g. by Piaget (ibid.: 53–54)—children are treated as actors, who are however “relatively more vulnerable, dependent and inexperienced (ibid.: 57; on the critical-psychological interpretation of Piaget’s approach cf. Ulmann 2013).

This can also be applied to the situation where older children suddenly comprehend connections that they had not realized before: a nice example is contained in the German biography of the piano genius Glenn Gould (2002: 61), who was completely aghast when he realized that the first fish he caught was going to be killed: “Ever since I have been a militant opponent of fishery.” (My translation) In David Grossmann’s novel To the End of the Land, there is a passage where one of the sons realizes that the meat on his plate stems from
animals that used to be alive, and who because of the deception or betrayal of trust he assumes quarrels with his parents for weeks. An academic and grandmother I know did not dare to honor the truth when her grandson claimed that so-called Chicken McNuggets were delivered to McDonald’s by chickens. Many examples of how children experience societal facts such as poverty, prejudice, etc., can be found in the “Handbuch Kinderwelten” (Wagner 2008; see also Köbl & Mey 2012).

There are numerous claims in Childhood Studies, especially in the area of methodology (cf., e.g., Lange & Mierendorff 2009 or Mey 2005, 2010), to the effect that cognitive-emotional specificities of children have to be taken into account. What I care about is to explore where Critical Psychology count contribute to their analysis and to overcoming them (Holzkamp 1983a: 417ff; Ulmann 1987; Markard 2009: 222ff).

Critical Psychology neither wants to nor can tell people, including children, how they should be or live. This is mainly due to the fact that emancipation cannot be thought of as an imposed norm or standardization. The standpoint of critique of Critical Psychology is not perfect humans in arbitrary conditions, but conditions in which—as Marx puts it—man is not a desicable being, and in which the free development of everyone is the condition of the free development of all. As far as this perspective can be generalized—as a thought experiment or in reality—it contradicts a normative concept of dealing with humans. The standpoint of Critical Psychology is therefore a specific critique of societal conditions, not a norm for those that live in them. Emancipation does not need spiritual-moral leadership; it replaces that with solidarian action—also between individuals of different generations—and in communal processes of learning and change.

9. References


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