

## INFANCIES, BIOPOLITICS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

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What characterizes the infant is that it is its own potentiality, it lives in its own possibility. Just as the life of a woman, the life of a child cannot be grasped, not because the child does not transcend to another world, but because it holds onto this world and onto his own body, in a way that adults find intolerable. (Giorgio Agamben, *Teología y lenguaje. Del poder de Dios al juego de los niños.*)

### **Part I: Reflections on the body, discourse and power**

#### *Reflections on infancy and means of control*

Infancy is diluted in a rain of therapeutic classifications, pedagogical practices, and in a medical approach that supports a given diagnosis. Normality, a scandalous term, resonates as a modern techno-myth that engulfs (within this techno-myth) promises of happiness and liberty. In this myth, narcotics do not work by themselves, but in the company of and determined by media discourses.

The astuteness of the new models of control lies in an excessive concern for the child, her body and her surroundings. This concern inscribes the irony of an era that emphasizes the “defense of the child” as a cause for legislators, activists, social workers, academics and psychoanalysts, among others. This cause simultaneously allows the annihilation of children through starvation, trafficking, war and other catastrophes that result from socio-political situations sustained by different powers.<sup>1</sup> This exacerbated precaution towards the child, only reflects one of the edges that constitutes biopower. This edge operates as the “Make live and let die” that Foucault formulated in his works.

Psychoanalysis is not foreign to this perspective. Although the psychoanalytical rhetoric aims at practicing a “rebellious” clinic, it still reproduces this same biopolitical concern found in Foucault’s “Make live and let die.”

It should not surprise us that in the clinical work with children, the results that are often published show that the psychoanalytical treatment has become a path to achieve a “happy ending.” As an example, let us consider a child that prior to psychoanalysis was not interested in studying, but after acquiring a knowledge that emerged from psychoanalytical work, the child became a student that obtained good grades, and is now considered intelligent. Although this is a bald illustration, it does not fall far from those psychoanalytical enunciations that refer to the “efficiency” of treatment. The psychoanalytical clinic offers an adorned discourse, a disguised critical and rebellious rhetoric that is received complacently along with those discourses built by pedagogy, psychology, psychiatry and pharmacology. Those who receive

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<sup>1</sup> According to FAO statistics, approximately 19,000 children die every day from causes that could have been avoided. Out of this number, 10,000 die daily from malnutrition. Online source: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/i3520s/i3520s.pdf>

these discourses also acquire the basis for an adaptation into a system that seeks to homogenize symptoms and their cure. Although psychoanalysis remains in a distant tension with the State, it cannot avoid its influence. Therefore, the analyst proceeds in ways that do not escape the practices mentioned above. These practices share a common concern for “discontent” and for “symptoms.” Nevertheless, and this is fundamental, beyond stating that psychoanalysis is similar to other therapies, what matters is that it operates as a warning: it is in the daily practice, in the position that the analyst takes and in her listening that the difference lies. In other words, psychoanalysis is *another* way of considering the clinical practice, infancy and society.

### *Reflection on the body and discourse*

With the invasion of sales and discounts and a privilege granted to the *image* (of bodies, organizations and institutions), the ideal of “success” achieved through the accomplishment of “challenges” becomes beyond reach. This ideal also favors the market itself. The neoliberal era insists in producing “complete” subjects; subjects who are whole and ideal, and who lack failures or fractures. If we think about this carefully, we see that the demand that the system puts forward, places the individuals closer to *jouissance* than to desire. In other words, this system locates the subjects near the idea of a perpetual and continuous satisfaction that is nothing else than a narcissistic nourishment, or pure fanaticism:

Narcissus kills the subject within himself and he dies of his excessive tie with his own reflection. Narcissism is at the base of institutional montages, from which he can serve all causes. Not only human reproduction, whose fundamentals he settles, but also any political aberration (Legendre, 1972:50).

In this context, it is possible to understand the increase in pathologies that engage the bodies; an engagement that results from the reference to the image, and that is represented by addictions, depression, suicide attempts, anorexia, bulimia, violence, and autism. We can also include the Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) as a result of that saturation and of the speed required to keep up with modern time. All of these “disorders” are in direct relation with the complexity that we currently live in the world.

Infancy –effect of a rhetoric for control and let die– has been misused by consumerism and by unlimited *jouissance*; hence, it has fallen and become servant to the neoliberal system. Infancy has been reduced to a gear in the machinery that reproduces only that which is alike. The capitalist discourse, with the weakening of its own boundaries, has sustained the illusion that the subject is capable of anything. It fiercely refuses to recognize castration, and because of this refusal, drugs and narcotics have become a promise to elude castration and to nullify impossibilities and “failures.” This consumption of drugs closes any possibility of questioning the position that the subject has within the social fabric.

These “pills” suppress anything that evokes infancy. That “infantile” element is, in itself, what represents the subjective division. Lacan, in *Notes on the Child* (Lacan, 2001: 55-58) questions the place

that the child has within the family fabric, but psychiatrists and pedagogy professionals, have surgically removed that which is the most uncomfortable, and yet, the most revealing: that which displays the unwholeness of knowledge and the incompleteness of a system. This transgression has remained unquestioned because biological knowledge and control policies insist in considering that infancy must be eliminated from the exercise of power and knowledge. Nevertheless, the creation of the idea of “child” cannot be understood apart from these fundamental axes: health and education. The child is that which attempts against the notion of ONE.

The current discourses only enounce a promise that can be listened in terms of: “you can be the master of your own actions!” This paralyzed humanism represents the effectiveness of that capitalist *ethos*. The monetary accumulation and the consumption of drugs can lead to believe that one “owns her own infancy” or to prove that oneself is “master of her own independence,” or an architect of her own destiny. Nevertheless, the slogan does not match reality because there is an inversion of positions: nothing is more atrocious, voracious and threatening than the servitude that has in its horizon the ideal of becoming “owner of her own actions.” Action always implies a coaction, even more so when health and education are involved. These ideals, residues of a brutal neoliberalism, are united by the notion of an absolute power that has been erected by capitalism, and these also unleash the game of similarities:

Just as humanity has presented and expressed this through words, reproduction is declared as the production of that which is similar, not of that which is identical, but *similar* (Legendre, 1996: 52).

One distant, yet fundamental reference is the *Book of Genesis* that can be read in our present rhetoric as: “Make the human being in our own image.” (Genesis 1:26-27). A God that inherits its symbols through the host, enables men to stand in the line for paradise. This is an idea that homologues in flesh and spirit with the others, it is a reproduction that comes from action. Drugs work alike: they produce the contemporary subject through different forms of immixtion: from Rivotril to the lights that advertise the latest film. In such circumstances, the child is diluted. That which appears is the child as an exact copy of data.

The distance between a Christian reflection and the realm of biopolitics is infinite; nevertheless, what matters are the imperatives that lie behind these. The major problem with Christianity is that it has taken the child as a soldier to serve in God’s army, and biopolitics has built an infant that acts in favor of the voracious consumption that the economic machinery demands. The knowledge that has come from the industrial revolution provides us with certain clues of this production, such as the economy of emotions and actions that behaviorism reveal.

The child is the heir of time. That time that is Aeon, an irresponsible fortunate time that plays dice randomly. That time that is established as laughter, deviation, question or discordant action. That time which presents the “new” to the “old.” That time is what also emerges as danger for the economic power. The child re-checked by the diagnostic screen and by the biopolitical effort of “Make live and let die”

disappears and fades into an “intelligence” or “deficit” category. In this way, the child attempts to define herself within a world that demands of her the credentials that dictate the value of her existence. In other words, the child questions if life is worthwhile, or if it is worth a sluggish death, or if life is a decent project for investment and administration... We face a merciless calculation of the risk that lives represent.

The mission of our society, a society of consumerism, is to provide “excess of jouissance;” an autoerotic jouissance that is offered as being unlimited, one that debilitates the subject’s desire and her social bond. We can witness how in present-day pathologies (such as depression, autism, disorders and fatigue) this surplus emerges as a compulsion towards an “uninterrupted consumerism,” or towards an “uninterrupted consumption of ourselves.” The child is at risk as a result of the changes and fluctuations in the mercantile and political discourses that enounce the problem of life and death by means of establishing new medical legislations. Today, we are no longer concerned about the leper, the venereal infected, the insane, the monster or the criminal. What concerns us is the child (accused) in the form of ADD or ASD; the adolescent (accused) of drug addiction or anorexia... These are terms that establish the base for a “wishful” normativity, and in this way, they create new “reforms” to legislate. We do not find it awkward that in this era we live an excess of legislation. Everyone seems to “demand” biopolitical regulations in their every day activities: *law and order comes before anything else*. The *State of Right* for those who deny the inalienable right to maintain the difference...

This society, oriented by consumerism or capitalized power, produced individuals that *a posteriori*, according to the “innovative” framework of legalization, will have a designated place in the system. These individuals are subjects of a privileged production; they become either merchants or trade material. Psychiatry and Pedagogy are in charge of administrating the child as a *surplus*, as the product of those *Great Market Values*, in spite of Legandre’s view:

Each of us is born as a capitalized object, image of someone else: each one is born as another, a radical other. We are born to become that thing, a thing that is not part of ordinary commerce, and that before being named, tries to live its own subjective part. It is in first place, the whole part of others; those privileged others, the parents —the literal reproducers— who are confronted with the unknown object of their desire, with the insatiability of a transmission (Legandre, 1996:19).

*On Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), we find a remark by Freud regarding the education of his time. He develops an evaluation of the role that education plays in the production of psychical banks that are in opposition against the drive: He considered education (in a sort of Uncle Tom style) hazardous for the psyche, because it is based in a deceitful sexual territory, and in an intimidating religious ground. Education in tis sense, transmits a cultural moral that is present in modern anxiety (that constantly eludes the conflict between the ego and desire):

We cannot be distracted by the enunciation that completely justifies that the psychoanalysis of the neurotic is comparable to a post-

education. A child, even an awry or helpless one, is not, in any way a neurotic: post-education is not the same as the education of someone who is unfinished (Freud, 1905: 310).

In fact, Freud never believed in the possibility of achieving psychical normality or a permanent level of subjective stability. What he considers is developed in *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*:

We do not aspire to erase the peculiarity of the individual character in favor of a schematic “normality,” or to demand that the person who has been analyzed completely, no longer feels passions or presents internal conflicts. The role that psychoanalysis has is to achieve the best psychological conditions for the functioning of the ego (Freud, 1937:2).

Therefore, psychoanalysis does not aspire to accomplish an education of the emotions, or of the affections:<sup>2</sup> if its role were to attain the best psychological conditions for the function of the Ego, the practice of psychoanalysis would become a sort of normality officer. However, today we see that this has become true in the practice of psychiatry and of those behavioral clinical models that work with childhood. What these have inherited are the psychoanalytic interpretations of normality that aim at strengthening “egos” or at acquiring “complete” personalities.

### *Biopolitical reflection*

Bare Life and Homo Sacer, theoretical elements in the writings of the Italian Philosopher Giorgio Agamben, allow us to articulate infancy as a body that has to be docile. It also has to be administered by the knowledge that links a subjected life with the functions and strategies of power. To Agamben:

[...] The shift from a “territorial State” to a “population State” and the corresponding increase of the importance of biological life and of health as a specific problem of sovereign power that today is progressively transformed in the “government of men,” (Foucault, 1979) has resulted in a “sort of animalization of men that is achieved through the most refined political techniques. We see its emergence in history, and in the multiplication of human sciences, as well as in the simultaneous possibility of protecting and authorizing the holocaust.” In particular, the development and the triumph of capitalism could not have been possible without the disciplinary control carried by the new biopower that has created through convenient technologies, the docile bodies that it required (Agamben, 2004:12).

In this way, it is also necessary to recall some notions that are related with bare property.<sup>3</sup> From this standpoint, the body acquires the quality of being merely bare life.

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<sup>2</sup> Psychology, Pedagogy and the State policies are responsible for this education.

<sup>3</sup> Bare property is that right that someone has over a thing, in which the only relation is held through property. The owner holds power over the thing, but she does not possess the property since it was surrendered through a right known as usufruct. Bare property

Bare property implies that there is a movement in which the body can be exploited as an excess (*surplus*), until death. The child, when taken as bare property in the discourse of psychiatry and pedagogy is reduced to this operation. He is exchanged from being a living entity, to the condition of being a mere object, or an usufructuary promise.

That which neoliberalism introduces through the understanding of childhood is that the image of the population and the regulation of labor, are inevitably associated with the circulation of currency. This circulation also produces a global servitude to currency. According to Foucault, the neoliberal regime creates the anthropological problem reflected on the *homo economicus*: The child is introduced into history as currency. In other words, the value of the child depends on the fluidity of her circulation through different knowledge that concerns health, safety, biology, education and politics, among others. In this way, the civil society is based on a transactional reality; a reality in which the subject that constitutes society, is also inscribed in it, under the condition that the subject simulates that she has become a mere element of interchange, a subject of transaction or *homo economicus*.

For Foucault the realities of transaction are presented in terms of:

[...] it is in the game of relations of power and of those which inevitably escape them, in the interface of those who govern and those who are governed, where the transactional and transient figures are born. These figures are not less real because they have always existed under the names of civil society, or madness, etc. (Foucault, 2007:337).

In other cases we refer to infancy as a regime of truthfulness that operates based on the location of a given element in the biopolitical device. Infancy becomes a transitory and transactional reality that is effective in introducing the child to the position of becoming a *homo economicus*.

The future *homo economicus* is that character that ever since the Industrial Revolution, has been constantly disturbed. The child occupies a legal place that inserts him in the machinery that controls the population and that evaluates which lives deserve to be protected. Those lives that do not add value to this machinery are left to die (due to its evident impossibility of circulation. They have become a devaluated currency, helpless lives that are destined to disappear).

The liberal art is commanded by a calculation of economic safety, and neoliberalism is that which optimizes this quality. Through this

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is that group of prerogatives that the owner of a thing still holds. When a third party demands the right of property over that same thing (usufruct or room, for example).

The right of property is that which a person has to make use of (usus), obtain benefits from (fructus) and decide over her property. The owner can sell, mortgage, or even destroy her property (abusus). The owner of a leased property has bare ownership over this; she can make use of her property (abusus, sell, etc.). Usufructuary right refers to that right that the tenant has. The tenant acquires the rights to use and *fructus*, but she cannot sell, mortgage or destroy this property because bare ownership grants these rights to the owner.

Bare property is also a modern doctrinal expression, inexistent in the civil code; however, bare property commonly refers to the group of attributes of ownership rights that belong to the owner of a stake and that are used by another person who holds usufructuary rights during the period of time before the demolition of this property. (Foucault, 2007:108-109).

optimization, it looks to avoid risk and bankruptcy (an ideal of the neoliberal model). In this way, the child becomes a priority in this movement. Neoliberalism seeks to obtain the minimum margin of error, from which results children that show a minimum deviation: they must be “perfect” and “happy” children.

This presents the global image of infancy. An image that is dictated by the “good will” of institutional discourses, and that impacts directly and radically on politics, health and education. Nevertheless – and this is fundamental – there operate a series of elements that belong to the psychical realm and that permeate and produce another destiny for the subject; a destiny that goes beyond the refinement of the biopolitical machinery and also of the political and economical diagnose validated by psychiatric, pharmacological, cognitive and behavioral therapies, all of these part of the neoliberal discourse.

Infancy is otherness; it is radically becoming another. To field of otherness and infancy should concern those<sup>4</sup> who are interested in studying social matters. This is why the techno-scientific discourse and the “fine tuned” science refuse to learn about infancy. In the production of knowledge, these discourses question that which moves within the ground of biopower and techo-science: it detunes.

The institutions are the ones that seem to win this game. They are the ones that operate based on demands that certify the scientific knowledge, and that validate and also reward infancy. As a result, the image of the child is diluted in favor of the advance of the biopolitical machinery.

Significations, practices and beliefs are in relation with the field of prejudice: who wants to be responsible for the cadaver, the reified, or the over-named? The abject is that which falls, that which does not fit. The abject appears before the State in the form of waste that no one wants. This reflects the reduction of infancy to a mere body that has become flesh for *jouissance*. This is knowledge validated by a biopolitical view that seeks life without risk, or that endorses the imperative of Sade’s sovereign man referred to by Lacan.

I have the right to use your body for my enjoyment, and I will exercise this right. I will exercise my right without anything that limits my whim to exploit you and to satiate whatever pleases me (Lacan, 2003:748).

Such is the will in which Sade’s sovereign man is located; a position that we can clearly see today, and whose imperative is: *I can enjoy that thing that you are, I can enjoy you as a thing until death, I can satisfy my exploitation in that thing that you are, you are no longer you, you have been reduced to a thing!*

The will of Sade’s sovereign man presents that absolute sovereignty that the discourses of biopower, such as those that psychiatry and pharmacology embrace, portray to be hegemonic in relation with the subject. Discourses produce realities, and the realities that psychiatry or pharmacology produce, criminalize differences, and at

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<sup>4</sup> In other words, the realm of madness includes the un-whole. We question completeness because psychiatry, psychology and pedagogy seek its fulfillment, and in this sense, by questioning it, we access that which is in-complete: the field of madness.

the same time, they produce mortifying everyday events: these are reign by imperatives of saturation, of autonomization. Such discourses turn into demands that, just as Sade's sovereign man, indicate: "*I have the right to enjoy your body, anyone can say that...*" This imperative throws infancy into the border of a promised jouissance, a border destined to achieve abjection.

It is in this context that Psychoanalysis and its clinical practice take another way of saying and another action, an action that seeks for the production of subjects from silence. These subjects do not participate in the gaze of the State, they are not made within the State.

## **Part Two: The (a)ffections of capitalism**

Neoliberalism is an attempt to build from the annihilation of the modern subject, an autistic and consuming individual who is indifferent to the politically constitutive dimension of existence. It is an individual who is referred because of the autistic way in which he enjoys the technical object, becoming subjective merchandise in mass culture. (Jorge Aleman, *Una Izquierda lacaninana*)

Statistical data shows that one of every 68 children has been diagnosed autistic<sup>5</sup>. Once more, this shocking data illustrates the psychiatric and psychological complexity to delineate the shoreline that divides infancy from childhood psychoses.

One of the descriptions that display autism refers to the autistic children as "those people" who live without discourse, who are unable to tell stories or to speak about their relations. The autistic does not blame someone else, they seem to be unwilling to produce knowledge... they reside in actions more than in words.

The analytic-transfereñcial sensation that is established when we work with an "autistic" child is a technical one. Given that there is not a question about why she suffers that symptom, it seems to be easily interchanged. That which is present in autism is the absence of the presence of the other as a semblance; in other words, the other emerges as a void. In this way, the analyst may become a part of the office furniture: she may become a chair, a table, the wall or a door. The autistic child does not recognize subjectivity because she is not interested in singularity or in the difference of the relationship. Therefore, that modernism or postmodernism present in the neoliberal discourse aim at revealing a know-how that concerns "those" spectral people.

To raise a child implies the abandonment of a gaze that makes of that child an object, and by doing so, parents allow that a subject of desire emerges. This task collides frontally and radically against the social discourse. It is because of this that we should not be alarmed by the rising numbers of ailments that are present in families and in social relations. The question is how to differentiate the clinical position from that which can become a sociological approach.

Lacan in Seminar 17, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, states that a discourse is the way in which someone creates a social bond. It is an

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<sup>5</sup> *Autism Speaks*, an international organization based in the US, estimates that the average number for ASD is one out of every sixty eight births. (Untoiglich, 2015:19).

over-determination that promotes a specific kind of bond<sup>6</sup>, that is characterized by its asymmetry and that is predisposed to develop different kinds of psychical suffering.

Discourse as a necessary statistic that exceeds words, always more or less occasional [...] remains in certain fundamental relations. These literally cannot be without language. Through the instrument of language, a certain number of stable relations are installed. Something larger can certainly be installed in these relations, something that goes beyond effective enunciations. (Lacan, 1969/1970:10-11).

Those symptoms that emerge in every discourse are different from one another as a result of the variety of ailments throughout history. Today, for example, our suffering is different from the one that people experienced in the Middle Ages or in the Colonial Era.

Other examples that illustrate this movement are Freud's first patients (his famous hysterics). Freud's patients sought treatment to cure their paralysis; paralysis which lacked an organic affection. These conditions are not present in our clinics nowadays. What we have in our practice are addictions, eating disorders, sleeping disorders, suicide attempts, anorexia, bulimia, ADHD, autistic specters, and violence. These expressions are increasing in our times, and this seems to be related with the way in which our socio-politics operates today: *fewer words, more actions*.

In this way, the so-called "pathologies" associated with the loss of subjectivity or the estrangement of intra-psychical and inter-subjective bonds are growing. This seems to be in a direct relation with the immense number of researches and publications regarding *autism, depression, fatigue and dullness*. These researches argue that these ailments result from genetics, and therefore, neither the subject, nor society, are "responsible" or are held accountable.

Furthermore, What is that which Lacan called capitalist discourse? In 1972, in the lecture that he delivered in Milan he said:

This crisis, not of the master discourse, but of capitalist discourse, which is its substitute, is overt. I am not at all saying to you that the capitalist discourse is rotten, on the contrary, it is something widely clever, eh? Widely clever but headed for a blowout (Lacan 1972).

He inverted the S1 and the \$ for its consummation:

S1 →	S2	\$	S2
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\$	a	S1	a

Master Discourse

Capitalist Discourse

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<sup>6</sup>The syntagma: "there is no sexual relation" alludes to discursive couples that build asymmetrical relationships; relationships that are based on a difference. For example, the discourse of the Hysteric calls for the seductive father. In the analytic discourse the call is made towards the analyst, and in the Master's discourse, towards the slave. But, to whom does the capitalist discourse call?...

This inversion is the possibility to access truth, which is supported and founded by the Master signifier. The subject located in the place of agent presents the mere action of consumption [*to consume*]. It is important to state that “present” here affirms that a signifier does not represent the subject for another signifier. When truth emerges, it can be devastating.

We must not forget that the value of the subject is that of a “whole truth.” In other words, what it rejects is truth as a hole in castration. It rejects the place of the Master signifier in the place of agent in the Master’s Discourse. It takes its place of the Master in the Capitalist Discourse; hence, it becoming a *truly* perverse form of discourse.

The structure that Lacan proposes for the Capitalist Discourse, as a variation of the Master Discourse, carries serious consequences. The permutation of the S1 for the place of the \$, allows access to the place of truth (at the bottom left of the formula). In other words, we can ask: Would this be a discourse if that which characterizes it is precisely its impossibility of accessing the truth as un-whole? The main feature of capitalism is not the idea that “everything is permitted”, but the disorientation that is produced in the uncertainty of not knowing who the *partenaire* is.

In Seminar 19, *The Knowledge of the psychoanalyst*, Lacan referred to this matter and stated that the Capitalist discourse is characterized by the impossibility of establishing a bond; an impossibility in which *Verwerfung* becomes the operation that rejects castration and division. Let us remember that division is precisely that which allows the subject to produce questions. Consequently, every discourse that is articulated with capitalism leaves aside that which we call love matters (Lacan, 1972:96).

It is important to emphasize that this scenario inevitably forces another form of subjectivity; a form in which the imperative of the super ego S1 demands the consumption of the subject, and the organism becomes the object of what we know as techno-science. This “fine tuned” science does not want to know about the body precisely because it questions that which “moves” and detunes in the field of biopower. As an example, the child that is scanned by medicine and accused by a diagnose, fades into a *specter* or into a “disorder.” The child is signified in a world that demands a value for her existence. In other words, the world demands ID cards that assign a “value” that makes the child worth of a certain existence. These cards offer a “promising” future through specialized therapies, modern clinical institutions, medical centers, an also through pedagogy and psychology.

A produce of objectified bodies that are presented and repeated as universals before a *plus du jouissance* and whose fantasy is built from the promise of happiness and idyllic, complete and excessive, that hinders any drive that results from the subjective difference. Videogames and tablets clearly illustrate what happens today among adolescents who use the term “autistic” to refer to that excessive use of gadgets that prevent the teens from having a social interaction. It is interesting how this behavior becomes a signifier that announces the impossibility of maintaining a social bond.

It is in *The third* (Lacan, 1972), where Lacan considers that this social symptom is an obstacle for the future of psychoanalysis:

[...] The future of psychoanalysis depends on what will come of that real. It will, for example, depend on the gadgets that will be imposed on us. We will truly become animated for the gadgets (Lacan, 1972:108).

A *gadget*<sup>7</sup> is not a symptom, it is an object in relation with a phallic satisfaction. The subject is the one who animates the *gadget* and not vice versa. If the *gadget* animated the subject, she, as an individual, would inhabit a social symptom (a task for psychology), and the subject would not be considered a subject *with* a subjectivized symptom (a task for psychoanalysis).

Later on Lacan will say:

There is only one social symptom: each individual is a proletariat. He does not have any discourse to make a bond, that of semblance (Lacan, 1972:86).

We live in an era in which the Capitalist Discourse is dominant and it rejects castration and bonds that are based on love. This Discourse forces a social rupture; a rupture that for Hannah Arendt was an *uproot*<sup>8</sup>. The knowledge that came from the industrial revolution leaves us clues to understand this operation: The rupture of the social bond is part of what constitutes capitalism. This is the reason why, for Lacan, the proletariat is that who does not build a bond through discourse.

The question that emerges is: Does the Capitalist Discourse produce individuals impeded from building a social bond?

If a signifier S1 is that which represents a signifier for another signifier (S2), then the subject is capable of articulating two signifiers. The analyst, from the position of agent (Discourse of the analyst), will aim at the emergence of the subject of the unconscious. The production of her discourse results from the master signifiers (S1), signifiers that are directed towards the drive (singular subjectivity). From this perspective, that which Marx reads (from the Market) and that which Lacan delivers (with psychoanalysis), is that the relationship that a subject builds with an object is of fundamental importance. This radically excludes an inter-subjective relationship.

Every person who possesses goods wants to interchange his for another one whose value satisfies his own need. The interchange, therefore, is an individual process (Marx, 1934:105).

This means that the relationship that a subject has built with an object reveals the function of the symptom. It also reveals the production of Fantasy, a production that deals with the lack of signifier in the Other. [S (A barred)] "There is no sexual relation"

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<sup>7</sup> A gadget is an electronic device that has a specific purpose and function: It is assembled in small parts, it is ingenious, practical and also innovative. For Lacan, these gadgets are linked to culture, particularly to science and technology. It produces a dichotomy between the individual and the subject that derives in a social symptom.

<sup>8</sup> The uprooting phenomenon results from contemporary tragedy; a tragedy that is caused by men and that could have been avoided if human solidarity was stronger than selfishness. It results from those who escape from hunger, sickness, and misery and has serious consequences in the legislation to protect humanity. Through uprooting we lose spontaneous means of expression and communication with the world, as well as the possibility of developing a project for our lives.

We can refer to Hamlet to illustrate this idea. If the primordial Other is genital –because it believes that a sexual relation is possible – then, it also pretends to get all possible jouissance. It is through this attempt, that the inscription of a signifier fails. This jouissance is that which Lacan questioned by the end of his teaching. It is a jouissance that can be named autistic or autoerotic.

Hamlet is the question for the function of the father; a function that failed to deal with the mother's desire. In other words, it failed to deal with that "genital" woman that asked her son to seek revenge for his father's death, and at the same time, she asked him to relieve her suffering; a suffering that came from immense fragility. This position anticipates the Capitalist discourse because, by hiding the truth, the father presents himself as a castrated subject. Desire is in hell since it is articulated through fantasy [*fantasma*]. This is true for Hamlet, and also for the capitalist consumer (autistic), who operates particularly to make her desire fail. This is the reason why there exists a sort of loneliness in capitalism. Capitalism promotes the closing of desire and accentuates the symptom through jouissance; while at the same time, offering *prêt-à-porter sales* that suits everyone's fantasies.

Boredom is a common affection that results from this "autoerotic" form of functioning. It is frequently present in children, and it is also common in adolescents and adults. Boredom has a philosophical background. Nietzsche first associated it with the tedium in *Strong Ideas* (Nietzsche, 2008), and then Heidegger divided it into several types in his work *Time and Being* (Heidegger, 1970). This is an affection that has a profound presence throughout his work, which can be synthesized as abandonment of one's self, and therefore, becoming an experience. We can notice the similarity with the "oceanic feeling" in Freud's work, *Civilization and its Discontents* (Freud, 1926: 65), when he made reference to this generalized affection.

We can find another important critical development in the work of the writer George Steiner, *Bluebeard's Castle* (Steiner, 1991). In his work he analyzes the role of culture after the war:

Contrary to the "Scythian" fantasies of nineteenth-century apocalyptic fables, barbarism did come from the European heartland. Though in parodistic and ultimately negating forms, political bestiality did take on certain of the conventions, idiom, and external values of high culture. And, as we have seen, the infection was, in numerous instances, reciprocal. Mined by *ennui* and the aesthetics of violence, a fair proportion of the intelligentsia and of the institutions of European civilization –letters, the academy, the performing arts– met inhumanity with varying degrees of welcome (Steiner, 1991:88).

In Lacan's work, boredom was in constant elaboration. In *The Formations of the Unconscious* he says:

There is a time when you are not thinking enough, I'm persuaded to believe this, because you live in it as in your atmosphere: in boredom. Maybe you have never thoroughly thought about the point in which boredom becomes something that is formulated as if you wanted something else. We can eat sh... but it is never the

same. All of these are a sort of alibies, formulated alibies, symbolized, of this that is in essential relation with “something else” (Lacan, 2004:108).

We could question if boredom goes beyond affection, if we could locate desire in its metonymic character as a desire of something else and that particularly in hysteria is a means for interrogating the desire of the Other. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be something from which the hysterical subject suffers. On the contrary, it seems to be a motor for change. The idea of boredom throughout Lacan’s teaching does not allow a possible clinical access through intervention within the psychoanalytical practice.

Boredom as an ailment, is frequently associated with anxiety; specially, when dealing with an indeterminate boredom that reflect how anxiety may be experienced in Obsessive neurosis.

As the result of reading Seminar 10, *Anxiety*, we tend to refer to anxiety as that which signals the real and the direction of treatment. Nevertheless, not every form of anxiety directs analysis. We may say that it is “anxiety after anxiety” the one that might have a didactic value. This form of anxiety generally appears in our analysands in terms of: “*I’m not sure what this is about... it affects me, but I know that this is the path.*” This anxiety acquires the statute of a symptom with a somewhat indicative value for the patient.

If in Hysteria, boredom is a means through which the subject makes a call to the Other, in Obsessive neurosis this boredom becomes perpetual. A general state of affection results from boredom, and can often be confused with inhibition.<sup>9</sup> From this perspective, if the analyst suggests activities to treat inhibition, the results could be counterproductive. Interventions resemble ideals; and, we cannot forget that for the Obsessive Neurotic, an ideal is a name for the jouissance of the Other.

Capitalism as a technique, therefore, results effective against the demand. Capitalism provides *gadgets* for and against boredom through which the subject attempts to deal with anxiety. Gadgets are also unspecified and multiple. It would be interesting to also consider in this group the “role plays” that take place online. These remind us of the role that tales or stories used to have in the forming of a hero, as an exit to exogamy.

To conclude, let us recall that obsession needs the hysteric dialect to psychoanalyze. However, in capitalism, there is no direct interlocutor, but a reduction of a technique that is un-analyzable for psychoanalysis. The only way this can be changed, is if there was a shift, as defense, towards another discourse. Even though the avant-garde occurs in the hysteric realm, it is mainly capitalist.

For Lacan, when someone speaks, is only to say the same, unless one is in front of an analyst. This means that the psychoanalytical experience takes place in solitude with another, it never takes place with a peer, and this allows the ex-istence of that who speaks (*parlêtre*). The psychoanalytical experience confronts the Other, the foreign, and the feminine.

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<sup>9</sup> Inhibition is what results from Freud’s *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety* (1926), because the place in which the neurotic symptom is located, is precisely the ego.

To finalize, we can say that this is precisely that from which the accused of suffering autism is deprived. Those who are diagnosed in modern times are also being deprived from this confrontation with the Other. Instead of enabling a relationship with the difference that leads to produce questions, they become the objects of the violent medical classification and pharmaceutical cures, through which any subjective possibility is eradicated. In this way, these subjects cannot be responsible for their own place, and society neglects its responsibility in the symptoms that produces. This is merely, pure hypocrisy.

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