SUBJECTIVITY AND DISCOURSE: COMPLEMENTARY TOPICS FOR A CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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This paper aims to discuss the rejection of subjectivity by psychologists dominantly oriented towards concepts like discourse and deconstruction, as well as communicative and relational activities. The recognition of the symbolic character of human phenomena by psychology occurred relatively late in relation to philosophy, linguistics and anthropology. Nonetheless, this entrance was so radical that it led psychologists to deny most of the concepts that have traditionally been used by psychology. This paper departs from theoretical traditions that advanced a step further in the comprehension of the human psyche as a culturally-historically engendered phenomenon. On this basis, a new definition of subjectivity is advanced as a phenomenon that emerges as a result of the symbolic forms which are socially and historically situated, from which concepts like discourse, deconstruction and dialogical-communicative systems also appeared. Subjectivity, as treated in this paper, is oriented toward specifying human processes that are not exhausted in these concepts, being complementary to them in a broader and complex approach to the study of human realities.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 1980s, discourse, deconstruction and communicative activities have been at the center of critical psychological approaches in psychology (Parker & Shotter, 1990; Rose, 1990; Shotter, 1995; Gergen, 1985, among many other authors). After the “Foucaultian boom” in social science, his definition of discourse as practice became a powerful critical device. A little later, Derrida’s proposal of text and deconstruction was also highly influential in social sciences and psychology. Psychologists, instead of integrating discourse as a new theoretical device, have turned it into the only concept capable of answering all theoretical and practical challenges that stand before them. Nonetheless, more recently, the possibility has been recognized of opening new critical avenues departing from different theoretical positions (Parker, 2015).

The introduction of the topic of discourse has been very useful for psychology, transcending the naturalization of psyche and its reduction to universal and invariable principles centered on individuals. The concept of discourse has also allowed advances in the comprehension of the social system as living networks of symbolic processes and realities, overcoming the comprehension of social reality as a blending of immediate concrete influences of the social environment. However, neither discourse nor deconstruction has attended all the challenges for critical thinking in psychology.

Instead of overcoming the traditional psychological approach centered on individual psyche, defined by psychological elements
intrinsic to a general and never well-defined psyche, the option was to reject individuals, rejecting also psychology as a science and legitimate practice. This path led to the overestimation of social symbolical productions, overwhelming individuals as mere epiphenomena of such social symbolical productions. This paper aims to advance a representation of individual and social realities as subjectively configured and inseparable from the social symbolical production within which they emerge.

One of the problems of psychology is its traditional fragmentation of concepts and fields. For this reason, the intention to advance a new psychological system demands new dynamic and integrative concepts, while avoiding the monopoly of a single concept that overrides all others. This effort began with K. Lewin and his group and was followed by Vygotsky in the last period of his work. From my point of view, developing new advancements in psychology is still very promissory in the present day.

This paper aims to discuss how the concept of subjectivity within a cultural-historical approach, far from being opposed to the concept of discourse, is complementary to it for advancing a new theoretical system capable of generating new knowledge and practices related to specific human phenomena, whether social or individual. Subjectivity is intermingled with discourse, forming a new system, the epicenter of which is the symbolic forms, processes and realities that characterize human existence as such. Unlike discourse, subjectivity always implies emotions. Their unity with symbolical processes emerges within the networks of social symbolical constructions as a new ontological definition of human phenomena, inseparable from discourse, but having a different quality. Meanwhile, discourses are living systems of symbolical constructions and processes, which taken together, define social realities as they are organized in human communicative activities. Subjectivity is the quality of human phenomena that allows individual and social instances to generate specific subjective senses and configurations within those human communicative activities. In such processes, singular individual and social alternatives can emerge within the shared social symbolic constructions.

All human alternatives facing dominant orders require strong individual and collective motivations capable of sustaining projects and avenues, essentially different to the dominant normative social order. Motivation, as it has been treated in psychology, appears as specific entities or functions that drive behaviors and actions that correspond to them by their content. Nonetheless, motivation, rather than being a punctual function, is one of the distinctive characteristics of subjectivity as a system. Motivation can never be reduced to one specific motive; it always implies complex subjective configurations, which appear as a “microcosm” of social and individual life. In such a condition, motivation is always generated by social and individual agents within the context of their lives, a topic that will be discussed in the second part of this paper. Nor do discourse, representation nor any symbolical social construction in themselves carry any motivational character. Motivation always results from the generative subjective production of individual and groups within those social symbolical constructions (González Rey, 2014).

The advancements of some current tendencies in the study of subjectivity have embraced the role of culture and social relations as
closely intermingled in the genesis and development of subjectivity. Subjectivity is no longer understood as a system of static intra-psychical and universal entities. It is conceived in movement but, at the same time, has a relative stability defined by its resistance throughout living experiences (Frosh, 2002, 2010; Elliot, 1992; González Rey, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2014, 2015).

**Subjectivity and the need for a more inclusive place for discourse within a cultural-historical psychology**

Cultural-historical psychology firstly appeared in those trends of Soviet psychology that highlighted the cultural, social and historical genesis of individual psychological phenomena. Nevertheless, most Soviet and Russian psychologists, as well as Western authors, have used the term only to define Vygotsky’s work between 1927 and 1931, defined as his instrumental period (Leontiev, 1984, 1992; González Rey, 2011, 2015; Yasnitsky, 2009, 2012; Zavershneva, 2010, 2015). From my point of view, it is important to extend such a definition to other trends in Soviet psychology. In doing so, the study of these authors’ relations would be possible, beyond the mere opposition between them, as historically presented by the official versions of the history of Soviet psychology. Actually, they complemented each other in many ways (González Rey, 2014, 2017, in press).

Despite of their cultural, social and historical comprehension of the genesis and development of human psychology, Soviet psychologists shared a very narrow comprehension of culture and social environment. Social environment was understood as immediate external influences that come from the outside, keeping the dichotomy between external and internal facts. At the same time, culture mainly referred to language, with signs being the more often used symbolical device, particularly in Vygotsky’s work (Zinchenko, 1993). Therefore, a wider representation of symbolical realities has not been achieved, symbolical realities such as institutions, social constructions like gender, race, social class, pathologies and others, organized as social discourses that include a system of belief, moral codes and different types of institutionalized orders. Furthermore, these social symbolical constructions, in their intermingled relations with politics, education, health systems, religions, science and other institutionalized forms of social life, have mostly been overlooked by the cultural-historical approach.

It is true that cultural–historical psychology has been mainly an individual psychology up until the present day. However, human actions do not emerge as a direct consequence or reflection of social networks’ facts and processes within which human activities take place, because human actions are not merely symbolical phenomena. They are subjectively configured actions that appear as individual and social subjective productions. Once emotions acquire a symbolical character, a new kind of human process emerges; the subjective one.

Individuals and social institutions are not external to each other. Both of these systems have their own subjective configurations but, at the same time, constitute each other, not as a result of the external influence of one upon the other, but through the subjective senses generated by each of these configurations during a specific experience. Subjective senses simultaneously produced by social and individual
configurations are generated within the same symbolical social realities, but they constitute a different type of phenomenon. Such production of subjective senses carries historical social experiences, not as a reproductive memory, but as subjective constructions that have no one-way relationship with what happened objectively in a past experience. Subjective senses continuously renew themselves through newly emerging subjective configurations. It is precisely the generative capacity of subjective phenomena, whether social or individual, that explains their unpredictable paths. The quality of experience that characterizes these types of unpredictable singular human behaviors, feeling and imaginative creation is what defines subjectivity as a new ontological human reality.¹

Subjectivity emerges from symbolical social networks that integrate multiple social instances. However, subjective sense and configuration are not constrained by the dominant symbolical forms and realities that are hegemonic within these social networks. Within these social symbolical networks, different subjective senses emerge from a wide range of individuals and social subjective configurations, defining the multiple ways in which these social symbolical realities are lived by different individual and social instances. Subjective senses are the link between the wide constellations of social and individual configurations. In this sense, the subjective character of social and individual phenomena allows the overcoming of the dichotomy between social facts and individual subjective processes. Social realities and individual psychical processes are replaced by a new type of human reality, the subjective one, which integrates both into a new qualitative level.

Maybe Vygotsky was the first to propose psychological concepts oriented towards such integration: perezhivanie and sense. Nevertheless, as a result of the prevailing place of intellectual-emotional units given by Vygotsky, together with his narrow comprehension of symbolical realities, he did not advance toward a new representation of human mind. It was impossible for him to explain how symbolical social productions could be subjectively produced in so many ways.

The intermingled relationship between subjectivity and social symbolical productions, in such a way that neither is reduced to the other, allows a different psychology, in which discourse becomes an important part of the theory for the assembly of concepts that simultaneously advance new constructions relating to individuals and social realities. However, discourse in itself does not exhaust the wide range of complex phenomena engendered by human realities.

Discourses are experienced in different ways as a result of singular subjective productions, whether individual or social. Sometimes, learning difficulties are explained as a result of dominant discourses of learning failure, overlooking the complex network of different processes engaged in the learning failure, among which are the subjective ones. The same has occurred in studies oriented toward mental distress, maternity, violent behaviors and so on. The emphasis on discourse has sometimes led to the omission of many other important processes involved in human

¹ I consider as ontological the specific theoretical representation through which one system of facts becomes a signified system susceptible to certain methodological procedures, a process in which an empirical field is created, whereby a theory is founded. In my use of the term ontology, there is no objective intention to define reality as it is. Knowledge represents a process through which intelligibility regarding an imaginary representation through empirical “pieces” is produced.
processes. This is one of the strengths of the concept of subjective configuration: the integration of different subjective senses, coming from different lived experiences and times, as inseparable from the way in which any current situation is subjectively experienced. Such quality is an important theoretical device to replace standardized and universal notions, such as psychopathy, schizophrenia, depression and many others, due to the one-sided explanation of the genesis of the symptoms and behaviors on which these labels are usually based.

This is why subjectivity, as defined in this paper, should be considered as part of the critical theoretical repertory in relation to traditional psychology. It opens a space to explain individual human creations as inseparable from social life. The concepts assembled in this proposal on subjectivity are oriented toward transcending static, individual and non-variable concepts used to classify complex human phenomena within universal entities, such as those of traditional psychopathology. At the same time, this proposal on subjectivity goes in the opposite direction to the hypertrophy of discourse, deconstruction or communication as absolute concepts, highlighting a new psychology, as it was signaled by the following statement by Shotter at the height of his identification with the social constructivist position. He claimed:

A central methodological assumption of social constructionism is that – instead of the inner dynamics of the individual psyche (romanticism), or the already determined characteristics of the external world (modernism) (Gergen, 1991; Taylor, 1989) – we must study the continuous everyday flow of contingent communicative activity occurring between people (Shotter, 1995, p. 160).

Although our proposal has common points with Shotter’s statement, unlike social constructionism, our focus transcends “contingent communicative activity”, because we understand communication as a new space for subjectivation, inseparable from the way in which such contingent communicative activity is subjectively configured in its agents. The contingent process, in which individuals subjectively do not engage, is mostly deleted after the moment of its occurrence. So it is difficult to share such understanding of human processes which depart from a psychology that has an important strength in the historical character of human phenomena.

The “everyday flow of contingent communicative activity occurring between people” is not independent from the active positions taken by the subjects in communication, which means most communicative activities are not independent flows in themselves, but moments of emergence of complex subjective networks within which the active positions of the partners in communication and the communicative processes in themselves become inseparable. Both partners in communication and communication as such generate a system in process capable of integrating individuals and their communicative activity within a certain social subjective configuration.

Subjectivity from a cultural-historical standpoint cannot be identified with individual psyche, since very early in childhood human beings develop affective patterns in their communication with adults that become a source of subjective senses. In such a process, emotions turn into new units with symbolical processes, configuring the child’s first subjective productions. We have explained elsewhere the differences
between subjective development and psychological development (González Rey & Mitjans Martínez, 2017; González Rey, Mitjans Martínez, Rossato & Goulart, 2017).

Although subjective development is not completely independent of psychological development, it maintains a relative independence in relation to it. Due to the omission of subjectivity as a phenomenon engendered within historical, social and cultural networks of experiences, discourse, deconstruction and contingent communicative activities replaced the concepts of traditional psychology, omitting the complex processes of individual and social subjectivity.

The topic of subjectivity, as treated in our works, integrates new theoretical, epistemological and methodological demands to advance research on it as well as professional practices based on this theoretical proposal (González Rey, 1997; González Rey, 2005b; González Rey & Mitjans, in press). At the current moment, the theoretical advancements on subjectivity are inseparable from the advancement in research and practices, opening an alternative path in psychology and social sciences.

**Subjectivity, motivation and emotions**

Emotions and motivation have been treated as two separated and secondary topics in most of the dominant theoretical accounts throughout the history of psychology. Psychoanalysis has focused on these topics, however, treating them in their genesis and development as dependent on universal somatic drives, or related to universal concepts, such as the lack of the mirror stage by Lacan and his followers. Even authors who do not follow orthodox psychoanalysis have treated emotions and motivation as associated with early sexual drive (Castoriadis, 1992; Elliot, 1992; Frosh, 2002, 2010, among others). Due to this reason, psychoanalytical authors have not advanced significantly towards a comprehension of motivation as inseparable from emotions and culture.

Vygotsky took an important step forward, integrating emotions with other psychological processes and functions at the beginning of his career. In “The Psychology of Art”, he wrote:

This means that, in essence, all our fantastic experiences take place on a completely real emotional basis. We see, therefore, that emotion and imagination are not two separate processes; on the contrary, they are the same process. We can regard a fantasy as the central expression of an emotional reaction. (Vygotsky, 1971, p. 210).

Such a relation between emotion, imagination and fantasy opens a new path to advance with respect to topics that, instead of being predictable, controllable, rational, intellectual and conscious, are unpredictable, uncontrollable, emotional and unconscious. A new theoretical domain seemed to be taking its first steps, transcending a psychology mostly dominated by a rational-intellectual reductionism. In more recent times such reductionism was replaced by a discursive-relational reductionism that also rejects emotion, fantasy and imagination as metaphysical constructions to be referred to individual psyches.
The path taken by Vygotsky in the first period of his work, which was interrupted during his instrumental period, was retaken by him later in a work entitled “On the questions of the psychology of the creative artist”. In that work Vygotsky returned to some important topics developed by him in “The Psychology of Art”:

In the process of societal life . . . emotions come into a new relationship with the other elements of psychical life, new systems appear, new blending of psychical functions; units of a higher order emerge, governed by special laws, mutual dependencies, and special forms of connections and motion. (Vygotsky, 1984, p. 328).

The above generative capacity attributed to emotions, recognizing that they “come into a new relationship with the other elements of psychical life” in a process from which new systems appear, and units of a higher order emerge, has led to the consideration of emotions as self-generative processes. That generative character of emotions allows them to be understood as inseparable from new psychological units and systems of a higher order. However, what does it mean to recognize emotions as having an active role in the emergence of systems of a higher order, among which they are also included? Unfortunately, this important idea remained unfinished in Vygotsky’s work, as well as some other concepts during his last period, such as senses and perezhivanie. Each of these concepts could represent units of a higher order, as defined above.

The concepts of sense and perezhivanie, in fact, represented two units of a higher order in relation to concepts previously developed by him. However, the psychological nature of those integrative concepts was not clearly defined by Vygotsky, as discussed by me elsewhere (González Rey, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2016(a)(b)). In these works, I argued that these concepts were relevant to advancing on the topic of subjectivity on a new basis. Nonetheless, the rejection of psychology as an individualistic and conservative system (Gergen, 1985: Rose, 1990) led to a “theoretical wave” that not only ignored new paths for the study of individuals intermingled with social realities, but also engulfed individuals and all the psychological concepts related to them.

Departing from a completely different position, this paper highlights a definition of subjectivity that integrates social realities and individuals through a new dimension of both: their subjective configurations. Such an integration implies considering emotions and motivations as the main criteria for distinguishing subjectivity from discourse, as phenomena of two different orders. While discourses are constituents of social orders, subjective senses and configurations are singular social and individual subjective productions that do not restrict themselves by any external orders. Social and individual changes have their main source in the tensions that will always result from the contradictions between social order and some individuals, groups and institutions.

The dichotomy between social orders and individual psychological processes demands advancement on a new level in the theoretical construction of both, a level that allows the explanation of the cultural, historical and social character of individuals and, at the same time, the individual active and generative character of the social networks they live within. By doing this, it is possible to maintain the relative autonomy of
both levels and, at the same time, their reciprocal integration. Subjectivity represents an alternative for advancement in the comprehension of the functioning of this intermingled dialectic between social realities and individuals, because both levels share a subjective side. In social and individual subjective configurations, both levels are represented through specific subjective senses which, being generated by each of them, carry subjective senses from the other.

Due to the emotional character of subjective senses and configurations, any psychical operation subjectively configured turns into a self-motivated operation. Motivation does not result from individual entities, whether from need, motives, sexual drives or other specific contents, whose function is to drive other psychological functions. Imagination and fantasy are subjective qualities associated with any psychological process or function that emerge within a subjective configured activity or relationship. Once psychological functions become subjective, their motivation is defined by the different subjective senses intermingled within the subjective configuration of their own function. Subjective functions and processes emerging as moments of subjective configured experiences express the system of subjectivity in those experiences. Subjectivity from this point of view does not represent a whole that flows over their particular expression; it exists through dynamic subjective configurations that embed its dominant network of subjective configurations, social and individual, in the ongoing agent’s experiences.

Subjective senses are ‘snapshots’ of symbolic emotional flashes that unfold in a chaotic movement, from which subjective configurations emerge as a self-regulative and self-generative organization of subjective senses. Subjective senses emerge in individuals and groups when they actively engage in their systems of communications and activities, which are closely interrelated to each other. Precisely as a result of such malleability, speed and dynamic character of subjective senses, their generative character is not apprehensible by conscious operations.

The aforementioned quality of the subjective senses is what makes possible their emergence carrying social symbolical constructions, such as gender, race, social status, religion and many others, as simultaneously configured at the present moment of one experience. Once symbolical social constructions appear as social or individual subjective senses, they do not follow the logic of discursive realities that organize the social order; as subjective senses they answer to the subjective configurations within which they emerge. The way in which one experience is felt and lived by individuals and groups does not depend on the “objectivized discourses” that form social realities; it will depend on the subjective resources that one individual, group or institution can generate while living a specific experience.

The main attribute of subjectivity as a human phenomenon is its generative character, its capacity to generate feelings and actions that correspond neither to the objective conditions of social reality, nor to the objective conditions of the same individuals. Vygotsky, for example, clearly noted such a quality of the human phenomenon, writing:

They didn’t understand [referring to psychologists at the time] that a handicap is not just an impoverished psychological state, but also a source of wealth, not just a weakness but a strength. They
thought that the development of a blind child centers on his blindness. The psychology of blindness is essentially the psychology of victory over blindness (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 57).

A weakness or strength of any human condition is not determined by its "objectiveness", but by the subjective senses that result from the positions of individuals and groups living the experience through their own subjective repertoires. Freud also recognized the subjective character of human processes but, unlike Vygotsky, without theorizing them as subjective. So, for example, what he conceptualized as transference was in fact the subjective creation of the other. Nonetheless, instead of taking this path, he understood it as the transfer of impulses associated with repressed individual representation from early childhood to another individual long afterwards. The appeal to universal labels to explain complex human processes, deleting their singular, historical, cultural and social character, is the best evidence that subjectivity as such was not in Freud’s focus.

Once subjective senses emerge in a process that is subjective rather than rational, it is possible to understand that conscious intentions never exhaust their complex subjective configurations. The self-generative character of such configurations results from emotions embedded within them. Motivation here is understood as being a self-generative emotional arousal intrinsic to the functioning of subjective senses and configurations. Motives do not relate directly to any given object; the “object” of human motivation is an idealized fiction actively generated by the subject, who is subjectively engaged in one experience through its subjective configuration. So, I prefer referring to subjective configurations as motivational systems than referring to motives as isolated entities oriented towards an object; motivation is an integrative expression of subjectivity as a system that expresses itself in multiple subjective configurations.

No matter how suggestive Vygotsky’s concepts of sense and *perezhivanie* were in the thinking behind new units capable of integrating intellectual operations and emotions, the fact is that emotions have never integrated intellectual operations as processes external to them, as Vygotsky aimed to focus on the unity of intellectual operations and emotions. Emotions are integrated in new units, subjective senses, which are generated together with intellectual functions by subjective configurations. When intellectual operations mobilize themselves to engage in one subjective configuration, the units from which they emerge are the subjective configurations, provoking a process such that intellectual operations carry motivational character through the subjective senses that are part of them as subjective operations.

Emotions within this proposal of subjectivity are no longer isolated dynamic impulses referring to needs or oriented to one concrete object, but are a dynamic quality of subjectivity; we are subjective beings. Emotions become constituents of the subjectivity. Imagination and fantasy are subjective processes, not rational ones, and they are dominant in human creation, no matter in what area this creation takes place. Fantasy and imagination are engendered by subjective configurations through which individuals, groups and institutions create their own worlds.
It is quite astonishing that critical theories focused on the social symbolic productions, mainly on discourse, have left human motivation out of their constructions; emotions as subjective senses are on the basis of the processes of resistance, creation, and critique that might be considered to be at the center of any critical psychology. In this regard, I give a reminder that Ignacio Martin Baró, the main figure in Latin American critical social psychology in the eighties, defended the idea that most of the concepts of psychology could be useful for a critical psychology within a new theoretical framework (Martin Baró & Dobles, 1986). So, critical psychologists should not deny psychology itself in order to solve its problems, but address them through new theoretical avenues.

Subjectivity, as discussed in this paper, is not just another psychological concept; it represents a theoretical system oriented towards explaining the specific generative imaginary capacity of human beings from which new human realities are created, appearing as a given objective world from one generation to the other. The fact that human beings are part of such different worlds, characterized as different cultures, is supported by the subjective character of both humans and culture. Subjectivity simultaneously represents a new alternative for understanding human mind, social life and culture. These three concepts do not reduce themselves to their subjective sides, but subjectivity represents a theoretical alternative for understanding them as reciprocally configured, allowing an understanding of phenomena whose explication are not exhausted by any of those instances per se.

Subjectivity assembles different concepts, in the relations of which can be understood different and interrelated topics that historically have remained separated by the different branches of psychology. The concepts of subjective configuration and subjective senses allow the articulation of different spheres of life, overcoming the long existing trend to consider some psychological functions or phenomena as intrinsic to a specific psychological branch. It is impossible to study school failure separated from the subjective functioning of the classroom, which in turn is inseparable from the social subjective functioning of the school, in whose configuration emerge subjective senses that embed social subjective configurations engendered in other areas of social subjectivity. At the same time, these endless processes of social subjectivity are not external to the social functioning of the family within which the child with learning difficulties lives.

However, the aforementioned networks of social subjective processes configured in different instances of social life do not exhaust the explanation of learning difficulties in a student. His/her difficulty does not result directly from such constellation of social subjective processes and configurations. Each student has a singular history within which different social networks of his/her own life are organized in individual subjective configurations, which in one way or another cross his/her different current existential spaces. The fact that subjectivity is a production and not a reflection implies that each individual, group or institution, is capable of generating options within the immediate broader social systems within which they emerge.
Some final comments

- The proposal on subjectivity discussed in this paper is not opposed to the concepts addressed towards understanding the complex symbolic social networks within which social and individual subjectivities emerge. Discourse is a symbolic system that articulates many different symbolic social constructions forming a living system within which particular symbolic social constructions such as gender, race, sex, and illnesses are embedded. These specific symbolic constructions, in their intermingled relations with social symbolic institutional realities like religion, morals, science, and policy, form the social dominant order.
- All social symbolic constructions organized as discourses, social representations and other social theoretical constructions do not directly activate human behaviors. It is necessary that those symbolical realities are turned into subjective senses and configurations in order to function as human motivations. Subjectivity is a motivated system within which imagination emerges as the corner stone of all human creations. These creations are the basis on which culture and social order are continuously renewed, having a historical course.
- The recognition of subjectivity as embedded in all human phenomena allows a transcending of the split between social political order and individuals, because both of them are subjectively configured. Social political order is configured within a social subjectivity and is inseparable from other subjective productions like myth, national histories, race, and many other social symbolic constructions that are inseparable from any social political order. In turn, social political order is configured in individuals by singular subjective senses and configurations, through which individual experiences are differentiated from this social order; such differentiated subjective productions configured within a dominant social order are the basis of the possibility of the subversion of this social order.
- Subjectivity is not formed by isolating elements and functions, as psyche has historically been treated by psychology. Subjectivity functions as part of symbolical discursive fields within which individuals are actively engaged through multiple and simultaneous networks of communication. These different phenomena are configured into one another through specific subjective productions. The symbolical discursive field is inseparable from the subjective configurations of social and individual subjectivities; at this level, there are always instituted subjective phenomena that are beyond individual intentions and representations.

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