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## Ideology beyond Marx: Shame, Disambiguation, and the Social Fashioning of Reparation

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**Abstract** *Marxist theories of ideology typically emphasize cognition at the expense of affect, undercutting the ability of such theories to fully imagine revolutionary practices and their impediments. This paper argues that the lived interplay between shame and thumos, the ancient Greek term for the affect that drives aggressive self-assertion, has a crucial impact on sociopolitical possibility. Both emotions take shape through the complex, dynamic interactions between infants and primary caregivers. The relational interplay of arousal, assertion and shame fashions affective templates that shape habitual responses to the other and the social world. Potentially, these templates motivate a drive for interactive repair; allowing shame and thumos to energize constructive progressive revolt. Capitalism, however, uses ideology to conscript these emotions so that their function is either limited and socially conservative or destructive. Enabling shame and thumos to spur social revolution that remains responsive to interactive repair is crucial for truly progressive social change.*

When, towards the beginning of *The German Ideology*, Marx wrote that the “first premise of all human history” was that “life involves before all else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things” (1845) he was articulating a common sense notion of human need—what drives human production fundamentally is the need for physiological subsistence. Satisfying these needs is the first crucial step in social and historical production: “The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself” (1845). Only after such needs have been satisfied do other needs arise and real social life and history commence (1845). These assertions form part of the epistemological critique upon which the young Marx focuses in the text, a forceful attack on German idealism, embodied in the contemporary young Hegelians, which privileged the realm of ideas and spirit (and abstraction) over material life. Marx’s first premise is that human life begins in the concrete struggle with matter, which he sees as actualized in hunger and physiological need. Such a focus, he reasoned, would allow him to found his analysis of human social life on “definite individuals, not as they appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as they really are” (1845). Such is Marx’s aim and fantasy.<sup>1</sup>

Almost precisely a century later, in 1943, the psychologist Abraham Maslow published “A Theory of Human Motivation,” which

1 For a Marxist-Hegelian (dialectic) critique of the notion of animal needs as fundamental for what is human, see Kojève (1980: 39-41).

asserted that there exists a basic hierarchy of human need. Most fundamental, or to use Maslow’s language, most “prepotent,” is physiological need—hunger, thirst, warmth, etc. Maslow dramatically makes his point: “For our chronically and extremely hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where there is plenty of food” (1943). Humanity, for Maslow, also has other basic needs (and he assembles them in their order of “prepotency:” safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization), but his controlling idea is that a person’s most fundamental wants need to be satisfied before that person feels able to gratify less fundamental ones. Gratification, he believes, “releases the organism from the domination of a relatively more physiological need, permitting therefore the emergence of more social goals” (1943). In this way he paralleled Marx, who argued that only after a person’s need for clothes, food, water and shelter were satisfied could the person fully exist in social life.<sup>2</sup>

Marx and Maslow are most strange bedfellows. I don’t want to overemphasize the parallel, however, except to suggest how it manifests powerfully the very thing Marx was trying to critique—the ubiquitous work of ideology, manifest in commonplace assumptions. For both Marx and Maslow, human life begins with a fundamental need for a certain kind of consumption—individual, appetitive, rooted in physiology. As much as

2 The holocaust survivor Primo Levi makes a similar point: “the need man naturally feels for [freedom] comes after much more pressing needs: to resist cold, hunger, illnesses, parasites, animal and human aggressions” (1989: 151).

our consciousness might be a historically produced phenomenon, an effect of sociohistorical forces, as Marx did not restrain himself from emphasizing in his writings, certain “bodily” needs remained natural, that is, somehow, at root, prior to or beyond sociality. Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, Maslow himself questions this momentarily, arguing that a precondition or prerequisite for even the most basic physiological need is freedom—a person needs to feel free to speak and to express oneself in order to really respond to hunger. The oddity of this assertion seems less odd if one views Maslow’s hierarchy as an unconscious effort to reify a bourgeois version of social life. With freedom and food in one’s belly, one is prepared to take on the fray of daily life and pursue higher needs. The fact that the young Marx starts his own genealogy of need in a similar place points to his own difficulty at that time to fully think his way outside of some of the more deeply rooted commonplaces of nineteenth century habits of thought. Marx has his own founding myth, or premise, at least in *The German Ideology*, which articulates an appetitive version of fundamental human need. A critical appraisal of this premise, however, as he himself would suggest, might begin with the notion that “phantoms formed in the human brain are...sublimates of their material life processes” (1845). To draw out the connection: Marx’s account of human need cannot be separated from the material conditions in which he wrote, which foregrounded the struggle for subsistence among the working class. His focus on this struggle strongly invests (and troubles) his notions of human need and desire.

What both Marx and Maslow neglect in their accounts of basic human need is the fundamental significance of interpersonal life—attachment, attunement, interpersonal engagement. Maslow would be confronted with this issue a little over a decade after positing his hierarchy of needs, when Harry Harlow began to perform his significant but inhumane experiments with very young rhesus monkeys, which showed that at least for that species, the need for attachment frequently dominated hunger as a motive for behavior. John Bowlby (1983) and others’ work on infants followed in this vein, strongly suggesting that a need for social life may be more basic for humans than most forms of physiological requirements. This is something Marx, one might think, would have championed as a founding premise, but, at least in *The German Ideology*, he didn’t. When he posited his version of human nature, as limited, hedged and flexible as it was, the version he posited, at least in its physiological account of fundamental human need, echoed the appetitive individualism of his contemporary ideology.<sup>3</sup>

3 In *Capital*, Marx made needs much more provisional: “[T]he number and extent of his [the worker’s] so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the products of historical development” (qtd. in Rubin 2004: 773). Gayle Rubin, from a feminist perspective, critiques Marx for largely assuming that needs are inherently masculine (2004: 773-774). I think Rubin’s critique is accurate and that Marx’s relative non-consideration of female labor issues is also an effect of his inability to escape being interpellated by

Much of the reason for this anomaly—that Marx, the brilliant inquisitor of ideology, did not, at least in this text, escape its influence and taint—is because Marx thought of ideology predominantly as working at the level of ideas, as producing “forms of consciousness” (Marx 1845). In escaping what he would have considered the bourgeois sentimentalism of certain forms of 18th century thought, such as that of Adam Smith, he replicated the Hegelian mistake—he largely abandoned affect as a significant form of motivation. Rather than analyze feeling, except perhaps as class resentment, he focused on need and thoughts and largely ignored the feelings that mediate and condition both of them. Material life is sensuous life, as Marx recognized, but this is life produced by feeling, by affect, by emotion, by the registering of the social world in the welter of impassioned experience. Yet when Marx thought analytically about the socioeconomic forces that produced familiar forms of human life, he imagined thinking as the primary place where ideology registered and performed its work, not the realm of emotion.<sup>4</sup>

Such a privileging of the cognitive, even for radical Western thinkers, has been and is surprisingly hard to resist. After a brief flurry of interest in emotion, particularly sympathy, by 18th century bourgeois individualist thinkers such as Adam Smith and Frances Hutchinson, theories of sociality and human life have typically failed to offer a salient account of the significance of affect in collective life.<sup>5</sup> Marx followed this pattern, as did Marxism more generally. As Megan Boler (1997: 258) has argued, “In some sense what we lack is a Marxist account of emotion...” The reason for this is twofold: first, until the last two decades or so, there has been a relative dearth of interest in the emotions in the human sciences as a whole. The social field has been construed as being predominantly relational and structural; that is, it is imagined and studied as a dense, complex configuration of organizations and systems (rather than, say, as an ensemble of attachments and affective interrelations or flows). The effort to engage in systematic analysis imagines the social field itself as, not surprisingly, systematic, as a relatively stable configuration of what can be construed in some sense as formal elements. The epitome of this way of thinking is manifested in works such as Claude Levi-Strauss’s *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1969: 29-41), which treats

ideology.

4 Slavoj Žižek has argued, following Lacan, that Marx saw ideology as a symptom, registering its functioning at the junction of material and symbolic reality. While Žižek may be right, this doesn’t mean that such a symptom had anything to do with affect. Rather, in Žižek’s Lacanian framework, the symptom results from a “deadlock” of desire, and desire, for Lacan is an effect of symbolic castration and attendant lack, not affective life in its complexity. See Žižek (2004: 712-713, 723).

5 See Terry Eagleton’s attempt to create a Lacanian-Marxist theory of the relationship between ethics and emotions in *Trouble with Strangers* (2009: 1-82). The problem is that using Lacan as a theoretical touchstone engages him with a psychoanalytic framework that tends to harrow the rich complexity of the role of emotions in social life.

relations of affinity and affiliation as formal structures rather than as complex precipitates and distributions of feeling or as regulated flows of emotional entrainment, investment and circulation, and in Niklas Luhmann's *Social Systems*,<sup>6</sup> which imagines society as a network of distinct communicative systems in which persons (and their emotions) are, at best, incidental and ancillary. Both works manifest a sense that the social order doesn't include affective life, at least not as a determinative component. This attitude reflects a habitual neglect of emotion as a generative social force.<sup>7</sup> If society is imagined as a social system or *order*, and if emotion is imagined as being an impediment to order or outside it, then emotion typically won't be part of the analytic calculus that strives to master the structure of social life. Second, Marx's critical effort to understand social life privileged the lens of economics as a mode of analysis. This centered his thinking in notions of exchange, transaction, the commodity, labor, capital, etc., which was both productive and limiting. It allowed him to foreground the particular transactive organization and structures of social life within capitalism, but it simultaneously caused him to underemphasize the affective energies and patterns that shape life in common and which pervade whatever consciousness and cognitions that any particular version of material life produces.

This problem with fully acknowledging or theorizing emotion extends well beyond Marx and affects postmarxist thought, even when such thought focuses in part on the body itself. Michel Foucault, for example, in his notion of biopower, strives to register the effect of social discipline in bodies. In his earlier writings on disciplinary societies, he argues that such discipline works, to borrow a phrase from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, "by structuring the parameters and limits of *thought* and practice" (2004: 143, my italics). But in what Hardt and Negri see Foucault defining as societies of control, by which they all mean to designate the late modern/postmodern West, a shift in the production of discipline occurs. "Mechanisms of command" become "more immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the brains and bodies of citizens... Power is now exercised through machines that directly organize brains (in communication systems, information networks, etc.) and bodies (in welfare systems, monitored activities, etc.)..." (2004: 144). In Hardt and Negri's version of Foucault, the information society pervades us down to our axons and dendrites. Yet this regulating immersion in biopower remains uneven, for while biopower influences affect, both Hardt and Negri's and Foucault's focus is on cognitive regulation and systems, which only secondarily engage with affect, privileging

6 Luhmann. (1995: 12-58). For another example, see Pierre Bourdieu's work on taste and distinction (2004), which ought to offer an account of emotions given its focus on the embodiment of social life in persons "below" the level of consciousness.

7 The work going on currently in microsociology is an exception to this tendency, developing from the work of Emile Durkheim and Erving Goffman. See, for example, Randall Collins (2004); Jack Katz (1999); Thomas Scheff (1994); and Jack Barbalet (2001).

the cognitive over the affective. Ideology works primarily structurally, not affectively. Thus, even in this strand of postmarxist analysis, which ought to fully theorize the relationship between mechanisms of social regulation and affect, ideology is conceived as predominantly doing cognitive work, regulating the imagined executive role of cognition in social practice at the expense of affect.

A dearth of theorizing about affect, then, is a problem in Marxist social analysis and its offspring, and this dearth largely stems from the cognitive bias that still tends to dominate philosophical and theoretical Marxism. The very word "ideology" derives from the Greek roots *idea*, meaning a form, kind or class, and *logos*, meaning discourse or reason. Both roots foreground cognition. In theory and in practice, ideology is typically conceived as a system of thought (of the ruling class, of power, etc.), but paradoxically, I would assert that this notion of ideology is itself the work of ideology.<sup>8</sup> Social regulation and production do not *primarily* work by limiting or scripting what we think.<sup>9</sup> Instead, as Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 52-52; 1991: 80-81) has emphasized, social systems exert their control by normalizing practices, by coercing actions, by producing motivations, not simply or predominantly by commandeering thoughts.<sup>10</sup> A primary way social orders exert such normalizing force is by defining and determining the field of feelings, the dispositions that competent social persons possess. Such dispositions and the emotions that inhabit them invest cognitions with values, producing valencies and intensities that determine the relative significance, focus and force of appraisals, judgments and recognitions. Social orders work, that is, produce and reproduce themselves, in part by habituating people and populations to emotional profiles and dispositions, and it is a person's consequent emotional responses to situations that typically rouse, animate and shape what he or she thinks, and more importantly,

8 In later Marxism, as Fredric Jameson has argued, ideology is conceptualized not as a problem of thought, but rather as a problem of practices; it doesn't register so much in what one thinks as in what one does (Jameson, 2009, 336-348). This reformulation, manifest in different ways in the work of Louis Althusser, Pierre Bourdieu and others, doesn't countermand the dearth of attention to affect in descriptions of ideology, however. And although Marx himself wished to oppose the overemphasis on thought in the German Idealism of his time with history and materiality, his conception of ideology does not escape the cognitive bias of analytic thought, even when construed dialectically.

9 Zizek argues that one's behavior and one's thoughts may be radically different, and that even if one becomes aware of ideology, one's behavior may not change at all. To use Zizek's phrase: "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it." He sees this as part of the basic functioning of ideology, which he sees as operating beyond consciousness: "The fundamental level of ideology, however, is not of an illusion masking the real state of things, but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself" (2004: 721).

10 See Bourdieu (1990: 52-65). Although as I argued earlier, Bourdieu's recognition of the connection between forms of social control and action does not lead him in any way to a robust account of the role of emotions in the social field.

how he or she acts. One doesn't have to agree fully with Arlie Russell Hochschild's (1979: 563-66) notion that emotions are managed by a social palette of "feeling rules" to recognize that the normalizing production of emotions and dispositions has an enormous effect on how individuals act, constructing, modulating and regulating the range of competent performance across the social field.<sup>11</sup>

One of the crucial ways through which social orders reproduce themselves is by creating templates of emotional life and feeling patterns, which have crucial effects on what is perceived as competent social life. These templates are initially generated and inscribed through an infant/toddler's early interaction with a primary care giver (or givers) (Schoore, 1994, 2003a, 2003b). This crucial relationship, and the precise lived interactions that specify what it is, attempt to work upon the child's temperament and adapt it to the conventions of the social order, fashioning and refashioning temperament through and as dispositions.

In early life, the primary emotion that underlies this interactive process is shame. Shame occurs when an infant or child cannot appropriately regulate his or her affect. As Allan Schoore (1994: 200-212) has argued, shame is one aspect of the crucial developmental process that all children go through in the process of socialization: learning to compose and modulate affect, both internally and in relation to others. In this developmental process, affect and cognition become coupled and enmeshed, but not quite merged or fused. They become interactive, recursively implicated, each shaping the other, as cognitive processes expand and get composed by the social environment—by relations with others—and the infant's affective repertoire registers this social shaping without simply yielding to it. One might call this process affective-cognitive intermingling without synthesis, a process that permanently entangles affect and cognition in the production of social practices. Moreover, as an infant's affect attunes to cognitive shaping, that modified affect in turn influences and shapes the infant's assimilation of socially generated frames and patterns, which register as both restricting and facilitating cognitions. This entire process occurs in and through repeated affective interactions, exchanges and transactions with others, involving an infant/toddler in situations of emotional arousal, which come to be continually modulated or adapted to the emotional tenor as well as the interactive and relational patterns of the social environment in which such arousal occurs. When the infant's emotional state is not attuned with that of the primary care giver or the social surround in general, especially when due to excessive arousal, loss of cognitive/affective composure, or a misalignment with the affective state of others, it creates stress for the infant and shame, which need to be managed or dissipated.

<sup>11</sup> Hochschild's interactive account of emotions posits that emotions emerge in social process, not as organismic responses that are merely managed or constrained by social forces. For Hochschild, feeling rules are crucial in the very production of emotion (1979: 551-554; see also 2003).

According to Schoore (1994: 336), the primary place where this learning occurs is in the intensely interactive matrix of the mother-child dyad. This is the initial matrix of attachment, but it is important to recognize that attachment is an ongoing, dialectically calibrated process, generated and continually revised in the ongoing specificity of that relationship, and not some reified "thing" that can be detached or separated from the dynamics of the relationship itself. In Schoore's words: "[a]ttachment can ...be conceptualized as the *interactive regulation of synchrony between psychobiologically attuned organisms*" (2003a: 64, my italics). Because the infant or child desires a rough synchrony of emotional feeling with the primary care giver and the social surround, it must learn to read the emotional state of the other, and to modify its emotional condition, whether it be joyful arousal or agitation and stress, to create or restore the rough synchrony that underlies attachment. In order for this process to go well, the primary caregiver needs to also modulate her or his arousal and affective disposition to synchronize with that of the child. Especially important is the caregiver's ability to help the infant manage accelerating and asymmetrical arousal, whether it is positive, as in joy, or negative, as in rage. According to Schoore (2003a: 142), much of this synchronizing of affect is not a conscious process in either caregiver or child. The primary caregiver, when effectively engaged with the child, responds to the "rhythms" of the child's affect as well as to the particular quality of that affect and its interpersonal communication. Although the caregiver's ability to recognize the child's affective states is crucial, it is his or her interactively aligned response to the temporal qualities of the child's emotion that facilitates synchronization.

However, since the problem of otherness inhabits the caregiver-child matrix, asynchrony of emotion is a constant part of the very process of attachment. As the child's affect accelerates or retreats into dormancy, or as the caregiver overrides the child's affective states with his or her own emotional condition, or becomes non-responsive, affective misalignments and disruptions occur. One role the caregiver has in helping the child to learn to manage his or her affective states is in guiding the child through the process of what I would call "active reattunement," that is, the process through which the child and caregiver repair the breach in their interaction caused by emotional misalignment and restore some form of affective synchrony. Schoore calls this process "interactive repair" (2003a: 143). Such repair is crucially the way in which the child learns to manage and quell the feelings of primitive shame that attend emotional dissonance.

Normally, primitive shame is the result of the child's recognition that his or her emotion is somehow too much for the situation or the other. Through interactive feedback, the child feels emotionally *exposed*; that is, the child feels as if its emotional arousal, rather than participating in some kind of dialectic of engaged, interactive sharing with the other, manifests its affective being in a way that is not reciprocated, that isolates that emotion from social interchange. Such exposure can occur either

through the caregiver's resistance to or rejection of the emotion, or more paradoxically, through his or her ignoring of it. In the latter case, the emotion is exposed in its very non-reflection; it is exposed as an unmet possibility of affective attunement. The typical response to this is emotional deceleration, deflation and/or withdrawal. And this emotional subsidence is the core of primitive shame. Ideally, the child learns to modulate his or her affect prior to the exposure and misalignment that produces shame by attuning to the affective condition of the primary caregiver and learning to respond emotionally in ways commensurate to the caregiver's own affect and behavior. In return, the caregiver ideally modulates his or her affect in response to the child's. This dynamic interplay provides continual microfeedback for the infant or child about what type and intensity of emotion will sustain the interplay, what emotion-driven performance will not quell or quash the other's interest; to put it bluntly, such microfeedback guides the child in how to avoid the shame of non-reciprocated emotional exposure. However, when the infant responds aggressively, gets too excited, rages over separation or weeps without a cause the caregiver can understand, the interplay breaks down. And because the infant is primarily, at this point, affectively and socially driven, such a breakdown involves, however briefly, a stunting of affective assertion, a diminishment of self or protoself, a subsidence of emotional assertion or even arousal—shame. The pattern of each particular child's affective attunement and failed attunement with the primary caregiver and the social surround fashions the foundation of the child's emotional life, generating a template of emotional assertion, shame and reparation that will powerfully influence a person's later interactions with others and with the social field. Later emotional regulation and management builds upon the templates and affective repertoires inculcated in this early interplay. This process is also recursive, in that these early templates shape how one behaves (as well as how one thinks), which shapes how others interact with a person, which can either reinforce or modify the earlier templates, which then influences further interaction, and so on. Reinforcement of templates is probably the dominant effect of interpersonal interaction, with modification as a secondary effect. This structuring of affective templates provides the motivational infrastructure upon which ideology will later encroach and attempt to settle.

Crucial in these early interactions are the ways a child learns to repair the problems created interpersonally by his own and the other's non-attuned or inappropriately regulated emotion. At the core of this interaction is a kind of struggle for recognition, in which the infant and caregiver interact in self-assertive ways, each seeking to have her or his own desire dominate the interplay, or at least to have his or her desire fully acknowledged. In ways that partially parallel Hegel's master/slave dialectic, both parties want the other to affirm the significance of their own affective gestures and performances.<sup>12</sup> Part of the problem of failed at-

12 The dialectic in the infant mother case is not as purely conflicted as in Hegel's account of the master/slave relation, which Alexander Kojève has inter-

tunement has to do with the volatile, often fugitive, aggressive assertions of affect that each party advances and wishes would control the other, or at least which would generate a mirroring response. The fantasy is that the other would become simply a mirror for one's own desire rather than an other, a fantasy that always meets with some degree of frustration. The failures of attunement and mirroring that inevitably occur and must occur in such intimate, contentious relations generate shame, the affect that registers the other's and/or the social world's non-attunement to or rejection of one's narcissistic fantasies and claims. However, if the shame produced by the affective misalignments and affronts that inhabit the relations between the primary caregiver and child can be tolerated, such relational dissonance can create fluid, desiring attempts to reattune to the other. Over time, these practices of reconnection can cohere and jell, forging templates of what Schore calls "interactive repair." In this process, the child learns particular forms of submission of his or her affective assertiveness, agitation and/or ebullience to the needs of the other or the social situation. There is in these templates a specified interplay of what Plato in the *Phaedrus* called *eros* and *thumos*, that is, between the urge for connection and attachment and the passions of self-assertion and a desire for recognition. Early interaction creates patterns for the proportional relation between affective self-assertion and the desire for attachment, both elements of one's desire for recognition. To some degree, this proportion is determined by the frequency and kind of interactive repair that occurs between caregiver and child. A caregiver who actively reattunes with a child's often conflicted affective experience will create a different template of shame, self-assertion and attachment than one who exacerbates or neglects the child's affective sallies and responses.

The child's own effort at interactive repair and the responses it receives is a crucial element in the setting of interactive patterns into affective templates. Reparation in the wake of shame is the child's first effort, often ambivalent, at recognizing himself or herself in and through the feelings of the other, and attempting to return to an emotional field that is recognized as *social*. As Jessica Benjamin (1988: 68-74) has pointed out, such reparation is a process that involves not mere submission, but assertion and recognition of the other as other. But because that other has expectations that the child behave in accord with affective conventions, this experience of emotional misalignment, shame and the attendant desire for affective reattunement and repair begins the process of the child's subjection to and subjectivation by the social order. Non-attunement is the infant's first experience with something

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preted as a fight to the death that must be modified into a dialectic struggle that sublates rather than destroys the other (1980: 15). Rather, as Jessica Benjamin has argued, the relation is at once conflicted and sympathetic, individuated and deeply relational. It oscillates between the kind of struggle that Hegel's dialectic outlines, and moments of alignment and consonance that do not involve subordination. See Benjamin (1988, 51-84). Axel Honneth (1996) and Patchen Markell (2003) have tried to draw out the political implications of Hegel's dialectic

akin to negation, and reattunement/affective repair is the child's first attempt to negotiate that negation.

Emotional life, however, is not so simple or fully socially controlled. For the interplay between infant and caregiver (especially the oscillations of attunement that surround and pervade the struggles with affective assertion, agitation, ebullience, shame and reparation) generates a complex palette of feelings that lays the groundwork for often ambivalent but potentially powerful and spontaneous connections to and care for the other. What the child may learn from the mother, mimetically, is how to manage feelings when one is *beset* by the emotions of the other, how to value connection with the other when the other *exposes* affective difference or when one goes unrecognized. What a child may also learn is that emotional assertion and connection are not incompatible, that good social life involves an abundance of both, and that one can attune (an early form of care) and be emotionally assertive simultaneously. Early child/caregiver interactions may not merely generate templates, but also emotional resources and aptitudes, a default feeling repertoire that senses that the means out of affective troubles induced by the other as other occurs through interactive and *social* return to the other's affective distress/difference. Much of later childhood development involves the effort to conventionalize and limit these feelings because they often complicate social and perhaps, even more powerfully, economic behavior.

How much and for whom a person cares is a driving but typically unacknowledged focus of social management and control, and this is an area where ideology, particularly capitalist ideology, explicitly attempts to compose emotion. Such ideology provides ideas, conventions, schemas and habitual practices about how we are to respond emotionally, to whom, and for what reasons. The social order is anxious about certain kinds of feelings of attachment and care that tend to impede or hinder the needs of social and economic exchange and the maximization of profit. For example, as the owner or manager of a company, a disposition to attune affectively (rather than strategically) to the feelings and needs of employees may make that manager more likely to make labor concessions (such as paying higher wages, being more accommodating about work scheduling or conditions, or providing better health care options) that would adversely affect profits. Similarly, a deep attachment to family may make it difficult for an employee to work the amount of hours that would maximize production, creating feelings of shame if the employee privileged work above family-focused emotional needs. In both cases, the difficulty stems from a potential dissonance or misalignment of affect. Though early caregiver/child interaction gives a person some resources to manage or contain or "survive" the feelings that arise in such situations, capitalist ideology works to compose the range of response, delimiting if not quite scripting possibilities for improvisational performance. Such ideology gives the owner/manager in my hypothetical scenario motivation and behavioral templates to act as if maximizing profits is a necessary and good

aspect of running a business that ultimately benefits employees; ideology also will make it feel right (or at least necessary) for the worker who labors for long hours to advance his or her professional life to act as if this "self-actualization" will attend to his or her family's emotional needs by giving each member the possibility of greater consumer power (each child can have his or her own room and his or her own TV and computer and video games and ipod, etc., to take care of his or her emotional needs while the parent/worker is at work). Contemporary ideology wishes to fashion attachments and one's affective palette according to the needs of capital, hoping to build on the templates laid down in early life, but since the caregiver/infant relation shapes affective life largely in relation to composing feelings and passions in a situation of deep intimacy (at least in the current postindustrial west, though this may be changing with the advent of commercial childcare), it adventitiously privileges deep attachment as a primary aim of social relating, rather than the efficiency of exchange. In this particular way, intimate, shame-tolerating early attachment often surreptitiously works against the needs of capitalist ideology.

Deep, dynamic attachment, as a consequence, poses a significant obstacle to the smooth, efficient running of the postmodern world. As Anthony Giddens (1992: 58) has argued, the new social ideal is for relations to be *at will*, so to speak; that is, they are to continue only so long as they are gratifying. They are to be *pure*, not complicated by obligation or duty or dependency, and consequently they are to be unconstrained and autonomous; more importantly, they are not to impinge on a person's freedom or mobility. For a person to get to this emotional condition, however, involves transforming the emotional templates and habituations that will have been generated in early life (if the primary caregiver effectively modeled reattunement and active repair as salient aspects of interpersonal interaction). Ideology exerts its influence in this domain by providing predominant customary templates (and more formally, rules and policies), attitudes, habits, compartments, postures and practices that refashion, adjust and normalize a person's affective repertoire and responses, modulations that typically truncate the complexity of a person's emotional templates or that cultivate some degree of detachment from them. Contemporary ideology allows attachment, but produces it as provisional and attempts to specify its trajectories, intensities and other dimensions. In the words of Daniel Siegel (1999: 253), ideology creates "windows of tolerance" for emotions; that is, it creates bounded "spaces" in one's mind in which "various intensities of emotional arousal can be processed without disrupting the functioning of the system." Siegel refers here to the mind as the system to be disrupted, an implicitly idealist conception. But the notion of "windows of tolerance" also could define the limits and levels of affect that can be socially tolerated and under what conditions, with the possibility of shame functioning as the internal register of a potential misalignment with the other, and thereby of the social field as a whole. In this effort to temper the range and intensity of emotion, ideology does attempt to use thought (and practices) to regulate affect. It especially strives to limit or

compose dispositions to attachment, reparation and reattunement that emerge in response to the distress of the other. Though we live in societies that supposedly privilege attachment and care for others, in practice the implicit and explicit pressures and interests of the economic sphere typically curb and adjust attachment and care. Our very “intersubjective orientation,” to use the words of Daniel Stern (2004: 106), is dramatically affected by the tensions, conflicts and complicities between early templates of attachment and shame, and ideological scripts, habituations and practices. In late modern/postmodern capitalism, forms of attachment and interpersonal dependency need to be effectively channeled, adjusted or restructured; otherwise, they might adversely impact the mobility and extreme individuation that capitalism requires of its labor force. Facebook and similar social media, with their loose, at-will networks of attachment and connection, seem to be a manifestation of such ideology at work.

Ideology, then, attempts to intervene in situations of emotional ambivalence, ambiguity, intensity and complexity, situations where attachments conflict with social mobility and freedom, and *disambiguate* those situations in favor of “socially appropriate” levels of affective feeling towards the other—deep perhaps, but not controlling. It accomplishes this by splitting shame away from its early involvement in attachment and reparation, as a feeling that is interpersonally *negotiated*, instead transforming it into the affect that registers the forces of social control. Shame, which is grounded in the other’s (and the social world’s) inability or unwillingness to mirror one’s exposure of feelings of affective investment, upsurge or elation, becomes instead an affective registering of the inadequacy of one’s entire social being (Schore 1994b: 155-56). Shame shifts from being an affective manifestation of emotional dysregulation in an interpersonal situation or an effect of unreciprocated emotional exposure that induces a desire for repair to the annihilation of self that shame becomes as the disciplinary appendage of the social order. In this sense, shame becomes, as Thomas Scheff (1990: 79) asserts, “the primary social emotion in that it is generated by the virtually constant monitoring of the self in relation to others.” Shame takes on its disciplinary social function by generalizing the threat of exposure and consequent nonrecognition; from the problem of emotional misalignment with the other in early childhood (which often generates impulses to interactive repair) it extends to any salient violation of social convention or norm, including feeling rules. And in this extension it becomes more adverse, more toxic, as the social world itself is less interested in affective repair than in affective control and normalization. The ideological aim is to use shame to sharply curtail more open-ended emotional responses to distress or the other’s need (or even to one’s own desire for affective attunement), and to facilitate those responses that are commensurate with the smooth functioning of a given social order. Shame becomes the affective mechanism by which persons accept their subjectivation (and subjection), because shame makes them feel as if socially transgressive being is no being at all. Ideology and disciplinary shame disambiguate the affective

complexity of situational response, and this facilitates socially conventionalized practices.

The ideological conventionalization of shame and reparation works hard to channel and regulate the powerful ethical possibilities that attend the impulse to attune to others in distress, which emerge from and through the dynamics of engaged, mutually synchronized infant/caregiver relations. This conventionalization (one might say delimitation) of reparation also powerfully influences other emotions that drive unconventional social possibilities, including revolutionary ones. Thumos, the ancient Greek concept of emotional self-assertion, often manifested as rage, is one significant example of this effect. In early childhood, as D. W. Winnicott (1989: 73-78) has argued, the good-enough caregiver is able to tolerate and survive the child’s rage, the child’s uncomposed self-assertion. Rage doesn’t by itself negate attunement, except perhaps momentarily. Rather, a good-enough caregiver responds to the child’s rage with possibilities of reattunement and/or modulation. This allows the child to pair rage and reparation, and to structure his or her disposition to rage with only enough shame to “protect” the other from rage’s annihilating possibilities. This hedging of rage with moderated, tolerable shame leaves rage in a place that is potentially useful interpersonally and socially. For through the construction of such an emotional template, rage can involve reparative feelings and possibilities, and the potential for destruction in rage doesn’t have to be rigorously censored. Instead, it can be loosed. This, of course, is not the revolutionary rage of someone such as Pol Pot, where the template for rage involves the annihilation of the other. Instead, it is the rage that, even if it arises in humiliation or nonrecognition, can direct its energy into revision and construction, a rage that can remain attuned to the other, even in its mode of destructiveness. It is a rage that sees reparation and reattunement as a necessary part of revolution, in whatever situation revolution occurs.

Capitalist ideology typically fights against this sort of rage, trying instead to conscript thumos into energizing each subject to police the social order and shame those who transgress.<sup>13</sup> This version of emotional assertion or rage is fueled by the social, toxic version of shame, by a need to cleanse the social order of adverse possibilities of affect. Thumos, along with disgust and contempt, become agents of shame as social humiliation, saturating the social field, or more specifically, social interaction, with emotions of social control, judgment and exclusion, rather than those of reattunement or reparation. When bound to such a version of shame, thumos has a social function, a “window of tolerance,” so to speak. Otherwise, thumos is to be either very tightly contained or suppressed.

What one can see from all of this is that human life doesn’t begin in any simple way with hunger or appetite or a hierarchy of needs. Rather, it begins in the material specificity of life with others; it

13 Peter Sloterdijk’s *Rage and Time* sparked my interest in thumos.

begins in socially engaged contact; it begins in the shaping and modulation of affective life; it begins in the social development of needs, in which affect has a primary role; it begins in a desire for recognition that entails mutuality and reparation rather than domination. Ideology, in addition to structuring thought, as Marx argued, and practices, as later Marxism has asserted, also strives to compose and fashion acceptable emotional profiles and templates. It aims to dominate the place where affect and cognition meet and become entangled. However, in spite of ideology, each person potentially forms a repertoire of emotional possibility in early life that plants the seeds for relationships between shame, reparation, interpersonal attunement and, yes, rage that make social transformation and humane revolution a viable, complexly impassioned possibility. And this may be our most fundamental need of all.

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