The Other’s conduct of everyday life: A critical Lacanian approach to Klaus Holzkamp*

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Abstract
Lacan helps me apply Holzkamp’s critique of psychology to Holzkamp’s psychology itself. To be more precise, I try to draw on some of Holzkamp’s critical ideas in order to enrich and expand a Lacanian critique of Holzkamp’s alternative psychology as it is presented in the text “Psychology: Social Self-Understanding on the Reasons for Action in the Conduct of Everyday Life”. This reveals some promising junctions and irreducible contradictions between the Lacanian and Holzkampian critical psychological traditions. Unfortunately, as a Lacanian, I am only able to consider these junctions and contradictions from my Lacanian perspective. It is from this perspective that Holzkampian psychology is shown to be partly unsatisfactory because it cannot entirely rid itself of some of the problems that Lacan and Holzkamp himself perceived in psychology, namely, psychologism, dyadic mirroring, individual-social dualism, individualism, structure blindness, abstraction, mechanistic rationality, and worldlessness. These problems can only be overcome, from my Lacanian perspective, by going beyond psychology, beyond Holzkamp’s Psychology of the Subject’s Conduct of Everyday Life, towards a kind of Metapsychology of the Big Other’s Conduct of Life.

Keywords

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Introduction

In what sense might Klaus Holzkamp’s psychological ideas be of interest to the theoretical perspective inaugurated by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan? We cannot answer this question without considering some important points. First of all, one must recall that the Lacanian orientation defines itself by its opposition to psychology and psychological deviations from psychoanalysis (Parker, 2001, 2003; Pavón-Cuéllar, 2013). Lacan and Lacanians break with the psychological discipline. They do not want to have anything to do with psychologists. Given this, it seems strange that they would be interested in Holzkamp’s psychology. But this psychology is not like those that have been rejected in the Lacanian tradition. Unlike them, Holzkamp’s psychology is a critical psychology. It is, in fact, the paradigm of German *Kritische Psychologie*, which is based precisely on a critique of many of the traditional psychological ideas that Lacan and Lacanians oppose (Holzkamp, 1992; Tolman, 2013). Moreover, the critique that Lacan and Lacanians have developed against those ideas is often consistent with Holzkamp’s. Indeed, at certain junctures, the two critiques intersect, while at other times, one might be completed or deepened by the other. It is at this level that German *Kritische Psychologie* may be of great interest to those Lacanians who are committed to the critique of psychology and whose critical interventions may be enriched and expanded by Holzkamp’s ideas.

If we confine our vision to the critique of mainstream traditional psychological models, Holzkamp’s psychology and Lacanian psychoanalysis offer ideas that are coincident, compatible and complementary. The convergence between the two perspectives becomes even more important when Lacanians present themselves as critical psychologists and place their ideas in the Marxist tradition of critical theory. This is the case of my own work, as well as that of other critical psychologists, the best known among them being Ian Parker.

When we realize the importance of the convergence between our Lacanian critique and that offered by Holzkamp and his followers, we are surprised by the lack of contact and interaction between them. This may be circumstantially explained by the fact that the two critiques belong to different critical psychological traditions that have developed in a parallel way, without ever really crossing paths with one another. But such circumstance, in turn, can be explained by the irreducible contradictions and incompatibilities between the methods and the broader theoretical projects of the two critical psychological traditions. A decisive discrepancy lies precisely in the position of critique in relation to what is criticized. While Holzkamp’s critique tends to be situated inside of psychology, the other is developed rather on the outside or at least on the margins, *in and against the discipline* (Parker, 1999). This difference is what
made Parker (2009) deplore the way in which Holzkamp’s critical psychology “at best ended up leading to something approaching good psychology” (p. 74).

The contradiction between the inner and outer positions of critique is particularly clear when we contrast German *Kritische Psychologie* with the radically anti-psychological questioning inspired by Lacan. Unlike the Lacanian critiques of psychology, Holzkamp’s approach does not break with psychology in its entirety. In fact, Holzkamp’s critique results in the proposal of an alternative psychology from the standpoint of the subject. It is precisely this alternative psychology that I wish to examine from a Lacanian critical perspective, yet supported and complemented by Holzkamp’s critique of psychology.

Lacan will help me apply Holzkamp’s critique of psychology to Holzkamp’s psychology itself. To be more precise, I will try to draw on some of Holzkamp’s critical ideas in order to enrich and expand a Lacanian critique of Holzkamp’s alternative psychology as it is presented in the text “Psychology: Social Self-Understanding on the Reasons for Action in the Conduct of Everyday Life” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a). This should reveal some promising junctions and irreducible contradictions between the Lacanian and Holzkampian critical psychological traditions. Unfortunately, as a follower of Lacan and not of Holzkamp, I will only be able to consider these junctions and contradictions from my rather Lacanian perspective.

My perspective will lead to an unavoidable misinterpretation of Holzkamp. This misunderstanding may be comparable to the unescapable misunderstanding of Lacan by those who have a good understanding of Holzkamp (e.g. Rehmann, 2013). It could be that we have two languages here that cannot translate to each other. Maybe there is no way to avoid misunderstanding.

In any case, my perspective will be rather Lacanian, and it is from this perspective that Holzkampian psychology will be shown to be partly unsatisfactory because it cannot entirely rid itself of some of the problems that Lacan and Holzkamp himself perceived in psychology, namely, *worldlessness*, *mechanistic rationality*, *abstraction*, *structure blindness*, *individualism*, *individual-social dualism*, *dyadic mirroring*, and *psychologism*. These problems can only be overcome, from my Lacanian perspective, by going beyond psychology, beyond Holzkamp’s *Psychology of the Subject’s Conduct of Everyday Life*, towards a kind of *Metapsychology of the Big Other’s Conduct of Life*. For the moment, and before considering this possibility, I will examine separately each one of the eight problems I find in Holzkamp’s psychology.
Worldlessness

Holzkamp (1996/2013a) is right in denouncing diverse psychological models for “irrealizing the world”, for conceptually excluding “the real world ‘in’ which the individuals act and gain their experiences”, for not allowing “integration with the world ‘in’ which we all live into the theory construction” (pp. 244-259). The real world disappears behind the inner world, behind the stimulus, behind the input of an information processing system, behind the interactions between individuals. This was true of traditional, gestalt, behavioural, cognitive and alternative psychologies, and it is still true of current mainstream psychology in general, which “remains a psychology without ‘being’ because it has not been able to address adequately the reality that we ‘are’ in the world” (Teo, 2016, p. 113).

Holzkamp explains the worldlessness of mainstream psychology as an implication of a standard experimental design. This “standard design”, which “identifies psychology as psychology and no other discipline”, replaces the real world with an experimental scenario that “comprises only three entities”, namely, the “test subject”, the “constellation” of stimulus, inputs and other independent variables, and the dependent variables, the test subject’s “answer, reaction, response or the like, registered by the experimenter as data” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, pp. 234-235). The goal here is “to represent the relationship between the conditions introduced and the behaviours to be ‘predicted’ (‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables) in as pure a form as possible” (Holzkamp, 1995/2016, p. 73).

According to Holzkamp (1996/2013a), in studying the standard design instead of everything else in the world, psychology loses sight of “the real, everyday world, which is located in comprehensive meaning contexts and ‘in’ which we all live” (1996/2013a, p. 244). But do we all really live in these meaning contexts? Personally, I do not feel as though I live there. Objects around me do not seem to be objectified meanings or meanings incorporated in things [Gegenstandsbedeutungen].¹ They do not mean their use value, but simply refer to it as another signifier. I only see signifiers that connect with other signifiers, which connect with others, and so on (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2010). By deciphering something, there is always something new to be deciphered. There is always another signifier. Meanings, for me, are purely imaginary. They are produced by the imaginarization of the symbolic, the idealization of words and other material things, the ideologization and psychologization of actual facts.

From the standpoint of the subject I am, even if I were to accept Holzkamp’s definition of “meanings” as “action possibilities for individuals”, I would still feel that my world is meaningless, as I do not see these “possibilities

¹ I thank Jan Rehmann for helping me to think about this concept.
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to act” but, rather, in Holzkamp’s terms, “obstacles to, and restrictions upon, these possibilities” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 280). I only see what Holzkamp describes as “dead conditions” that “cannot be transformed into meanings or possibilities to act”, amidst which “one is simply powerless” and “totally subjected” to “these conditions” (p. 302). So, I am convinced that it is impossible to conduct or live one’s life, while Holzkamp is persuaded that “it is impossible not to conduct or live one’s life” (p. 299). In his own way, Holzkamp believes in Sartre’s idea that “man is condemned to be free” and “responsible for everything he does” (Sartre, 1945/1996, p. 39). I think, rather, that man is condemned, and that this is precisely why he is not free. Instead of being free, one is responsible for everything that is done. One cannot decide, or live, for oneself.

I would say that there is no possibility to act for oneself. When I might see a possibility, I perceive only one, “only one possibility of acting under existing conditions”, so that is no longer a possibility, for there is no “possibility of an extension of the scope of action” (Holzkamp, 1985, p. 355), and, therefore, no choice between different “possibilities to act” (1996/2013a, p. 284). Finally, I do not see a possibility, for I am convinced, in my fatalistic Lacanian perspective, that every possibility is nothing but an imaginary possibility that conceals a system in which there are only symbolic necessities and real impossibilities. The deceiving consciousness of such an unconscious system can make me feel that I am free. But this freedom is just “necessity made conscious” (Plekhanov, 1898/2006, p. 12). It is the real impossibility that disappears behind an imaginary possibility.

Lacan (1964/1990) would say that “the path of the subject passes between the two walls of the impossible” (p. 187). Between these two walls of “the real”, there is the “hallucination” of “possibilities” (p. 188). Actually Holzkamp (1996/2013a) himself recognizes this when he conceives us as “individuals swimming in a fictitious free space between real walls” (p. 281). If the walls of impossibilities are something real, and the free space of possibilities is something fictitious, then why insist upon possibilities? Why insist upon that which is fictitious?

Holzkamp acknowledges the fictitious character of the free space of possibilities. In this I agree with him, as I also think that possibilities are fictitious, hallucinatory or imaginary. One may say that this imaginary character is precisely the meaning of the possibility for me, and therefore my world is not as meaningless as I think. However, if that were said, I would consider that I was not being taken seriously.

If I am taken seriously, then my right to discard Holzkamp’s “phenographic circumscription” – restriction to the subject’s experience – as not “applying to

I thank Jan De Vos for pointing this out to me.
myself” – to my experience – must be respected (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 290), and I must be allowed to indicate, in Holzkamp’s words, that “I experience the circumscribed phenomenon differently” (p. 291), that I do not see the possibilities of which you speak, and that there are no possibilities in my real, everyday world. Therefore, this world is a meaningless world. If this is the world for me, then Holzkamp’s “world-containing psychology” (p. 259) would be a worldless psychology for me, as it would only offer its alternative design in terms of meanings and reasons, instead of my real meaningless and reasonless world. From this standpoint, Holzkamp’s psychology may be seen as a new way of “irrealizing the world” for me as “a ‘psychological’ individual involved” (p. 254).

It is true that my assumption that Holzkamp offers a worldless psychology goes against everything he and his followers argue for. Nevertheless, at least from the standpoint of the subject that I am, the world and my relation to the world have no place in Holzkamp’s design. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of my experience, and does not need to be demonstrated.

I certainly agree with Holzkamp when he says that the standard design does not provide a “language to talk of the individual’s relations to the world” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 245); however, concerning my relations to the world as I experience it, Holzkamp’s alternative design provides no language to speak of them either. I cannot be satisfied with the translation of “conditioning statements into the reason discourse” (p. 339), nor do I feel that reasons and meanings can describe my relations to the world, which is elsewhere, beyond them, behind them, in the social structure.

When I read Holzkamp, I feel that the social structure vanishes behind the meaning structure. And the meaning structure, the structure of possibilities to act, vanishes behind the subjective reasons for action. In my Marxist and Freudian perspective, these subjective reasons are not completely reliable, as they may just be “pretexts”, excuses, ideological rationalizations of the “real causes” or “unconscious motivations” (Bernfeld, 1926/1972, p. 18; Fenichel, 1934/1972, p. 172). The problem here, as Holzkamp (1996/2013a) pointed out, is that we can only denounce these motivations from the “standpoint” of the observers of the subject, and not from the “standpoint of the subject” (p. 284). It is as if the subject could not observe himself/herself, be his/her own observer, and try to clarify the causes of his/her reasons. It is true that this is very difficult, but then why deprive the subject of our help? Why not allow us to work together with him/her and help him/her see what maybe only collectively, we with him/her, we can see? What is wrong with this? Why should we avoid taking a stance on the subject’s motivations?
Why should we try again to neutralise our standpoint, our theoretical-political stance, and pretend neutrality and objectivity in our account of the subject’s reasons? Is this not falling back into naïve empiricism? Or perhaps is it the even more naïve illusion of being able to put oneself in the place of the other? In any case, why should I stick to the reasons from the standpoint of the subject? Why should these reasons always explain actions just as stimulus always explained responses in the standard design? Why do psychologists, however critical they are, always offer this kind of mechanical generalizations?

**Mechanistic rationality**

I think Holzkamp (1996/2013a) is completely correct when he denounces an ideological “mystic metamorphosis” through which the standard design transforms the subject into the “stimulus-response mechanism” (p. 271). But I am afraid that Holzkamp is also transforming the subject into a mechanism, a reason-action mechanism, in which an action is always preceded by a reason that is always preceded in turn by a meaning understood as possibility for action. In this mechanistic rationality, there is no place for the inexplicable and the incomprehensible, for mysteries and surprises (Lacan, 1956/1981), and, most importantly, no place for non-linear time and retroactive causalities in which the action precedes its reason and thus creates its meaning afterwards, *après-coup*, *nachträglich* (Lacan, 1969/2006). In my opinion, if we do not consider this reverse logic of the event, which is so important in the Marxist and Freudian perspectives, we simply cannot avoid falling into mechanistic explanations of human behaviour.

In order to avoid falling into mechanicism, Holzkamp (1996/2013a) explicitly replaces the “stimulus/response” mechanistic connection with the “meanings/reasons” non-mechanistic relationship (p. 306). In this relationship meanings are conceived as “social possibilities for action given to the individual” (1985, p. 236). Meanings belong to the “subject-facing side of the societal structure” of the world, so that this world would have a place in Holzkamp’s psychological approach (1996/2013a, p. 278). However, in this approach, according to Holzkamp himself, “the focus” is not on the level of meanings, as in sociology, but on the level of the “subjective reasons for action” (p. 297). Here I feel that the worldless and mechanistic reasons/actions relationship, and not the meanings/reasons relationship, is that which really replaces the stimulus/responses connection.

The new stimuli are subjective reasons, and the new responses are subjective actions. This is much better than before, of course, but it is not any
less mechanistic. And, what is worse, the world has once again been lost. The objective world does not really relate to the subject’s behaviour. Subjective actions are not understood on the basis of the social structure, but are explained by something clearly psychical, that is, the “subjective reasons for action”, which are clearly distinguished from the “objective living conditions” (Holzkamp, 1985, p. 344).

As in the standard design, in Holzkamp’s (1996/2013a) alternative design, the psychical is “explained by the psychical” (p. 245). Therefore, just as in the standard design, “there are no human beings acting ‘in’ their real world, but ‘psychological’ individuals caged in a merely private psychic world (‘quasi-world’) who, for conceptual reasons, are unable to ever find a way out” into the “outside world as it exists” (p. 251). This real world, at least as I see it, is composed of incomprehensible impossibilities and transindividual structural necessities, blind and impersonal economic forces, historical surprises and political absurdities, social dead-ends and edges of cultural precipices. For conceptual reasons, individuals cannot find a way out into this world when they are caged in the worldless psychological sphere described by Holzkamp, the merely private psychic domain of meanings and subjective reasons, perceived possibilities of action, and the realization of these possibilities.

Holzkamp’s concepts describe a psychological sphere where there is no place for the world as I understand it. I would say, therefore, that the psychological concepts offered by Holzkamp deserve his own denunciation of “the worldlessness of psychological concepts in alternative approaches” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 254). As an alternative approach, Holzkamp’s psychology might be seen as a new kind of worldless psychology with a new surreptitious version of the standard design. After all, according to Holzkamp, “the standard design can be seen as the methodological framework of psychology in its entirety, its mainstream and sidelines” (p. 255). It is as if psychology in its entirety could not rid itself of the standard design; as if all psychologies, even Holzkamp’s, were condemned to the worldlessness inherent in the standard design. Holzkamp suggests this when he recognizes that this worldlessness “determines” the “professional identity of psychology” (p. 255). In this point of view, psychology would be worldless, or it would not be psychology. This is just one of the reasons why I reject psychology.

Abstraction

Holzkamp does not reject psychology, as he believes that worldlessness is not a general problem of psychology, but a specific problem of the abstraction that
characterizes the standard design. In reality, he wants to “remove the standard design from the sphere of constructing abstract stimulus-response relations or variable models and locate it where it actually belongs: in the real world ‘in’ which the researcher and test subject actually meet” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 270). This is fine; however, when Holzkamp comes to describe this real world, I find his description very disappointing. Even though he avoids “trivialities” and is only interested in clarifying that which “cannot be clarified without scientific means” (p. 331), his description of the world is too simple, too obvious, too comprehensible. It is limited to a narrow, shallow framework of conscious relationships, either “cooperative” or “merely interactive”, between “individuals” (1985, p. 326). People know what they want and they also know how to play their part. Time is linear. Space is shared. There are no mysteries, no surprises, no paradoxes, no logical problems, no deadlocks of perspective, no social horizon, but only the walls surrounding interpersonal relationships. There is no place for the cultural complexity and historical density of actions. At least for me, this is not what the real world looks like from the point of view of any subject.

Even from the viewpoint of the simplest subject, the world is not as simple as it unfolds in Holzkamp’s description of the real world in which the researcher and test subject actually meet. This description seems rather to be an abstraction of this world with its unfathomable depth. Therefore, like the standard design, Holzkamp’s alternative design offers an abstraction of the real world instead of the concrete real world. Holzkamp (1996/2013a) points out that the “causal nexus” is “abstracted from the reason discourse” (p. 299), but is it not true that this reason discourse is abstracted from a concrete real world that includes not only reasons and causes but also many other connections, some rational, others irrational?

Holzkamp’s representation of the world surprises me with its abstraction and simplicity, but also for its narrowness. This narrowness can be observed clearly when he defines “the world” as “the sum of all localities accessible to and ‘passed through’ by the individuals” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 277). This is the narrow world considered by Holzkamp and contained by his world-containing psychology. It is the worldless world of psychologism, solipsism, subjectivism, and Fichtean subjective idealism (Lacan, 1936/1999a, 1955/1999b). It is just the world from the perspective of individual subjects. It is the “visible” world on this side of the “horizon” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 276). For Holzkamp, beyond the horizon, there is no world. There is nothing important for the individual there, only empty space.

Contrary to Holzkamp, I am convinced that there is a world beyond the horizon, outside the psychic sphere, behind the scenes of everyday life. So, I do
not think that “the ‘world’ is always present in scenes of everyday life conduct” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 275). I would say, rather, that these scenes are always present somewhere in the world. The scenes of everyday life reveal a small place in the world, of course, but they do not reveal the world as such, and they do not reveal as much as they conceal. Most of the world disappears behind the scenes of everyday life. Most of the world is behind the “partial reality” of these scenes and can only be discovered by going beyond everyday life (Lefebvre, 1968, pp. 57-61).

When Holzkamp assumes that the world is present in scenes of everyday life, his assumption reminds me of the bourgeois aspiration to enclose the entire world into narrow domestic European environments of the nineteenth century. But those theatres of the world were nothing more than that: just theatres. They were part of the world, but the world was also outside them. What happened inside was only a continuation and a distorted echo of what happened outside.

**Structure blindness**

The Holzkampian vision of the world consists in the scenes of everyday life. These scenes are not the world in its entirety, but only a part of the world, a kind of theatre, a theatre of the world. We may say that they are a psychological theatre of the world. When Holzkamp takes this theatre for the real world in its entirety, he is taking a psychological representation of the world’s structure for the structure that is psychologically represented. Thus, he falls into the same psychologism that he definitely rejects.

Among Husserl’s objections to psychologism, Holzkamp (1996/2013a) underscores the argument that “individual thinking of a logical structure or law is not identical to the law or structure itself” (p. 262). Mainstream psychology, according to Holzkamp, denies this “difference between individual operations of thinking and the societal formation or structures as well as their discrete form of existence” (p. 263). But is it not true that structures also exist through our operations of thinking? These individual operations are structural operations. It is the structure that thinks through my thoughts. In a sense, I am like a thinking labour force of the economic, social, cultural and ideological structure, and my individual conscious thoughts are the thoughts of this transindividual structure of the unconscious (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2010a), this social and meaning structure that is, as Holzkamp (1996/2013a) acknowledges, “complex and opaque” (p. 312), as well as “ambiguous, contradictory, intransparent and blurred into impenetrability” (p. 315).
Consciousness remains unconscious for it cannot really penetrate into this unconscious structure that becomes un-conscious through each subject. Yet, in his psychological perspective, Holzkamp (1996/2013a) pretends that the unconscious is “nothing else than a special form of the conscious” (p. 295). In contrast to this, I may say, in my psychoanalytical perspective, that consciousness is nothing else than a special form of the unconscious (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2010a).

My individual conscious operations of thinking are not as individual and conscious as Holzkamp suggests. Rather, they are transindividual forms of existence of the economic, social, cultural and ideological structure of the unconscious, which is outside, in the material and perceptible world. And we can obviously recognize this without falling into psychologism. Actually, from my point of view, we must recognize this in order to avoid psychologism. What I call psychologism can also be at work in artificially giving existence to psychology through the categorical differentiation between the world and the theatre of the world, the structure and the psychological individual thinking of the structure. In Lacanian terms, this differentiation arbitrarily differentiates the structure of language and the psychological metalanguage of individual thinking (Lacan, 1971/2007). But “there is no metalanguage” (Lacan, 1960/1999c, p. 293). There is only the structure of language that thinks of itself when the so-called individual is thinking of the structure.

The structure does not think in the same way through different individuals, of course, but this does not mean that these different forms of thinking can be distinguished from the structure, since the structure consists precisely in these forms of thinking and the structural transindividual articulation between them. This is a Durkheimian idea that influences, especially, French social sciences and Lacanian psychoanalysis (Zafiropoulos, 2001), an idea that cannot be accepted in a Weberian methodological individualism like the one we find in most current social and human sciences, including perhaps Holzkamp’s psychology. It is because of this individualism that, I might suppose, Holzkampian psychology includes some echoes of mainstream psychology and its “structure blindness” (1996/2013a, p. 263), its “context blindness” (1985, p. 21), its “blindness to real connections and real contradictions” (p. 27). It seems to me that Holzkamp does not always see the transindividual structural character of what he conceives as individual psychological thinking.
Individualism

Holzkamp (1996/2013a) rightly criticizes social psychology for separating out “individual-related items” that “are assumed to impact upon the individual directly” (p. 256). Instead of this individualist reductionism, Holzkamp would like social psychology to attempt to “comprehend the individual’s actions in their relations to the structural context of the world” (p. 256). However, at least from my point of view, this assertion entails an individualist reductionism that reduces the object of social psychology to what Holzkamp describes as the individual’s actions. It does not matter if these actions are related to the structural context of the world. Fact is that we focus on the individual’s actions, on the individual, and not on the social itself. The actor is still not a group or a social class, but the individual. This is only one reason why I’m convinced that individualism still affects this social psychology sketched out by Holzkamp. As I have recently pointed out, “the Holzkampian psychological conception not only regresses to a moment that predates the Marxist relational human being”, but “goes back even further before Feuerbachian collective subjectivity”, and tends to “fall into erratic individualism” (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2017, p. 110).

Holzkamp’s own psychological individualism does not eclipse his brilliant opposition to other kinds of psychological individualism. In existing social psychology, as Holzkamp (1996/2013a) insightfully points out, “the individuals are merely turned towards one another, while they turn their backs to the real, meaningful world ‘in’ which they actually live and act” (p. 256). But would it change anything if the individuals turned to this real, meaningful world? After all, the world would still be on one side, and the individuals on the other, as if the world and individuals were different and separate things, as if we could see the world without seeing the individuals, as if the individuals were not the world, as if the world were not that which contemplates itself through the eyes of the individuals.

Holzkamp, despite his Marxism, does not avoid the representation of society as “an abstraction opposed to the individual” (Marx, 1844/1997, p. 146). He assumes that individuals are different from a world that thus appears as their environment. This is a typical psychological assumption that reveals the biological foundation and determination of psychology, as was noted, some time ago, first by Canguilhem (1958) and then by Foucault (1966).

Just like biology, psychology systematically separates individuals and the environment, as if the latter were a given and unchangeable “natural environment” to which individuals must “adapt” themselves (Braunstein, 2006, p. 367). It is as if the environment were not what it is, namely, a social and cultural world that cannot be distinguished from the individuals, a world that
cannot be contemplated by the individuals because it is not before the eyes of the individuals, but it is the individuals themselves who, therefore, instead of adapting to something that exists outside them, can transform the world by transforming themselves (Lacan, 1936/1999a). It is in this sense that psychoanalysis, despite Holzkamp’s (1988/2013b) accusation, does have a “concept of the human possibility of ending” the “suffering and entanglement of individual subjects” by “participating oneself in changing the conditions causing it” (p. 33). These conditions also lie in an individual, in an inner world, that should not be artificially differentiated from the outer world, from the environment, as that to which the individual must adapt.

Of course, instead of a passive and unilateral adaptation of individuals to their environment, Holzkamp (1996/2013a) clearly acknowledges that individuals’ conducts of life imply active and multilateral “interdependencies with other individuals’ conducts of life” (p. 272). Here we see a reason why “the concept of the conduct of everyday life might open a route to overcome the abstract individualism of psychology (and its accompanying wordlessness) that encloses subjects in isolated psychological special functions” (Højholt and Schraube, 2016, p. 3). It is true that Holzkamp left behind the traditional psychological individualist focus on the adaptive individual with his/her isolated psychological special functions and focused on the interdependencies between individuals’ conducts of life. Yet, despite these interdependencies, the conducts of life still are what Holzkamp describes as individuals’ conducts of life, and their “habituation” and “learning” within “meaning structures” are not so different from their “biological adaptation” to a natural environment (Holzkamp, 1985, p. 132). It is also true that Holzkamp (1996/2013a) himself, in the end, admits that “every conduct of life is both individual and collective”, places the “individual” and the “collective” in quotation marks, and recognizes that “this conceptual pairing has no analytical value at all” (p. 322). But this recognition comes too late. It only comes after a systematic use of the conceptual pairing that arbitrarily separates the individual and the social.

**Individual-social dualism**

Holzkamp’s starting point is the abstraction of the individual from the social, and the resulting “phenographic description” from “each individual’s particular standpoint” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 340). Before reaching the “constructive level”, he begins at the “descriptive level” by describing conducts of life as “individuals’ conducts of life”, as accomplishments of individuals and not of groups, communities or social classes (pp. 272, 318-319). This is how Holzkamp
reproduces what he rejects, namely, “the bourgeois form of the abstract-isolated individual” (1985, p. 438). Psychological subjects, as conceived by Holzkamp, are primarily individuals abstracted from their transindividual concrete being, and deprived of the social forces, historical movements and cultural orientations that always underlie conduct of life. Without all this, subjects fall into the “worldlessness of the individual” that Holzkamp rightly denounces in the standard design (1996/2013a, p. 245).

Unlike the standard design, Holzkamp certainly considers the world. But initially, in his own words, he only considers the world from “the standpoint and perspective of the individual” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 276). But is this perspective really that of the individual? Is it not, rather, and from the very beginning, the perspective of the Lacanian big Other; i.e., of culture, of ideology, of the system, of everything in which the individual is alienated? It is this cultural and ideological Other, in its individualistic liberal historical manifestation (Lacan, 1961/1991), that “restricts, curtails, impairs intersubjectivity”, creates the illusion of an individual perspective, and determines the “centring” and “irreversibility” of this perspective (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 332). Indeed, from the outset, the so-called individual perspective is already a transindividual perspective that can only be accounted for by a Copernican “reflexive” and “constructive” approach (pp. 322-323). I do not really understand why we should begin with a “descriptive” and “pre-reflexive” imaginary experience in a “Ptolemaic world view” that would “absolutize” the individual’s perspective (p. 322).

In my opinion, there is no such thing as the individual’s perspective. This perspective is always a transindividual perspective of the big Other, of ideology, of language, of the symbolic system of culture. It corresponds to what Holzkamp (1996/2013a) calls the “standpoint of multiple reciprocity” and “superordinated meta-perspective” (p. 326), but it is not exactly a meta-perspective, as there are no other perspectives, but only this perspective, this system, this “language” without “metalanguage”, this “Other” without “an Other of the Other” (Lacan, 1960/1999c, p. 293). So, we do not need to “construct or calculate a ‘meta-standpoint’ (as an orthogonal top view) outside the entire system” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 323), since this meta-standpoint already exists inside the system. Yet it is not a meta-standpoint that would imply a kind of metalanguage, but rather the complex and multifaceted standpoint of a language without metalanguage. It is the many-sided standpoint of the system, of the big Other who sees many different things through the eyes of people, who are not isolated planets, each one with its own perspective.

Individuals are not “planets” floating in space (Lacan, 1955/2001, pp. 323-331). They do not have separate individual perspectives like those of planets.
What seems to be pre-reflexive is just a moment of the reflexivity of the system. This symbolic system of culture does not function as a planetary system, either Ptolemaic or Copernican, as it does not only extrinsically govern the places and displacements of its elements, but intrinsically constitutes the very being of these elements. Unlike planets, these elements are not distinct elements, but structural positions. What Holzkamp calls the individual is just something abstracted from the transindividual structure. Hence, why should we assign a perspective to this abstract individual that does not even have a concrete existence?

After giving existence and assigning a perspective to the individual, Holzkamp makes clear his theoretical-methodological individualism when he explains that “at the centre” of his analyses “are individual subjects within a particular scene of conduct of everyday life” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 275). In my opinion, as long as individual subjects are at the centre of analyses, we cannot accomplish “the social self-understanding as the guideline of a subject science knowledge interest” (p. 330). This interest obliges us to put the social structures at the centre of our analyses. It is true that Holzkamp is also interested in the “relationship” of these “individual subjects” to “social structures” (pp. 275-276), but he can only be concerned with this relationship of the individual to the social insofar as he began with an individual-social dualism and its inherent abstraction of the individual from the social.

**Dyadic mirroring**

As usual in modern social and human sciences, after separating the individual from society, we need to find a way to relate the individual to society. We need to find, for instance, the “conduct of life” and conceive it as the “mediating link”, the “missing link” between the individual and the social (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 275). However, instead of finding the missing link, would it not be better not to have missed the link in the first place? Would it not be better not to have abstracted the individual from the social?

We should begin by recognizing that individual subjects are parts, points and effects of the social structure. Indeed, strictly speaking, they do not relate to the social structure, but are the same thing as the social structure. In Marxian terms, their essence is an “ensemble of social relations” (Marx, 1845/1969, pp. 14-15).

The so-called individual is always more than an individual. I am not only an individual, but a class, a nation, a gender position, a knot of groups and filiations, as well as the tensions, contradictions and conflicts between different social and cultural categories. I am inhabited by all this. I’m a “social being” (Marx,
There is not only the “social mediation of individual existence” (Holzkamp, 1985, p. 229), but my “individual existence” is itself a “social activity” (Marx, 1844/1997, p. 146). I am society that reaches “subjective existence” in the “particular individual” that I am (pp. 146-147).

I am an Other. I am not only who I am. I am never alone and I cannot relate to another individual in private. For these reasons, I cannot accept Holzkamp’s concept of the “research dyad” and the correlative individualist idea that “strictly simultaneously one can never contact more than one person at the same time” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 267). I would say, rather, that strictly speaking, we cannot contact only one person, for when we contact one person, we are always contacting a group, a class, a mass of people. Moreover, we are not alone with them, as there is always someone else, a third party, the Lacanian big Other, the personification of language or culture, which always mediates in all interpersonal relationships, even in Holzkamp’s research dyad, which is therefore not exactly a dyad.

In my Lacanian perspective, even the ostensibly two-person relationship is not really a two person-relationship at all, but a specular imaginary relationship with my image in the mirror (Lacan, 1954/1998, 1936/1999d, 1955/2001). The only way to go beyond the mirror, transcend dyadic mirroring, get out of myself and really relate to someone else is to relate to the social structure, to the entirety of society, by relating to the big Other, to the symbolic system of culture, to the structure of language. Here everything relates to everything. But these relations do not exactly correspond to what Holzkamp calls the “intersubjective mode of relation” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 325), since there are, strictly speaking, no relations between subjects, but only structural connections between positions, which Lacan (1971/2007) describes as “inter-signifying relationships” (p. 10). This is the object of a *Lacanian meta-psychological mode of explanation*, which is thus different from Holzkamp’s “meta-subjective mode of understanding” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 325).

In sum, from a Lacanian point of view, there are two main problems with the Holzkampian *mode of understanding*. First, one can only discover intersubjective or interpersonal relationships by understanding too much, finding subjects and persons where there are only signifiers and structural positions. Second, one can only find research dyads and other two-person or two-subject relationships by abstracting them from the symbolic system in which each position relates to all other positions.
Psychologism

Holzkamp (1996/2013a) may say that he is not abstracting individuals from the structure, as he recognizes, in his own words, that “human beings are able to integrate the historically developed structure of the world into their experience and actions” (p. 264). But why should human beings need to integrate this structure into their experience and actions? This experience and these actions are indistinguishable from the structure. The structure is integrated into them from the beginning (Lacan, 1969/2006). Why should human beings need to make this integration? The answer is that they need to make this integration because Holzkamp, as a good psychologist, abstractly separated that which was integrated from the beginning. At least for me, this abstract separation involves psychologism, as it sticks to a pure abstract psychological reality in which the world disappears. Indeed, we cannot see the structure of the world in the subject’s experiences and actions that Holzkamp abstracts from the structure of the world. The structure is there, of course, but we cannot see it. This is precisely what Holzkamp (1996/2013a) calls “structure blindness” in the standard design (pp. 262-264).

It is true that Holzkamp (1996/2013a) engages in the theoretical enterprise of “overcoming” the “structure blindness” of the standard design in mainstream psychology, and considers two possible “starting points” for this enterprise (pp. 264-265). We may start either by dealing with the concept of structure, or by taking the standard design as the basis for further considerations. When facing this crossroads, Holzkamp has good reasons for choosing to begin with the standard design instead of the structure. He does not want to either “lose sight of the depicted standard design” or “neglect those contradictions and inconsistencies in traditional psychology” that he has “extensively discussed” (p. 265).

Holzkamp’s option brings us back to our starting point. As a psychologist who seems to be quite attached to psychology, Holzkamp prefers to begin with the critique of the contradictions and inconsistencies in traditional psychology and then propose an alternative psychological approach that would not be blind to the structure. As a Lacanian who is not really attached to psychology, I would prefer to begin with the conception of the structure in my alternative psychoanalytical approach, and then return to psychology in order to criticize its structure blindness on the basis of my approach. My aim is to develop a critique of psychology, even alternative psychology, and even Holzkamp’s psychology. To achieve this aim, I begin by breaking with psychology, while Holzkamp (1996/2013a), in contrast, begins by criticizing mainstream, traditional psychology for the purpose of proposing a new alternative psychology that
should also be a “meta-theory of psychology in its entirety” (p. 295). But is it possible for psychology to become a meta-theory of psychology? I would say rather that such a meta-theory cannot be a psychological theory, but something different, something “beyond psychology” (Lacan, 1954/1998, p. 259), that is, what Freud (1915/1984) calls “metapsychology”, which has nothing to do with what Stam, Rogers and Gergen (1987) understand by this term (see Orozco-Guzmán & Pavón-Cuéllar, 2014).

Instead of going beyond psychology, Holzkamp (1996/2013a) offers an alternative psychology conceived as an investigation of “scenes of conduct of everyday life” (p. 274). But I truly do not understand why we should need psychology to investigate such an object. This investigation is undertaken every day by each one of us!

Psychology may well deepen our everyday investigation of scenes of conduct of life, but would it not be better to go behind the scenes, beyond the ideological appearance of things, and investigate what is not evident in our everyday life? Why should I accept that “a science of the subject cannot leave the standpoint of the subject in everyday life to theorize about overall issues” (Dreier, 2016, p. 27)? Is it not precisely through this theorizing that science can elucidate the standpoint of the subject? This elucidation requires at least a “meta-subjective scientific understanding framework” (Holzkamp, 1985, p. 540).

What good is science if it only replicates what is evident from the standpoint of the subject in everyday life? As a Marxist and a Freudian, I am not only interested in that which is patent, but also, and especially, in that which is latent, that is, the metapsychological structure concealed by the patent ideological appearance that constitutes the object of psychology (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2015). I want to cross this appearance, and the only way to cross it, is through its theorizing and through its critique, which is also a critique of psychology (Althusser, 1965/2005; Pavón-Cuéllar, 2016, 2017).

I would criticize Holzkamp’s psychology, not only for all the reasons I have already mentioned but also, and simply, because it is still psychology. My problem is with psychology, not exactly with the standard design. Actually, I do not see how psychology could get rid of the standard design, since for me this design has been the psychological design by definition, one that always implies psychologism and psychologisation. The standard design has always been an integral part of the meaning of psychology. This is not to say that psychology has a fixed meaning once and for all. The idea of the essential connection between psychology and the standard design does not result from a linguistic essentialization and fetishization, but from the historical observation of what psychology has been up to now.
I agree with Holzkamp (1996/2013a) when he says that the psychological standard design “is not what it pretends to be”; it is not the “stimuli-constellation” or “operationalization of hypotheses as dependent of independent variables”, but, rather, “a segment of the real world” from which “psychology draws its professional identity” (p. 266). I completely agree with this, but I do not understand why Holzkamp clings to this identity, and finds it “reasonable not simply to brush” the standard design “as deficient”, but “to preserve its identity constituting function” (p. 266). As an identity constituting function, the standard design involves the social-political positioning of psychologism with its ideological functions. Holzkamp knows these functions very well and would probably agree with me that they are enough to justify the suppression of the standard design. By suppressing it, we would also put an end to psychology, of course. We would not be able to preserve psychology. But why should we need to preserve psychology? Just because it constitutes our professional identity as psychologists? But then, why should we need this identity? Just to earn our living?

Conclusion

It would be unfair and naive to pretend that the profitable professional identity of psychologists is the only reason that justifies the survival of psychology. I think there are deeper reasons for this survival, one of which has been unwillingly exposed by Holzkamp’s theory of conduct of life. In a sense, it is true that this theory involves a “meta-theory of psychology in its entirety” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 295), since what we currently call “psychology”, as a basic device and not simply a superstructural supplement of liberalism, aspires in its entirety to the liberal ideal of liberty to conduct one’s own life (Mariátegui, 1930/1976, p. 146; Horkheimer, 1932/2008, pp. 33-34).

We cannot refute an ideal, of course, but we may ask ourselves if this ideal may be, or may become, real. Beyond the non-conclusive Kantian antinomy freedom-causality, or the modern undecidable duality agency-determination, is it really possible for me to conduct my everyday life? Is it possible to give meaning to reality and thus have a possibility to freely act despite the material structural determination? Holzkamp’s response is affirmative. But I would use his own words to say that his perspective (1988/2013b), like the one of interactionism, “neglects the material processes of economic reproduction and its inherent power structures (inaccessible to hermeneutical elucidation), which objectively determine, channel and limit the freedom of giving meaning to reality” (p. 33).
The power structures can easily exert their power and give their meaning to reality by convincing me that I’m freely giving this meaning to reality. My feeling of being free can be itself an effect of the structures (Marx, 1846/2014). When I feel that I am conducting my life, why should I be sure of my feeling? Is it not possible that my feeling deceives me? Could it not be that something or someone else conducts my life while I feel I am conducting it? But who or what might conduct my life instead of me? Actually the question is not only who might conduct my life, but who owns this life?

Whose life are we talking about? At first sight, it is my life, of course. Even on second thought, it may be considered my life, at least in the liberal perspective. But even in the Marxist representation of capitalism, life must belong to the workers who freely sell their life, their labour force, as a commodity, and this is what differentiates a proletarian from a slave, as we know that the slave’s life is owned and sold by his master, while the proletarian’s life is owned and sold by the proletarian himself. However, once the proletarian has sold his life, this life no longer belongs to him. It belongs to capital. It is absorbed by the vampire of capital, of dead labour, or dead life.

Life thus becomes capital, which from the Lacanian point of view is nothing more than a symbolic value. From this point of view, such a symbolisation, or transformation, of real life into the symbolic value of capital, may still be conceived as the basis of an alienation that affects everything in everyday life. Life would be alienated or taken by that which Lacan calls the big Other, the symbolic system of culture, which might thus own and conduct the subject’s life. This life would be the Other’s life.

The Other would thus be the subject of the human subject’s life, the reality of the human essence as Marx understands it, as the ensemble of social relations. Should we then conceive these relations as the subject itself? If we do so, the subject must not be reduced to either the traditional psychological individual subject in social relations, or the alternative subject offered by Holzkamp’s critical psychology, “the subject within the context of her/his conduct of everyday life” (Holzkamp, 1996/2013a, p. 314). After all, how can we distinguish this context from the subject within it? How can we separate this subject from the Other? And how can we disentangle the Other’s necessities of action from the subject’s possibilities to act? These imaginary possibilities might be just the psychological representation of those symbolic necessities and real impossibilities that can only be analysed through a metapsychology of the big Other’s conduct of our life. Such metapsychology was actually foreshadowed by Holzkamp. It precisely corresponds to psychoanalysis “interpreted from positions critical of society, as, for example, in Freudo-Marxism and its newer versions”, which “can be read perfectly well as a theory of suppressed, stunted subjectivity
under the pressures of social constraints and contradictions” (Holzkamp, 1988/2013b, p. 31). These constraints and contradictions are the blind spot of Holzkamp’s psychology of the subject’s conduct of everyday life.

References


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