Critical psychoanalytic social psychology in the German speaking countries

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Abstract
The article traces the main stages of the history of psychoanalytic social psychology in German speaking countries. Beginning with Freud, it illuminates the Freudomarxists, Critical theory, the developments during the 1960ies and 70ies and of ethnopsychoanalysis, followed by an illustration of central topics of psychoanalytic social psychology (in- and exclusion, authoritarism and right-wing extremism, as well as the aftermath of the National Socialism and the fields of subject and gender). Reflections on a psychoanalytic-oriented empirical social research complete the text.

Keywords: Psychoanalytic Social Psychology, Psychoanalysis, History, Freudomarxism, Critical Theory, Political Psychology, Ethnopsychoanalysis

Introduction
Psychoanalytic social psychology aims and aimed at integrating psychoanalysis into the analysis of politics, history, and society in order to unveil their respective conscious and unconscious subjective factors. This kind of social psychology had been established at several German speaking universities, such as Frankfurt, Hannover, Munich, Bremen, Zurich, and Salzburg, during the 1960s in the wake of a socio-critical upheaval. In the course of the last two centuries, however, it has been increasingly marginalized or eliminated altogether in most places. This ‘fate’ shared with other critical sciences, has also led to a renewed politicization and a rekindling of psychoanalytically oriented critical thought by a younger generation.

We want to seize the possibility offered by the Annual Review of Critical Psychology in order to reconstruct the history of the tradition of psychoanalytic social psychology in German speaking countries, which has spanned more than a hundred years by now, and to open up
possibilities of updating it. We focus on the main traditions and developments until the 1980s. Over the last thirty years, however, psychoanalytic social psychology has taken up a number of new issues. It has, for example, incorporated reflections on adolescence and organization theory and has focused on empirical studies drawing on psychoanalytic methods, sometimes at the cost of meta-psychological concepts. Reconstructing all of these developments would expand this text out of proportion, primarily because they are related to the question of whether the political and socio-critical potential of psychoanalytic social psychology has changed or even waned.

Integrating psychoanalysis into critical social theory does not come without problems. The history of psychoanalytic social psychology reveals a number of pitfalls that have accompanied it: Over and over, psychoanalytic social psychological texts exert psychologistic reductions or even naturalizations or biologizations of social relations and phenomena. On the other hand, there are also sociologistic or ‘culturalist’ reductions, which ignore the contradictions within subjects, or ‘idealistic’ perspectives that do away with human ‘nature’ altogether. Psychoanalytic social psychology has to fend off both kinds of reductionism. Taking issue with the potential but also the limits of psychoanalytic knowledge and its relation to social theory is fundamental.

Debates on the relationship between psychoanalysis and sociology have always delved into the question concerning which psychoanalysis and in what way this psychoanalysis should be performed. German speaking psychoanalytic social psychology has mainly referred to the writings of Freud himself. However, the exact manner of interpreting and handling them has always been an embattled field. Psychoanalytic social psychologists soon discovered that meta-psychological problems are indispensable for a socio-critical and political reception of psychoanalysis, not least because Freud’s meta-psychology addresses the constitution of subjectivity and the role played by inner nature and outer reality.

Historicizing psychoanalytic knowledge is necessary: Freud did not analyze ‘humans as such’ but subjects that were constituted by a bourgeois-capitalist, patriarchal, and colonial society; the ideals that marked psychological development as ‘normal’ and ‘successful’ or ‘deviant’ and ‘pathological’ are also determined by this socio-historic frame.

The kind of psychoanalytic critical social psychology we introduce in this paper has mostly been rather self-sufficient and focused on certain debates in German speaking countries. This isolation has its pitfalls, which we will discuss in our conclusion, but also has its advantages. The isolation of psychoanalytic critical social psychology allows us, at least, to set limits to our presentation and makes it legitimate for us to restrict our reflections on the history of psychoanalytic social psychology to German speaking countries – with the exception of writings and debates of German authors exiled to America. Astonishingly, such an overview of psychoanalytic social psychology, also called ‘analytic social psychology’ (Fromm), ‘political psychology’ (Brückner, Horn), or ‘critical theory of the subject’ (Lorenzer), has not been published.²

² Firstly, however, there are anthologies presenting papers compiled in historical perspective: For example, anthologies edited by Dahmer (1980) that contain the psychoanalytic, social psychological writings of Freud up until the 1980s and the documentations of marxism-psychoanalysis-debates from the 1920s and 1960s by Sandkühler (1971) and Gente (1970). Secondly, we want to point to monographs that deal with certain aspects and phases of the history of psychoanalytic social psychology, above all, we owe Dahmer’s (1982) analysis of Freud and the Freudian left of the 1920s/1930s a great deal. Furthermore, Brückner (1982), Krovoza/Schneider (1988), Busch (2001), and Emmerich (2007) deserve mention. The recent introduction to ‘critical psychology’ by Abl (2007), which gives much room to the leftist reception of psychoanalysis, almost seems like a revival of
Our overview makes no claims of being complete. Rather, we want to offer a historic overview of the main characteristics and developments of German speaking critical psychoanalytic social psychology, commencing with Freud and his culture theoretical attempts, in the first part of our paper. Here, we reflect changes in research questions and theoretical concepts in relation to historical changes to some extent. In the second part, we provide some insights into thematic debates about the major topics of psychoanalytic social psychology: authoritarianism, processes of inclusion and exclusion, National Socialism and its consequences, and questions regarding the constitution of gendered subjects. In the short third part of our paper, we present debates that focus on methodological issues of psychoanalytic social psychology. In our conclusion, we discuss omissions and possible future directions and actualizations of critical psychoanalytic social psychology.

1. Historical development

1.1. Freud

“The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk,” says Hegel (1821, p. 13). Freudian psychoanalysis, too, came into being at the dusk of the nineteenth century, when classical bourgeois society had already started to crumble and to enter its imperialistic phase. With it, the (gendered) bourgeois subject, who would lie on Freud’s couch, eroded as well and revealed, in its innermost core, the contradictions of bourgeois capitalist society as inner psychological conflicts. This erosion of the subject influenced Freudian theory as much as the societal crisis phenomena of the time: The First World War, the flare-up of nationalisms, the social struggles, and, finally, the global economic crisis and the advent of the National Socialist Movement. Freud’s psychoanalysis can be read as an attempt to write a critical theory of bourgeois society from the perspective of the “mental frontiers of this world” (Freud 1985, S. 273), albeit in a psychologistic, a-historical, naturalistic, and mythologized manner. Marxist psychoanalysts saw this critical potential for an analysis of societal phenomena early on, started to immerse themselves in Freud’s writings, and read them against the grain in a socio-critical manner.

As Dahmer (1975) has shown, Freud’s work already contains many themes and questions that have marked the history of psychoanalytic critical social psychology, and which were taken up or critically interrogated by later authors.

1. Critical subject theory

Freud stressed that his individual psychology is, “is at the same time social psychology as well” (Freud, 1921, p. 69) – but it is even more so than Freud himself conceptualized. In his analyses, Freud revealed “nature” as socially developed “pseudo-nature” (Dahmer, 1994, title, transl. NR): He was not interested in ‘drives’ themselves. Freud self-critically called his drive theory his “mythology” (Freud, 1933, p. 95), thus indicating that it was mainly a heuristic instrument. He was rather interested in specific “vicissitudes of the drive” (Freud 1915) that are structured by social interactions and which he tried to trace in the clinical setting with the help of his critical-hermeneutic method. In their ‘pathologies’ and their failure to live up to debates from the 1920s that centered around the question of whether psychoanalysis was Marxist, i.e., materialistic and dialectic, enough.

3 When possible, we have adopted direct quotes from existing English translations, which are referenced in brackets after the German references. Quotes from texts that have either not been translated into English or the translations of which were not accessible to us have been translated by Nora Ruck.
the standards of ‘successful’ socialization, his patients unveiled the structuring factors of gendered bourgeois ‘normality’: Their suffering was social suffering. In their unresolved inner conflicts, social contradictions became apparent. Freud did realize this, inquiring about the necessary conditions of ‘normal development’ and showing that allegedly ‘pathological’ psychological mechanisms can be found ontogenetically in all people and structurally in all major social institutions.

Freud, however, had neither a notion of the society in which he lived nor a truly historical view of the people and phenomena he analyzed. He rather vaguely equated society with ‘culture,’ and analyzed the very interactions that shaped his analysands only within the a-historic confines of the (bourgeois nuclear) family. Thus naturalizing (bourgeois) society and its hegemonic family constellations and gender relations, he also essentialized vicissitudes of the drive which are structured by society at large, and by family and gender relations.

In order to fully unfold the socio-critical potential of Freud’s subject theory, his theoretical notions must be freed from family-centrism as well as ontological mystification and be historicized and socially contextualized. Such a founding in terms of social theory and thus politics would also define the limits of the therapeutic process: Psychoanalysis can reveal the social contradictions that have solidified in inner psychological conflicts and find ways to transform “[neurotic] misery into common unhappiness” (Freud/Breuer 1895, p. 305); the basic conflicts, however, could only be resolved by completely overthrowing the ruling social relations.

2. Cultural criticism

Freud repeatedly addressed social questions and, from the 1920s on, he developed a theory of (bourgeois) culture. His theory recognized that bourgeois culture is based on violence on the one hand and the self-discipline required of its members on the other hand. In the beginning (e.g., Freud, 1908a), he sketched a rather simple repressive relationship between sexuality and cultural sexual mores, thus formulating the conflict between individual and society as an external one. With reflections that foreshadow the later psychoanalytic structural model (id-ego-superego; Freud, 1914a), it becomes increasingly clear that the vicissitudes of drive and culture are intertwined, and that Freud has sketched a “dialectic of culture” (Marcuse, 1955).

Culture depends on human drives but needs to refuse their immediate satisfaction at the same time: In order to control outer nature, culture must subject individuals to compulsory labor and to rationality, it must annihilate desires and ‘channel’ or sublimate drive impulses. Furthermore, pacifying the ‘cultural community’ internally requires that norms and ideals of communal life are internalized and that people identify themselves with the community. Internalizing the constraints and ideals that constitute culture in the form of the super-ego, which gains its strength from tabooed aggressive and culturally inimical tendencies, produces permanent feelings of guilt – “Civilization and its Discontents” (Freud, 1930) –, which grows with the progress of culture but promotes progress at the same time. If the renouncements and work efforts imposed on the individual are not compensated for adequately, the conflicts produced in the individual lead to mental illnesses – or are acted out socially, often in the form of violence.

4 In his “scientific myth” about the band of brothers that murders the authoritarian primal father and, in an act of retroactive obedience, internalize his norms and make them the fundament of culture, Freud projects this dialectic onto the origin of human cultural development (see Freud, 1912-13; 1939).
In most of his culture theoretical works, Freud only describes a somewhat abstract ‘culture.’ In *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), however, he discusses ‘culture’ as a class society that is based on exploitation and repression and in which the majority of people are subjected to coerced work whereas a small minority reap the rewards. If this domination is increasingly revealed as irrational by the erosion of religious justification, it is to be expected that the repressed will refuse to play their part in the game and will destroy culture. This exposition leads to Freud’s famous sentence: “It goes without saying that a civilization which leaves so large a number of its participants unsatisfied and drives them into revolt neither has nor deserves the prospect of a lasting existence” (Freud, 1927, p. 12).

Though Freud’s reasoning contains a historical approach that allows for the appearance of another, less dissatisfying culture: Freud regarded the “the great experiment in civilization” (Freud, 1927, p. 9) in the Soviet Union with legitimate suspicion. The dialectic on the basis of culture and the individual’s tragic position that goes along with it cannot be solved in his view. This ontologization of social relations may seem problematic, but his “pessimism contre Coeur” (Eissler, 1985; transl. NR) can also be read as an unconditional commitment to the repressed. His psychologistic take on society carries a critical potential: it persistently focuses on the suffering of individuals, measures alleged cultural ‘accomplishments’ against the measuring stick of human suffering, and reveals that culture is structured by coercion and violence.

At the same time, Freud’s notion that sociology “cannot be anything but applied psychology” (Freud, 1932, p. 179) also shows the problematic aspects of his perspective from the viewpoint of the “mental frontiers of this world”: Freud does not have a theory of the social, and so he de-historicizes and ontologizes bourgeois society and the autonomous, rational individual produced by it. Furthermore, his attention to human suffering reaches its limits where a fundamental critique of society would be at stake (e.g., in relation to the coercive nature of work and gender relations, which he recognizes in principle). In this case, he affirms the socially required discipline and its demands for psychological repression.

A major question for psychoanalytic social psychology arose somewhat later: How can its ontologizing tendencies be countered by a form of historiography that does not lose the critical potential which, paradoxically, arises from the allegedly ‘a-historical’ elements of psychoanalysis? Two of these elements can he highlighted. First, the resistive ‘depth structure’ that distinguishes Freud’s theory as a conflict theory and that characterizes both drive theory and the concept of an unconscious that eludes rational access; second, the “obsolescence” (Marcuse, 1963) of psychoanalysis: Psychoanalytic insights and notions derive from the ideals of classical bourgeois society and allow to reconstruct the erosion of the bourgeois subject by means of ideologically critique. A de-mythologizing and decrypting of Freud’s theory and his basic terms is no doubt necessary. Mythology, however, might also be understood as a mimetic approach that makes the ‘other’ of hegemonic rationality accessible to reason.

Consequently, the element of the ‘other’ that reaches beyond the status quo does not show as a revolutionary movement in Freud’s pessimistic culture theory but in his minor writings, e.g., about the critical potential of the joke (1905a) and about aesthetics (e.g., 1908b, 1914b): Desires that are buried and repressed in the course of socialization do not only reveal themselves in ‘symptoms,’ but are made available for a critique of society by means of a playful regression that circumvents censorship and that is at work both in the joke and in art. Many authors (e.g., Gross, Reich, Marcuse, Lorenzer, Brückner, Dahmer) have considered it fundamental to take this “heap of ruins” (Benjamin, 1940, p. 698; transl. NR) of the life story,
as well as repressed possibilities and desires, as a starting point for a psychoanalytically inspired theory of revolution.

3. Mass psychology

Freud’s writings that are devoted to criticism of religion and to mass psychology offer yet another point of departure for further reaching social psychological thoughts: Freud theorized social institutions, movements, and ideologies as instances of a “crooked cure” of psychological conflicts, aiding in binding anxiety and in canalizing aggressions, and promising an illusory participation in power by means of narcissistic identification. They can be read as socially necessary buffers, cushioning the antagonisms of bourgeois society for the subject, and as stabilizing ideological mechanisms of integration that stand in the way of social change: Irrational and/or anachronistic institutions like religion or nation are rigidly adhered to because of their psychological function. With the upheaval of National Socialism, it stood to reason that the mass psychological analyses of group processes and stereotyping carried an important potential (see chapter 2.2.).

Here, it is necessary to historicize the phenomenon of mass psychology It is the eroding bourgeois subject, helplessly exposed to the increasingly monopolized production conditions as a “solitary individual” (Marx) and in need to compensate the constant narcissistic wounds by participating in a “collective narcissism” (Adorno), that is particularly susceptible to these mass processes. Freud, however, does not allow for a way out of the cultural dialectic, and so his critical perspective on mass processes and the juxtaposed hypostatization of the individual completely leaves out the possibility that the collectivization of the solitary individuals may, on the one hand, carry a liberating and emancipative potential and is, on the other hand, necessary if bourgeois society is to be overcome.

1.2. Freudo-marxism

In the 1920s and 1930s, Marxist psychoanalysts such as Siegfried Bernfeld, Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, and Otto Fenichel made efforts to integrate Freudian insights into Marxism. In view of the failed socialist revolution in Germany and the experiences of the Second World War, their main goal was to understand why the workers did not revolt against the oppressive conditions under which they lived, and why the ‘ideology of the rulers,’ i.e., bourgeois ideals and, particularly, the nationalism that obscured class relations, entered the (unconscious) emotional lives of the ruled. In this regard, they devoted increasing attention to the uprising National Socialist Movement, which drove all proponents of the Freudian left into exile in America.

These psychoanalysts not only authored the first programmatic writings ever on the relation between psychoanalysis and sociology (Bernfeld, 1926; Reich 1929; Fromm, 1932; Fenichel 1934), but also the first psychoanalytically inspired analyses on authoritarianism (see chapter 2.1.), fascism, and the relation between social relations, hegemonic family structures, and the resulting character structures. They accomplished a first historiography of Freudian terms and concepts which, however, remained stuck half way and cemented Freud’s naturalizations even more at times: Arguing against ‘idealism,’ which was held against ‘humanistic’ psychology of the time from a Marxist perspective, these authors made a case for psychoanalysis as a ‘dialectic-materialistic’ natural science. Albeit in their different approaches, all of them juxtaposed a biological world of drives to social ‘outer stimuli’ which were hypothesized to ‘act upon’ the drives. Their emphasis on social relations allowed them to come up against psychologisms and to conceptualize human thought and action as deeply historical, but with
the opposition between ‘organism and environment,’ derived from biology, they set limits to
the intertwining of individual and society: Within the simple contradistinction between
biological drive structure and social deformation, the basis for deviation and resistance needed
to be sought after in the drives and when the critique of biologism was driven further it
evolved into a rather idealistic recourse to ethics (see especially Fromm, chapter 1.3.; see for a
critique Dahmer, 1973). Both nature and ethics were coupled with idealized notions of
matriarchy, thus cementing bourgeois gender relations and naturalizing social images of
femininity and maternity (see Gross, 1916, 1919a; Reich, 1932; Fromm, 1934).

This tendency is already evident in the works of the first leftist psychoanalyst Otto Gross,
who was not a Marxist, but an anarchist. Conceptualizing the conflicts revealed by Freud as
an internalization of the conflicts between the individual’s self-realization efforts and an
authoritarian society, he realized that conflicts were social in nature. Hence, he could
deconstruct the bourgeois-patriarchal nuclear family as well as some of its dominating images
of femininity and masculinity and reveal their pseudo-nature (see Gross, 1919b, 1920). This
was only made possible for him, however, by trading the alleged Freudian biologism by the
even more biologistic notion of an “inborn character” (Gross, 1916, p. 27; transl. NR). This
inborn character is conceptualized as a (gendered) natural mechanism of self-regulation that is
intrinsically altruistic. It is suppose to guarantee that people can live together harmoniously
and free from domination under the auspices of (see Gross, 1919).

While Gross attacked patriarchal family structures, Wilhelm Reich – at least for a while –
provided psychoanalysis with the foundation of a Marxist inspired social theory, historicized
the bourgeois nuclear family, and gave room to social momentum. In his programmatic
reflection on the relation between sociology and psychology, he tried to narrow the subject of
psychoanalysis down to individual psychological questions, thus forfeiting the entire potential
of Freudian culture theory (see Reich, 1929, 1934). In contrast with the limits he himself set
to the scope of his reflections, his approach increasingly boiled down to Gross’s “repression
hypothesis” (Foucault, 1976). He, too, started from the assumption of a natural “sex-
economy’ and, celebrating genital sex, equated it with “orgastic potency.” He assumed that
this sex-economy was repressed by present society with its hostility towards sexuality.
Accordingly, his political-practical activism centered on the liberation of this self-regulation
principle.5 Reich suggested a division of labor between psychology and sociology which
informed his work Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933; see chapter 1933). In this book, he
first analyzed the rise of National Socialism within the framework of Marxist analyses of
fascism of the time. Later, however, he considered fascism a mere matter of a fascist
mentality. His sexual revolutionary program was supposed to counter this mentality. He
believed that the sexual revolution would unfold orgastic potency which, in turn, would free
individuals from their neuroses, would automatically do away with mystic, religious, and
fascist orientations, and bring with it harmonizing social ethics and (deeply bourgeois) ideals
such as self-sufficiency, desire to work, heterosexuality, and monogamy (see Reich, 1927,
1936).6

Otto Fenichel was probably the harshest critic of such psychologism: In many sharp and
precise polemics, he tirelessly countered attempts to grasp social phenomena like class

5 This activism resulted in his exclusion not only from the Psychoanalytic Association but also from the
Communist Party. Freud fought against too offensive a politicization of the psychoanalytic movement, afraid
psychoanalysis might be endangered. Reich, as Gross before him, was erased from the historical self-narrative of
psychoanalysis.

6 In the course of his search for the biological basis of this sex-economy, which he intensified during the 1920ies
(see Reich, 1923), he discovered the orgon, a cosmological ›life energy‹ that won him considerable popularity in
esoteric circles (see Reich, 1942).
domination, war, and criminality by psychoanalytic means, while leaving aside genuinely sociological perspectives (see Fenichel, 1932, 1934, 1935). To Fenichel, it was relations of social dominance and the resulting objective conflicting interests that needed to be analyzed. His writings are also based on the conflict between biological drives and social reality that culminate in mental life with their interaction.\(^7\) And he, too, tried to divide the Marxist analysis of society and psychoanalysis by virtue of their subject matter: in the case of neurotic behavior, temperament and childhood development needed to be focused on, whereas in non-neurotic, e.g., mass psychological behavior, the study of the actual social situation is called for, because he considered drive structure a relative natural constant (see Fenichel, 1934, 1946). Fenichel’s fear of psychologisms is understandable. However, his biologistic misunderstanding of drives foreclosed insights into the complex interrelation of biographic experience and actual social situation that is at work in mass dynamics (see chapter 2.2.). Later, however, Fenichel would criticize authors like Fromm and Horney – in a similar manner in which they were criticized by Adorno and Marcuse (see chapter 2.3.) – for adhering to a sociologism that had done away with the unconscious and with libido theory altogether. Siegfried Bernfeld is certainly the most advanced author of his generation as far as epistemological reflections on psychoanalysis and its relation to Marxist social theory are concerned. In his attempt to analyze the left youth movement he was involved with, Bernfeld failed with the project of an anti-authoritarian, socialist education due to the reality of bourgeois society. After this, he wrote a fundamental ideology critique of bourgeois pedagogy: in capitalist society, the objective function of education was to sustain class society, and the critical educator’s work was a “Sisyphos”-work within these constraints (Bernfeld, 1925). The only way out, according to Bernfeld, was the revolutionary overthrow of society. This early work was already influenced by psychoanalysis and proves his profound insight into the ideological mechanisms of class society. Soon, Bernfeld turned his full attention to psychoanalysis. Though Bernfeld regards psychoanalysis as a natural science, thus trying to make it inaccessible to ideology critique, he strictly tries to avoid reductionist thinking in order to integrate psychoanalysis into Marxism (see his writings on Reich in particular: Bernfeld, 1932). He takes Freud’s claim that individual psychology is always social psychology as well very seriously. Thus, he developed the concept of a “social location” (Bernfeld, 1929; transl. NR) as a new psychoanalytic perspective, showing that ‘vicissitudes of the drive’ can only be understood against the backdrop of a thorough reflection of the class specific and milieu specific social location of the individual. This location not only brings about psychological conflicts and enables, reduces, or canalizes certain conflict solving strategies, but also determines whether a symptom causes suffering, whether a certain behavior is classified as ‘pathological,’ and whether a sublimation is considered as ‘successful.’ Early approaches of a sophisticated psychoanalytically inspired empirical social research are evident in Bernfeld’s work: in his reflections on criminality and neglect (Bernfeld, 1929, 1931a, b), he accepts both psychoanalytic and Marxist perspectives on social phenomena rather un-dogmatically, sewing the two of them together by means of the (social theoretical) notion of the ‘social location,’ and anticipating Adorno’s refusal to immediately link sociology and psychology (see chapter 1.3.).

Ernst Simmel, who organized a discussion on socialism and psychoanalysis together with Bernfeld in 1926 (see Bernfeld, 1926), had encountered psychoanalysis when treating ‘war neurotics’ as a military surgeon during the First World War. In short-term treatments he realized that the major causes for the soldiers’ traumatic breakdown were related to military discipline, which produced an authority bound and combat-ready ‘military ego’ that would be loyal into death, and which systematically destroyed the military members’ ‘civic’ ego-

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\(^7\) As Dahmer (1972) emphasizes, Fenichel turned more dialectic in regards to the formation of super-ego and character, where subject and social reality are obviously intertwined.
structures and their mechanisms of coping with anxiety (see Simmel, 1919, 1944a). According to Simmel (1920) due to this transformation, many soldiers had trouble integrating into civic society after 1918, a fact which Simmel later (1932) held responsible for the particular allure the National Socialist Movement had for these men. With its authoritarian leadership structure and its Manichaean world view, National Socialism (re-)produced a permanent state of war. Simmel’s engagement to provide therapeutic help for the poor and to effect the necessary health care reforms were followed by what are probably the most intriguing reflections on the relation between individual conflicts and mass dynamics written in his generation. His writings were marked by a biologicist notion of drives, too – at the core of his theory are ‘cannibalistic’ instincts to devour (see Simmel, 1944b) that allegedly need to be tamed socially. Nevertheless, Simmel showed in a very dynamic manner how participating in collectively ‘normalized’ delusions like nationalism and anti-Semitism served to restore an individual mental balance that had been disrupted by social anxieties (see Simmel, 1944a, 1946; Pohl 2000; see also chapter 2.2.).

1.3. Critical theory

Critical theory tried to avoid both the biologicist and the sociologicist pitfalls of Freudo-marxism that resulted from the simple division between the disciplines sociology and psychology. It was certainly the most influential result of Freudo-Marxist discussions for West Germany’s intellectual life and was developed at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung IfS) in Frankfurt am Main from the 1930s on and during the protagonists’ exile in the USA. Its social theory was inspired by Western Marxism (Karl Korsch, Georg Lukács) and its subject theory by Freudian psychoanalysis. Critical theorists aimed at developing an “interdisciplinary materialism” that recognized psychoanalysis as an “an indispensable auxiliary science for history” (Horkheimer 1932, p. 119). The researchers at the IfS asked why people of the developed capitalist countries did not aim at social emancipation but – in the case of Germany – chose National Socialism and thus their increased incapacitation instead. And also the supposed emancipatory Russian Revolution ended in a Stalinist disaster. These tragic social developments were analyzed against the backdrop of a “dialectic of enlightenment” which spanned the entire history of civilization. This project was designed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer/Adorno, 1947) and in Critique of Instrumental Reason (Horkheimer, 1947) and is one of the last attempts to write a ‘grand narrative’ since: it is neither culture pessimistic nor adheres to a Hegelian or Marxist hopeful teleology but elaborates the negative dialectic of progress instead. Psychoanalysis plays a central part in this historico-philosophical conceptualization of a long process of social rationalization. While ‘work’ became the central mode of dominating nature in a historic process, mental structures changed accordingly: The act of pacifying the gods with sacrificial offerings was increasingly turned inwards as a self-disciplined abdication of immediate satisfaction: “The history of civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrifice” (Horkheimer/Adorno, 1947, p. 43). Guided by the dictates of ego and super-ego which developed in the historical process, the spontaneity of the drives (of inner nature) is canalized and utilized.

At first, this process promised freedom and independence from the demands of nature, but it also brought about a subject that is rather untouched by drive impulses, that is not able to set its own goals, and that thus becomes compliant with whatever power. In contrast to this, Adorno and Horkheimer posed the “remembrance of nature within the subject” (Horkheimer/Adorno, 1947, p. 32) without regressing into the sort of “back into nature” (Horkheimer, 1947, p. 87) that was promised by National Socialism when it took hold of human drives.
This abstract history of civilization provides the framework in which critical theorists formulated their diagnoses of society, asking about the “subjective conditions of objective irrationality” (Adorno, 1955a, p. 68) in their respective concrete conditions. The different stages of theory development can be distinguished according to the mechanisms proposed to be at work in interrelating social structure and subject structure.

Erich Fromm, the director of the social psychological department at the IfS, knew Reich’s work and partly built on it in developing the concept of a “social character”. This approach brings together the social system, the schooling of children, and the resulting character structure in a rather deductive manner. From this perspective, capitalist society is said to bring about the patriarchal nuclear family, which in turn is supposed to install repressive educational methods, which again allegedly lead to a specific orientation and fixation of vicissitudes of the drive in the sado-masochist character structure. According to Fromm, this social character structure was responsible for the affective attraction of submitting to an authoritarian (political) ‘leader’ (see Fromm, 1936, 1941, Jay 1973).

This concept was also taken up by the study *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al. 1950; see also chapter 2.1.) that was conducted and written during Adorno’s exile in America. Social psychological approaches now seemed important for different reasons, though. The authors still sought to explain why the revolution did not take place but now they also inquired whether the US population supported a fascist coming to power and tried to build the theoretical and empirical grounds for psychological-pedagogical countermeasures. After the war, and after Horkheimer and Adorno had returned to Frankfurt, Adorno turned his attention to matters of a democratic education with preventative effects against a return of National Socialism in several essays and radio programs (Adorno, 1959). In particular, he emphasized an *Education for Maturity and Responsibility* (1969) which would start off in early stages of childhood and help avoid the development of authoritarian social characters. However, Adorno focuses on education and psychology at the expense of an analysis of social structures (see chapter 2.3.).

Already during the exile, *Theodor W. Adorno*, in particular, started to have doubts about the concept of “interdisciplinary materialism. Could psychoanalysis and social theory be reconciled so easily? This presupposition, which had also characterized the concept of the “social character” was problematized from two different angles. The first problematization emphasizes that psychological and social structures cannot be related in a deductive manner. During the so-called culturism-dispute, Herbert Marcuse (1955), a member of the IfS who did not return to Germany, and Adorno (1952) criticized the proponents of what was now called a ‘neo-Freudianism’ revision of psychoanalysis, especially Fromm and Karen Horney, for forfeiting the critical potential of psychoanalysis for the sake of its “sociologization.”: The social individual collapses into social demands, leading him/her to “want to act in the way they have to act” (Fromm, 1944, p. 407). Fromm’s work exhibits the typical feature of Freudo-marxism according to which deviant behavior could only be explained by recourse to an ontological ‘healthy’ individual beneath sexual repression. The IfS broke with Fromm in 1939.

Adorno provided a different explanation for the friction between subject and society. It is not an ontological ‘natural’ relic that resists social colonization and repression but socialization itself which plants the seed of resistance. Society itself is contradictory, as primary (family), secondary (school), and tertiary (work) socialization confront the individual with conflicting demands and constitute different experiences of interaction that are reflected psychologically, “while remaining products of the social totality, individuals, as such products, no less
necessarily enter into conflict with the totality” (Adorno, 1955a, p. 72). The “non-identical” within the psyche, defying cultural demands and social constraints, is a residue of early childhood that then allowed for different interactions than the later context of the ‘facts of life.’ When the individual fantasizes about this (now seemingly idyllic) early stage later in life, a yearning to “catch up with one’s childhood by transforming it” (Adorno, 1962a, p. 395; transl. NR) is brought to life. This yearning can clash against social demands of self-control and rationality.

The second problematization of the concept of the social character points in the opposite direction. It is not the friction between psychological and social structure but the illusion of a historic coming about of social characters that is emphasized here. According to Marcuse, the social totality is developed in such a way as to rub out the contradictions between the different socialization levels and brought about a “one-dimensional man” (Marcuse 1964). For this reason, psychoanalysis became increasingly obsolete (Marcuse 1963). The ego had mediated between the psychological apparatus and the outer world, which had provided access to the power of the “non-identical” in its failure, but was now fading away. Even the psychodynamics of the ‘authoritarian character,’ who was proven to be rather inflexible and uncooperative in the face of social change, gave way to a manipulative “characterless character” (Weyand, 2001, p. 140; transl. NR), short-circuiting super-ego and id. As Adorno notes, “The superego becomes the spokesman of the id” (Adorno, quoted after: Ziege, 2009, p. 270; transl. NR). Utterly conformist attitudes thus seem spontaneous to the individual. Adorno (1951) shows this by using the example of the mass psychological dynamics of National Socialism: The “show’ of “Volksgemeinschaft” (folk community) and “anti-Semitism” is not mediated by any ego. Nevertheless, and maybe even because of this, self-incapacitation seems like self-realization to the “people” (see chapter 2.2.), and the discontents about culture succumb to a “yearning after the absolutely hollow ‘warmth’ of authoritarian communities and military ‘campfire romanticism’ as well as to the attachment to higher authorities and leaders” (Rensmann, 1998, p. 72; transl. NR), defying all subjectivity. With the notion of “repressive desublimization,” Marcuse (1964) described a parallel development in democratic societies. The dynamics of his time made it seem as if social or psychological authorities did not demand suppression or sublimation anymore, and as if the freedom to satisfy one’s needs was entirely attainable by consumerism. The “non-identical” did not appear as suffering and ex negativo (Adorno, 1966) but was rendered utterly isolated and cut off from experience.

*Herbert Marcuse* agreed with Adorno when diagnosing an increasing “one-dimensionality” but held on to the revolutionary potential of the partial drives. Marcuse was prone to essentialization, too. In contrast to Fromm, however, who did away with partial drives as “infantility” and “refusal to grow up” (Fromm, 1970, pp. 19f), Marcuse did not vouch for genital heterosexuality and the alleged ‘mature personality’ going along with genitality, but searched for resistance in the chaotic nature of the pre-genital partial drives and their perversions, especially the primary narcissistic impulses which indulged in “Nirvana” instead of the “merit principle” (Marcuse, 1955)

The different theoretical positions led to diverging assessments of the revolutionary potential of the student protest movements of the late 1960s. Was the “68 generation” a manifestation of the non-identical or of a mere conformist, anti-American rebellion? Adorno was highly ambivalent as far as the ‘student movement’ was concerned. Apart from the liberating tendencies, he also saw the students conform to the changing sexual morals of consumer society and resort to anti-intellectual actionism and a complete misjudgment of the historic situation with regards to its alleged pre-revolutionary character. Marcuse’s assessment was not euphoric, either, but a bit more positive (Kraushaar, 1992). He hoped for the possibility of
a narcissistically-pregenitically motivated “major refusal” as it becomes obvious from his writings:
“The students know that society absorbs any kind of opposition [...] They feel, more or less clearly, that the ‘one-dimensional man’ has lost his power to negate, his ability to refuse. It is for this reason that they refuse to be integrated into this society” (Marcuse, 1968, pp. 380; transl. NR).

In comparing Adorno’s and Marcuse’s positions, two possible relations between critical theory and political movements become cogent. Adorno became rather politically quietist in the face of the “one-dimensionalization” of society, whereas Marcuse represents a kind of escapism that made him the acclaimed star of the student movement.

1.4. Psychoanalytic social psychology in West German post-war society

Psychoanalysis had become part of critical social psychology in West German post-war society because of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s remigration. The establishment of a psychoanalytic social psychology that was closely allied to clinical practice, however, was not only made uncertain by the expulsion and murder of psychoanalysts by National Socialists: Psychoanalysis had been integrated into the National Socialist health care system under the name of ›deutsche Seelenkunde‹ (›German study of the soul‹). The heteronomous determination of therapeutic goals such as ›combat capability‹ led to a ›moral de-contextualization‹ and to the loss of the socio-critical potential of psychoanalysis (Schneider 1993, p. 761; transl. NR): Thus, it became necessary to establish psychoanalysis with a special focus on its political and moral dimensions. On the one hand, it was Alexander Mitscherlich who promoted a political re-contextualization of psychoanalysis. On the other hand, young scientists in his close circle made use of psychoanalysis for the benefit of a critical social psychology in the wake of the protest movement of the 1960s and 1970s.

Alexander Mitscherlich continuously took a moral and political stand on social changes in (West) Germany from 1945 until the 1970s, drawing both from his clinical psychoanalytic work and from psychoanalytic theories. This already shows in his early works that were not even thoroughly psychoanalytic (Mitscherlich/Weber, 1946, Mitscherlich, 1946, Mitscherlich/Mielke, 1948/1960). In his major writings On the Way to a Fatherless Society (1963), The Inhospitableness of Our Cities (1965) and The Inability to Mourn (1967, together with Margarete Mitscherlich), he offers social psychological diagnoses of West German post-war society in which he – not unlike the critical theorists – draws a dreadful picture of an “anonymous, de-individualized mass society” (Busch 2001: 101; transl. NR). Mitscherlich diagnosed an “ego-depletion in our society” (Mitscherlich, A. and M., 1967, p. 20; transl. NR) which becomes apparent as an impaired ability to act upon social institutions actively and willfully. His major contribution to psychoanalytic social psychology lies in the fact that he always analyzed the conditions of this ego-depletion against the backdrop of the clinical study of individual life histories.

Together with Margarete Mitscherlich, he traced the ego-depletion in society back to the defense mechanisms against guilt and against remembering the atrocities of the National Socialists that prevailed in many Germans (Mitscherlich, A. and M. 1967; compare chapter 2.4.). Almost at the same time, Mitscherlich (1963) proposed another explanation, focusing on the consequences of the historic changes in work conditions on family and political structures. According to Mitscherlich, social structures and relations that are handed down to children by their parents are hardly concrete and imaginable. By contrast, they are “inaccessible and erratic” (ibid. p. 200; transl. NR) to the individual. For Mitscherlich, this impression grew even stronger in the face of political transformation processes that confront the dominated with “faceless systems” (transl. NR), bureaucracies and functional machineries of domination. As he explained, “One cannot ‘picture’ them albeit subject to them mercilessly” (ibid.; transl. NR).
NR), which produces anxiety, aggression, and prejudice (see Mitscherlich, 1953, 1962/63, 1969, 1977). Despite this dark picture that reminds of Marcuse’s and Adorno’s analyses of a ‘one-dimensional’ world, his work is remarkably optimistic. Again and again, he intervened in social debates with concrete suggestions for change. He demanded the development of a “constructive disobedience” (transl. NR) and stood up for “the obligation for dissent or even resistance” (Mitscherlich, 1963, p. 356; transl. NR).

The psychoanalytic social psychologist Mitscherlich was always at pains to be up to date and to provide critical cultural diagnoses of his time and political engagement. However, he does not draw on the social theories that distinguished the works of the Freudo-marxists and critical theory (see chapters 1.2. and 1.3., see Busch 2001). For a critical social psychology, this is not only a deficit. His efforts “to reconstruct the imprints of society on the biographies of individuals” contain a “political as well as specifically psychological quality” (Krovoza/Schneider 1989, pp. 135f.; transl. NR) that was missing from the grand social theoretical reflections of his successors. This characteristic of Mitscherlich’s work complies with the socio-critical re-contextualization of psychoanalysis mentioned above.

It was younger scholars from Mitscherlich’s circles who took up the debate on the relation between social theory and psychoanalysis on this basis and against the backdrop of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Busch (2001) broadly summarizes this development with the term critical theory of the subject and counts Peter Brückner, Helmut Dahmer, Klaus Horn, and Alfred Lorenzer among its major proponents.8

Helmut Dahmer (1973, 1975) analyzes psychoanalysis as to its potential for a critique of ideology, while Alfred Lorenzer (1973) reformulates psychoanalysis as a materialist socialization theory. His concept starts from the level of drive development. According to Lorenzer, drive structures develop as inner reflections of the satisfying relationship between the child and its bodily needs (so-called ‘first nature’) on the one hand and the caregiver, representing socio-cultural practices, on the other hand. Lorenzer calls these reflections of real interactions specific interaction forms. They structure the expression of the infant’s bodily needs, that is, human inner nature only appears in socially mediated form. Without losing sight of the embodiedness of psychological processes, Lorenzer conceptualizes drive structures as social and historic factors.

Specific interaction forms are related to linguistic and non-linguistic (e.g., pictorial) cultural symbols (Lorenzer, 1972, 1970b, 1984). It is only with these symbolization processes that consciousness and the unconscious are made possible – albeit in a historically specific social form. Lorenzer considers language to be more than an ensemble of words (Lorenzer, 1970a, 1974). According to Lorenzer, language is conceptualized as “a unified whole of language use, life practices, and understanding of the world” (Morgenroth, 2010a, p. 50). Social discourse infiltrates the child via symbolizations and (co)determines his or her consciousness. Socially tabooed interactions forms are deprived of consciousness by non- or de-symbolization. This, however, does not always succeed entirely. Lorenzer continues from here with two ideas. First, the subject’s resistance is tied to the de-symbolized or that which is not yet symbolized and constitutes the dark side of social discourse. It is only by the conflictuous friction between individuals and discourse that subjectivity emerges (see Lorenzer, 1972). Second, Lorenzer accounts a particular relevance to ideologies in the socialization process (see Lorenzer, 1981). As linguistic and non-linguistic templates,

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8 The works of Thomas Ziehe deserve mention but cannot be included here. Ziehe (1975) stipulated a debate with his concept of a new/narcissistic socialization type (NST), which drew on the classical concept of the social character on a self-psychological basis.
ideologies offer a symbolic framework for the recurrence of suppressed contents which cover up the de-symbolized and at the same time make it accessible to consciousness and to action, albeit dressed up in false symbols (re-symbolization). Ideologies literally lead to false consciousness and may replace clinical symptoms. This way, ideologies may even contribute to the prevention of pathologies.

Even if Lorenzer’s approach has remained fragmented, it remains a productive re-conceptualization of psychoanalytic social psychology which has sparked rather little attention until now. As Morgenroth explains, “His approach was considered as too hermetic” (Morgenroth, 2010a, p. 50; transl. NR) and remains sociologically ‘unsatisfying’” (König 2000, p. 567; transl. NR) due to its lack of social theoretical reflections.

Klaus Horn struggles to find a psychoanalytic answer to the question regarding the social significance of subjectivity (Horn, 1972, 1973). He analyzes remains of suffering and resistance within the subject under conditions of late bourgeois society. Both theoretically and content-wise, he mostly summarizes the insights gained by Mitscherlich and critical theory. He deepens these earlier reflections with the help of a theory of narcissism but hardly offers innovative results. Nevertheless, his methodical reflections on psychoanalytic social research are of vital significance. It was Horn who first devoted systematic attention to psychoanalytically oriented methods of data analysis and collection (‘scenic interview) (Horn/Beier/Wolf, 1983; Horn/Beier/Kraft-Krumm, 1984).

Peter Brückner’s political psychology reaches way beyond the mere analysis of the subjective factor of social processes. Brückner radicalizes Mitscherlich’s strategy of reconstructing social encroachments in individual life histories by conceiving of political psychology as both a scientific and a political activity. The core idea is that there is a “relationship between the life histories of individuals and the historic harms they inflict on one another” (Brückner 1968, p. 94; transl. NR). Brückner (1966) noted a concrete aspect of this general idea under the keyword pathology of obedience. On the basis of the psychoanalytic theory of culture and structure, he describes ego-ideal and super-ego as “bridgeheads within the interiority of the governed individuals,” thanks to which social authorities can rule (Brückner 1970, p. 19, see 1968, p. 100; transl. NR). He conceptualizes the super-ego as a function that not only co-determines the vicissitudes of the drive but can also suppress non-conformist perceptions of society and political reflective processes. S/he who has internalized too many social imperatives gets afraid when criticizing, doubting, thinking, and questioning normality. This insight forms one backbone of what is maybe the most careful analysis of the anti-authoritarian current of the student protests of the 1960s; Brückner’s reflections on The Transformation of Democratic Consciousness (Brückner, 1970). With their anti-authoritarian protest, the students collectively engaged in a deconstruction of the inner ‘bridgeheads’ of authority. By projecting these (back) onto authority figures they perceived them as a part of reality that could be provoked and attacked. They produced social situations in which they could change their super-ego structures and, thus, their blocks in thought and their feelings of fear, helplessness, and shame, all this in the process of a social interaction with authority figures (see Brückner, 1970). Brückner is convinced, however, that this “organized self-release” (Brückner, 1970, p. 47; transl. NR) and the alteration of super-ego structures can only succeed within the context of political practice.9

9 Brückner showed solidarity with the protest movements of the 1960s and accompanied the movements of the 1970s up until the RAF with critical reflections (see Brückner, 1973, 1976a and b, Brückner/Krovoza, 1972b). He did not want to legitimate but to understand them against the backdrop of the historical development of society. Official politicians as well as the university directorate of his home university in Hannover did not
Brückner does not halt at these insights into the pathology of obedience but uses them to reflect on psychology and psychologists in a science critical manner (see Brückner, 1966; Brückner/Krovoza, 1972a). He concludes that socially induced thought blocks can also be found in (political) psychologists (see Brückner, 1968). For this reason, political psychology can only gain valid insights into social reality “when it destroys its everyday occurrence by means of critique” (ibid., p. 94; transl. NR). “Political and psychological activity« (ibid. p. 95; transl. NR) is part of its method of knowledge; “it understands phenomena by trying to change them” (ibid., p. 95; transl. NR). This attempt to change society allows the researchers to experience that which cannot be thought of and to analyze when feelings of fear, shame, guilt, insufficiency, and helplessness occur. It is only the political and psychological reflection of this experience against the backdrop of its social basis that makes emancipative knowledge of social power structures possible. As he puts it, “Experiencing who we are and who really rules in society is part of the same process” (ibid., p. 98; transl. NR). Brückner’s methodological call for radical reflexivity aims at nothing less but the abolition of the “separation between ‘value-neutral’ scientist and ‘concerned’ person” (Krovoza/Schneider 1988, p. 34; transl. NR).

Regardless of the fact that Brückner’s hopes for a far-reaching social change remained unfulfilled, it can be noted that it was only in the course of its further development in the context of the protest movements that critical psychoanalytic social psychology gained a “reference point beyond theory and, as a consequence, a specific approach to its subject that mediates psychological and political thought. In this regard, this phase marks both the end and the new beginning of political psychology in Western Germany” (Krovoza/Schneider, 1988, p. 34; transl. NR).

1.5. Ethno-psychoanalysis

Ethno-psychoanalysis was developed in Zurich during the 1950s and 1960s and represents another attempt to link psychoanalysis and the critique of society. It was founded by Paul Parin and Goldy Parin-Matthèy – both emigrants from Slownia/Austria – as well as Fritz Morgenthaler. All three of them were politically dedicated and leftist psychoanalysts who practiced in Zurich and had supported the resistance of Yugoslav partisans as physicians. For ethno-psychoanalysis, too, the experience of fascism and National Socialism was essential.

Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler wondered whether the Freudian method was applicable to other societies than European-bourgeois society and conducted field work with the Dogon and Agni communities in West Africa. Thus, they tried to explore the interdependency of social and psychological factors in these societies. At that time, several attempts to link ethnology and psychoanalysis had been undertaken, among others, by psychoanalysts who conducted ethnological studies like Géza Roheim and proponents of the ‘culture and personality’-school that had developed in the USA during the 1930s. However, it was Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler who first applied the psychoanalytic method as a field work method (see Reichmayr, 2003). In addition to analyzing socio-historic structures, they conducted intensive psychoanalytically inspired conversations with the Dogon and the Agni over a long period of time and put a special emphasis on the (transference) relationship between themselves and their respondents (see chapter 3). Zurich’s ethno-psychoanalysis

comprehend this difference between understanding and legitimating: In their eyes, Brückner had not distanced himself from the armed groups decidedly enough; he was suspended from his service as a lecturer and barred from university.
gained prominence due to the reception of its books by the student protest movement of 1968 with which Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler sympathized. *White People Think Too Much*, a book about psychoanalytic studies with the Dogon from 1963, stimulated particular interest. Students who struggled with current social relations, with colonialism, and ethnocentrism were especially keen to learn about other forms of social life.

Paul Parin, Goldy Parin-Matthèy, and Fritz Morgenthaler increasingly considered ethno-psychoanalysis as a method to analyze the interpenetration of social power relations and mental powers in their own society within the framework of comparative critical social psychology. Ethno-psychoanalysis, so they hoped, would open up an understanding of both the mechanisms of power with their effects on the psyche of the dominated and the dominant, as well as political, social, and racial oppression. It is a special characteristic of the Zurich school of ethno-psychoanalysis that its members continuously bridged psychoanalytic research with clinical practice. In their view, psychoanalytic work that did not reflect on the meaning of social relations only added to the obscuration of reality. This nexus between psychoanalytic activity and critique of society is evident in various publications, among others, on psychoanalytic technique, on issues like sexuality and norm orientation, and on “medicocentrism” in psychotherapy (Parin/Parin-Matthèy, 1988).

Parin and Morgenthaler furthermore played a central role in establishing a training institution for prospective psychotherapists which, during the 1960s and 1970s, brought forth a circle of leftist analysts who actively engaged in the 68 protests. Most significant in this regard was the so-called “Plattform”-movement founded as a cooperation of young psychoanalysts from different countries in 1969. The platform was committed to a leftist psychoanalysis, involving social engagement and international solidarity, and demanded the democratization of the hierarchical and elitist structure of psychoanalytic education (Burgermeister, 2008). A split between leftist and bourgeois analysts in 1977 gave way to the direct democratic Zurich Psychoanalytic Seminar (Psychoanalytisches Seminar Zürich; PSZ), the major training institute for psychoanalysis in Switzerland.

Young analysts started to take up ethno-psychoanalytic approaches. Most popular are probably the ethnologists Maya Nadig and Mario Erdheim who conducted ethno-psychoanalytic research in Switzerland and Central America and lectured at the Ethnological Seminar at the University of Zurich, at the University of Bremen, and at the University of Frankfurt. While Parin, Parin-Matthèy, and Morgenthaler had mostly pursued their research activities outside the academic field, Nadig and Erdheim worked within the confines of academic institutions and critically dealt with the resulting contradictions in their writings. Taking up George Devereux’s 1976 book *From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences*, they called for integrating and making conscious both the subjectivity and emotionality of the researcher and transference/counter-transference processes in the research process. They harshly criticized science with its self-image of objectivity, which left little room for the subjective elements of research. In their field research, Nadig and Erdheim developed the idea that researchers needed to go through a process of “social death,” which they considered the precondition of fully immersing into social processes. Analogues to the training analysis of the psychoanalyst, this social death was supposed to restructure experience in such a way that “the role systems that sustain our identity and steer our perception are shattered by confrontation with the other” (Erdheim/Nadig, 1994, p. 72; transl. NR). Nadig and Erdheim deemed the confrontation with and analysis of colonial, gendered, and classed structures of inequality as well as one’s own delusions of grandeur and omnipotence as a most significant task of science. Their writings clearly express the ethno-psychoanalytic objective to take an estranged view of one’s own society. Mario Erdheim is
most well-known for his book *The Social Production of Unconsciousness* (1984), in which he analyzed how the unconscious is produced in the course of the socio-historic process in order to stabilize relations of dominance in different ‘cultures.’ Erdheim broadened the scope of psychoanalytic culture theory, which until then had been focused on early childhood, to include theoretical reflections on the vital significance of adolescence for processes of cultural change and stability, and on the role played by initiations and institutions like school, youth clubs, or the military. Maya Nadig studied the social situation of women within the Zurich uplands and in Mexico, among others, and placed the relation between her and her interviewees at the core of her analyses (see Nadig, 1986). Pursuing her aim to combine critical ethnology, feminist social research, and psychoanalysis, she comes up against both an essentialist notion of culture and ethnicity and an a-historic and biologistic concept of sex and gender, and criticizes patriarchal psychoanalytic traditions (Nadig, 1994). Her first critical impulse is especially necessary in ethno-psychoanalysis, because, despite all claims to do away with categories such as ‘other’ and ‘self,’ many writings that were produced before the 1990s still exert pressures for an essentialist understanding of culture.

In addition to Erdheim and Nadig, many other (younger) analysts in the context of the Zurich Psychoanalytic Seminar put forth the linkage of psychoanalysis and socio-critique by conducting their own ethno-psychoanalytic research and by focusing on subjects like feminism, fascism, racism, and migration (see Morgenthaler/Weiss/Morgenthaler, 1984; Roth 1994; Modena, 2002; Bazzi, et al. 2000; Ninck Gbeassor, et al. 1999; Pedrina, et al. 1999).

2. Research foci

2.1. Authoritarianism and right-wing extremism

The analysis of authoritarianism has a central place in the history of psychoanalytic social psychology because it paved the way for the development of its empirical orientation. It is due to early psychoanalytic research on authoritarianism that the entire field of social research culminated in seminal studies that are still relevant today.

The incipient stages of research on authoritarianism date back to the writings of Reich and Fromm in the beginning of the 1930s (see chapter 1.2. and 1.3.). Fromm had discovered a certain and widely common “sado-masochist character structure” that he deemed the result of a patriarchal family with a father who tries to restore his authority, which has been delegitimized by his actual social powerlessness, by authoritarian behavior. The tormented children submit to the father, develop a rigid and punitive super-ego, and project their massive aggressions, once directed at the father, at outer enemies (see chapter 2.2.). This concept offered Fromm an explanation for the wide support for National Socialism among the German population and for the susceptibility of German workers to it. Already in 1929/30, Fromm and his colleagues had conducted a survey among workers, which had analyzed political and social attitudes as well as the distribution of certain social characters among workers, for the IfS (Fromm 1931/1980). The study was not published until the 1980s in English and German. It provided the basis for all research projects to follow in this field and, in addition to the scientific value of the insights gained, its highly distressing results served as a warning signal for the members of the institute, revealing how low the workers’ readiness for resistance against National Socialism actually was (the IfS started developing exile plans soon after). In 1936, the IfS authored the *Studies on Authority and Family* (Horkheimer, 1936), which were designed as both theoretical and empirical studies, were still written in Germany, and took up Fromm’s concept of the social character.

The major work *Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, et al. 1950) was produced in two volumes in exile. It is the core of the research project “Studies in Prejudice” conducted by the
IFS together with American social scientists from the middle until the end of the 1940s. The Studies in Prejudice were commissioned by the American Jewish Committee and their aim was to explore how susceptible to fascism Americans were in the face of the Second World War (see Wiggershaus, 1988). Horkheimer, then director of the IFS, praised the “combination of European ideas and American methods” (ibid. p. 456; transl. NR) used by the research team. On the basis of questionnaires and interviews, the authors developed a typology of different character and personality structures and analyzed them with regard to political and social attitudes, unconscious conflicts, desires, and fears. The scientists thought of character as a “determinant of ideological preferences” (Adorno, et al. 1950, p. 5) which was regarded as rather firm but not final, and the types ranged from an anti-democratic authoritarian, highly biased syndrome to a “genuine liberal” unbiased type. The F(ascism)-scale designed to gather the relevant data on types contained nine variables: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and “toughness,” destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex. According to the research group around Adorno, the variables complemented each other in such a way as to “form a single syndrome, a more or less enduring structure in the person that renders him receptive to antidemocratic propaganda” (ibid. p. 228). Following Horkheimer, the authoritarian or sadomasochist character “can be observed throughout the entire history of bourgeois society,” but now stands “symptomatically for a world that adheres to family authority even after the inner substance of the family has dissolved” (Horkheimer, 1960, p. 281; transl. NR). In other words, bourgeois family, with its patriarchal and unquestioned authority figure at its core, is already eroded, and now the father represents a “weak” figure.

The research group focused on anti-Semitic attitudes which appeared in everyday life and which they called “prejudices.” After their return from exile, the scientists of the IFS conducted a large-scale group experiment (Pollock, 1955) (see chapter 2.3.), in addition to several smaller studies on anti-Semitism and authoritarianism. Today, the study on authoritarianism is counted among the classics of research on prejudice and authoritarianism. Studies on right-wing extremism often referred and still refer to this study directly or try to apply it in a modified version. Others have criticized the concept of character as static and for its neglect of later – and earlier – influences (e.g., in adolescence) and of “situative constraints and life contexts” (see Wacker, 1979, p. 105 ff. who refers to the Stanford and Milgram experiments; transl. NR).

The concept of authoritarianism was taken up by Christel Hopf (1995), who criticizes Adorno et al. for overemphasizing the traditional father figure and the Oedipus conflict. Hopf, by contrast, accords more significance to the mother within the family and stresses that problematic and uncertain attachment experiences as well as pre-Oedipal relations between the child and the mother or another significant person are important factors in the development of authoritarian character structures. She propounds the thesis that authoritarian submissiveness has given way to authoritarian aggression towards strangers (at the beginning of the 1990s). Hopf emphasizes the significance of specific socialization experiences that may change the course of development in another direction. Thus, her concept is more “open” but mainly focuses on real inner-family relations and does not aim at social theory. Gerda Lederer conducted her own surveys with only minimally changed scales. In a comparative study in East and West Germany after the reunification, she showed that adolescents who had grown up in East Germany exerted a less “closed” syndrome with correlating variables (see Lederer, 1995). Lederer emphasizes the dialectic of authoritarian submission and aggression that exists in aggressive personalities.
Detlef Oesterreich distances himself from the classical concept and from the two authors mentioned above. Instead, he speaks of an “authoritarian reaction” which not only functions as an adaption to authoritarian conditions but also expresses a search for protection and security, thus resulting in a situational submission due to fear and uncertainty. Oesterreich focuses on the situational conduct of individuals. He starts from the assumption that the causes of authoritarian attitudes have to do with excessive demands on children who then cling to images of their parents that promise security and become utterly dependent. Oesterreich, too, conducted a comparative study on authoritarianism in adolescents in East and West Germany (Oesterreich, 1993). According to him, political situations in a state of crisis can trigger authoritarian reactions, causing an increasing orientation towards right-wing extremist groups. Oesterreich, however, reveals a reductionism that is at the same time sociologistic and a-historic in thinking that a political system change causes insecurity and “identity crises” and produces adolescents who are, because of their fixation on security, especially vulnerable to commit racist arson and other attacks against migrants, as happened in East (and West) Germany in the early 1990s.

For Manfred Clemenz, the traditional concept of authoritarian personality mitigates the role of narcissism and pre-Oedipal experiences. Following authors such as Adorno (1955a), but also Bohleber, Brede, Heim, and Overbeck, he considers the combination of perspectives on both Oedipality and narcissism as particularly useful for the study of right-wing personality structures (see Clemenz, 1998). For example, Karola Brede has suggested the concept of the “new authoritarian” who is characterized by features like self-referentiality, ambiguity intolerance, defense against the experience of failure by narcissistic delusions of grandeur, narcissistic delusions of merging with superiors, etc., which, according to Clemenz, can be considered as the “psychological correlates of the economically and technologically induced process of modernity” (Clemenz, 1998, p. 148; transl. NR). Clemenz, however, cautions against pathologizing the individual and argues in favor of a multi-dimensional model, a “biographically oriented reconstruction of the entire cascaded process of meditation” (ibid. p. 158; transl. NR). Right-wing extremism thus becomes a paradigmatic application of psychoanalytic social psychology.

Klaus Ottomeyer advocates a perspective that considers situational conditions, for example the unsettling effects of anomaly, in addition to psychoanalytic developmental psychology. Together with right-wing or populist offers that fuel fear and intensify existing sentiments, he combines the above two factors into a triad of authoritarianism or right-wing extremism (see Menschik-Bendele, 1998). Adolescence, in particular, is marked by drive conflicts and identity conflicts that trigger fear and doubt and may disturb the development of identity. “Escaping” into right-wing extremism may seem as a way out then. Ottomeyer emphasizes, however, that ruptures in ego-identity can occur also in adults of all ages and make them vulnerable to right-wing extremist offerings.

It is interesting that the concept of group focused enmity, which was developed in a long-term study by a team lead by sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer and has become rather popular over the last ten years, is considered as a syndrome of characteristics or tendencies which show considerable overlap with the traditional concept of the authoritarian character and its F-scale (see Heitmeyer, 2002). This approach contains a broad notion of exclusions, attitudes, and everyday practices (e.g. sexism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, homophobia, a hostile attitude towards muslims, disabled, permanently unemployed or towards homeless people) but is (mainly) reduced to processes of deprivation, while inner-family socialization and conflicts (as well as their social mediation) are not included (contrary to classical studies on authoritarianism).
Overall, discussions on authoritarianism have been mostly focused on “situation versus character” debates and on the validity of items. Arguments concerning the limits of the concept, its “obsolescence” (Marcuse), and its “patricentric and Oedipal bias” (Clemenz; transl. NR) have gained some momentum in the last years, however they seem to have receded already. Which concept of social character coincides with today’s late capitalist society, and whether subjectivity can be understood this way at all are questions that must become the subject of discussion, debate and reflection while keeping the now traditional notions in mind.

2.2. Inclusion and exclusion

In the face of the National Socialist mass movement and its rampant anti-Semitism at the latest, critical social psychologists put considerations of the dynamics of masses and the constitution of in-groups, out-groups, and enemy-groups at the forefront of their reflections. At the beginning, analyses of nationalism and anti-Semitism focused on authoritarian attachments that developed within the family and on their respective prejudice structures (Fromm, 1931; Adorno et al., 1950; see chapter 2.1.), but soon processes of communitarization took on a pivotal position in the research agenda. It was not the single individual and its character structure, produced within family relations, but the interpenetration of individual conflicts, political propaganda, and mass dynamics that was at the heart of analysis. Taking up Freud’s mass psychology (Freud, 1921), critical social psychologists asked how nationalist, in particular the National Socialist, mass (movements) worked. What made them so attractive for individuals? What kept the mass together, and which emotional attachments and dynamics played a part in it? Even more so than Freud, the authors focused on processes of the formation of the concept of enemy, especially anti-Semitism, because they realized that nationalism and racism/xenophobia/anti-Semitism could only be understood in combination, as complementary processes. The process of building an in-group or an out-group functions like a paranoid delusion on the level of mass psychology.

Reich’s Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933) does not live up to its title but is based on reflections on social character rather than an analysis of mass dynamics themselves. However, Reich is ahead of the later mass psychological approaches in his attempt to historicize and contextualize the subjects of the mass within a Marxist class analysis that locates the specific fears and desires that were susceptible to National Socialist propaganda.

In 1951, Adorno wrote one of the most interesting mass psychological texts, Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda. He showed how accurately and intuitively Freud had anticipated the structure and dynamic of the National Socialist Movement. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich took up this analysis in their book The Inability to Mourn (1967). National Socialism offered the lower middle class, tormented by the fear of losing its economic and social position, the possibility of compensating narcissistic wounds by imaginary participation in the “collective narcissism” (Adorno) of the German ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ (folk community) kept together by the ‘Führer.’ Fascist propaganda has a structuring function in this regard; it seizes existing fears, intensifies them, canalizes the germinating melting desires and aggressions on the basis of already existing ideas of nationhood and resentments, and presents a leader who is supposedly going to save the world from its alleged downfall (see Adorno, 1943/2000, 1951; Löwenthal/Gutermann, 1949).

Taking up these reflections, though not in relation to National Socialism, fundamental reflections on the ego-stabilizing function of nationalisms were to follow. Vamik D. Volkan’s analyses of large group processes acquired vogue also in the German speaking countries.
Volkan differentiates the different aspects mentioned in Freudian mass psychology but essentializes the analyzed large groups (Volkan, 1988, 1997). Jan Lohl (2010) deepens one aspect of Volkan’s approach against the backdrop of research on nationalism (Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm) and speaks of a “national containment” which is loaded with narcissism by national symbols. Özdogan (2007), too, taking up Lorenzer’s symbol and interaction theory, emphasizes the significance of national symbols (architecture, flags, historical narratives) for the nationalization of subjects in the course of socialization.

In his conception of war as a “psychosocial arrangement” between the interests of the social elites and the narcissistic needs of the mass which stabilizes power relations, Mentzos (1992, 1993) conceptualizes the identification with a national “grandiose self” as a symptom of a “pseudo-coping” with inner conflicts. Bohleber (1992) puts particular emphasis on the desires for merging, wholeness, and integrity that cling to an organic image of the nation connected with images of the family. The nation is so interlocked with images of purity that it is desperately in need of the ‘other.’ Everything that appears as ‘impure’ or as a threat is then projected onto the ‘other,’ who is imagined as a filthy alien element that supposedly has to be cleared of (see Bohleber, 1994; Heim, 1992; Springer, 1999).

Anti-Semitism was conceptualized as a negative mechanism of communitarization rather early on. Social fears, which increase by economic crises, and which bring to the fore inner psychological conflicts, are discharged in the form of aggressions. The image of a homogenous in-group – a fantasy that covers up existing power and ruling relations – can only emerge when aggressions that are in fact directed against the authoritarian leader, the ruling classes, or the competing members of one’s group, are turned against certain social groups that are excluded from the community. With the chosen enemy, repressed aggressive tendencies, tabooed sexual desires, and critical objections by ego and super-ego can be fought against, as can be the fears of guilt produced by aggressions against social elites and one’s own ‘fellow folks.’ These projections lead to a paranoid attitude, as the members of the ‘outgroup’ are ascribed properties that are eliminated in one’s own self, they are perceived as a constant threat and, due to the projected aggressions, as perpetrators and haunters that need to be fended off, kept down, or destroyed altogether. The projected aggressions can thus be realized as an alleged ‘act of self-defense’ (Pohl, 2006). Because of this dynamic, Simmel (1946) called anti-Semitism a “mass psychosis” the function of which had been described by Waelder (1935; see also 1946) at an earlier point. Simmel’s text derives from the Psychiatric Symposium on Anti-Semitism, which he had organized in San Francisco in 1944, in which Adorno, Fenichel, and Horkheimer participated as well, and which witnessed the most advanced analyses of the psychology of anti-Semitism of the time (see Simmel, 1946). At a symposium about the psychological and social conditions of anti-Semitism organized by Mitscherlich in 1962, Wangh (1962) emphasized the significance of a detailed historical perspective for the analysis of NS-anti-Semitism. Lorenzer (1981) conceptualized nationalist and anti-Semitic ideologies as ‘templates’ with the ability to sew together current and older psychological conflicts in a process of afterwardness.

Similar dynamics, but different auguries, marked anti-Semitism after Auschwitz, so-called ‘secondary anti-Semitism’ (Schönbach, 1960) in post National Socialist German nations (see chapter 2.3.). After the mass murder of Jews, anti-Semitic resentments had to take on a new and more hidden form of appearance while, at the same time, they gained a new motivation. Jews, being the main victims of National Socialism, reminded many Germans of the horrendous crimes of the German nation. In order to restitute their “collective narcissism,” they avert these memories. Again and still, the nation supposedly must be cleared from ‘Jewish elements,’ mostly by means of projecting guilt and by relativizing victim-perpetrator
relations (see Adorno 1955b). This act of ‘clearance’ can take on different and changing forms (Adorno, 1955b; Clausen, 1987a; Rommelspacher, 1995; Rensmann, 1998; Schönbach 1961). Analyzing these new forms of anti-Semitism and against the backdrop of psychoanalytic social psychological reflections, a form of ‘left-wing anti-Semitism’ (Keilson 1988), manifest in a fundamental rejection of the state Israel after the Six-Day-War, entered the discussion (see Kloke, 1994; Rensmann, 2004, pp. 296-320; Postone, 2005), which led to major splits within the German left at the beginning of the new millennium. Quindeau (2007, 2008a) has recently propounded the thesis that, going along with the dying out of the perpetrator generation, the anti-Semitism which acted primarily as a defense against guilt has changed into an anti-Semitism that serves to relieve from guilt. As a compensation for their alleged acknowledgement of German responsibility for the Holocaust, the descendants of the perpetrators search everywhere, but especially in the Arabic countries, for even worse anti-Semites, completely ignore the anti-Semitism of the German majority population, and act as newly reformed missionaries against anti-Semitism. Taking up these reflections, Stender (2011) has shown how racist, anti-Semitic, and current anti-Muslim discourses are interlocked into a complex web of inclusion and exclusion in the German immigration nation.

It must be emphasized that mass psychological analyses can explain neither nationalism nor National Socialism or anti-Semitism in its basic dynamics. Such a claim would amount to a psychologistic reduction. Mass psychological reflections only make sense within the framework of social theory. As Horkheimer and Adorno in The Elements of Anti-Semitism (1944), and later authors such as Postone (1979) and Clausen (1987a,b), have emphasized, anti-Semitism must be considered as an ideological basic motif of (late) capitalism. Jews are perceived as the personifications of the abstract side of capitalist exchange of goods, and thus as representations of the circulation sphere, i.e., the world of trades and finances that is targeted by a kind of fetishistic critique of capitalism in times of crisis. The enemy, thus determined, may secondarily serve as a template for a crooked cure of other (inner psychological) conflicts of the subjects. Only against the backdrop of this definition of anti-Semitism as a basic element of bourgeois society it becomes evident that critical social psychological studies on anti-Semitism not only aim at reducing prejudices, but concomitantly aim to bring forth, a fundamental critique of society (see for an overview of research on anti-Semitism within critical theory Rensmann, 1998).

The same holds for the analysis of racism, which must be discussed within the context of capitalist societies that are structure by the logic of the nation state and by (post)colonial relations (see e.g., Balibar/Wallerstein, 1991). There is a difference between racist and anti-Semitic enemy constructions. While Jews are constructed as representations of capitalist real abstractions and thus connected with fantasies of intellectuality and omnipotence, racism fantasizes about the inferiority and closeness to nature of the ‘other.’

Because of the specific historical conditions of psychoanalytic social psychology, and in consequence of the Shoah, analyses of anti-Semitism have always taken a central position within psychoanalytic social psychological theory building. Studies on (post)colonial racism have been rather neglected or have merely accompanied the analysis of racist anti-Semitism. It was only after the xenophobic attacks on asylum-homes that occurred after the German ‘reunification’ in the early 1990s that researchers started to devote attention to the relation of racist attacks and (male) adolescence (see Nadig, 1993, 2001; Streeck-Fischer, 1993), taking up Erdheim’s (1985, 1987) reflections on xenophobia. Erdheim had called attention to the

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10 Anti-Semitism combines both tendencies: Fenichel (1946) already emphasized that Jews served the anti-Semist as a projection surface for both super-ego as well as Id tendencies and are thus imagined as both omnipotent and subhuman.
dynamics of afterwardness of the ‘representation of the other’ which develops early in life, is constantly re-written as an image of the exterior of the primary object, the family, and one’s ‘own culture’ that is both seducing and threatening, and is formed and connoted anew in adolescence. Xenophobia as well as its counter-piece, exoticism, helps to circumvent the confrontational disengagement from the family. Pohl (2003) and Nadig (2001) show that xenophobia – like anti-Semitism (see Winter, 2011a) – has its affective roots in gendered conflict structures, and that male xenophobia and gynophobia often accompany each other. Nadig (1993) furthermore points to the complex interlocking of individual psychological, peer-group specific, social, and economic processes in the development of adolescent violence.

Recently, social psychologists have asked whether the anti-Muslim resentments that flared up after 9/11 present a new phenomenon next to (cultural) racism and anti-Semitism (see Follert/Özdogan, 2011). To us, this debate, like the one about the interpenetration, overlaps, and aperiodicities of different forms of racism and anti-Semitism, seems pivotal for a contextualized analysis of current resentments in Western countries.

2.3. National Socialism and Its Consequences

In view of the fact that the vast majority of Germans identified with National Socialism, its nationalistic goals, and its anti-Semitic politics between 1933 and 1945, psychoanalytic social psychology after the NS-regime turned its attention to the constitution of the mental substructure of a German post-war society that thought of itself as democratic. This is of particular importance, because there is an asynchrony of social change that has already been stressed by Freud (1933). When a dictatorship transforms into a democracy, the re-constitution of political institutions as well as legal reforms can be realized rather quickly. It takes much longer to achieve a change in the subjective dimension of the political, in implicit patterns of orientation, affects structures, libidinous attachments, identifications, and enemy constructions. Changing this dimension could only be attempted by a generation change (Mitscherlich, A. and M. 1967). For a critical social psychology, it is of utmost significance to ask about the (cross-generational) “existence of National Socialism within democracy” (Adorno, 1959, p. 115).

The results of the empirical study Group Experiment (Pollock, 1955), conducted by Adorno and Horkheimer, showed an unsettling, and oftentimes unabated continuity of National Socialist ideological fragments, anti-Semitic and anti-communist world views, and an affective national cohesiveness during the 1950s. Nonetheless, anti-Semitic attitudes had changed after the mass murder. As Rommelspacher notes, “At the core of secondary anti-Semitism is the wish to forget the atrocities of National Socialism and to do away with all emotions connected to it” (Rommelspacher, 1995, p. 42; transl. NR). This secondary anti-Semitism (Schönbach, 1961; see chapter 2.2.) brings about traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes with a new livery and envies Jews “their negative chosenness” (Diner, 2002, p. 234; transl. NR), their innocence for the crimes committed to them, which is perceived as a latent accusation by many Germans. According to this scheme, “it was not the SS people who were brutal, who tortured the Jews, but the Jews who supposedly forced the Germans to acknowledge the crimes of the SS” (Adorno, 1955b, p. 124).

According to Adorno, secondary anti-Semitism is closely interrelated to the consequences of National Socialist communitarization, identifications with Hitler, the mass leader, and with the collective phantasm of ‘folk community’ were not destroyed (Adorno, 1959). They lurk within many individuals and wait for a renewed expression of an objectively reconstructed German nation, with historical impact, that is in line with reality. Adorno conceives of the
unconscious persistence of National Socialist identity constructs within the context of the economic constitution of (West) German post-war society. From the perspective of critical theory, societies based on a capitalist mode of production produce angst and feelings of powerlessness that are continuously dealt with by their members by affectively submitting to the socially offered form of the nation and by internalizing concepts of an enemy (see chapters 2.1. and 2.2.). How one’s own history is dealt with specifically must be understood against this general background. “The fact that fascism lives on, that the work of reprocessing the Past has not yet succeeded and has instead degenerated into its distorted image — empty, cold, forgetting – is the result of the continued existence of the same objective conditions that brought fascism in the first place” (ibid., p. 124). Attempts to protect collective narcissism by warding off history as well as secondary anti-Semitism come down to an effort to continue dealing with socially produced feelings of powerlessness and fear by national identifications and anti-Semitic concepts of the enemy (see Adorno, 1955). The past can only be accounted for by fundamentally changing the social conditions of the past.\textsuperscript{11} Claussen (1987) has shown what ‘remembering Auschwitz’ means in this regard; Without an understanding of the social conditions and relations of bourgeois society of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, where modern anti-Semitism is rooted, the remembrance of National Socialist mass murder remains incomplete.

Despite his remarkable insights into the consequences of National Socialism, Adorno’s social psychological reflections are rather general when it comes to subject theory. It was Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich who started to fill this deficit during the 1960s, without, however, referring to Adorno. In \textit{The Inability to Mourn} (1967), they analyzed the consequences of Hitler’s death as mass leader that so many Germans were attached to by submissive narcissistic love. “Indeed, the loss of an object invested with such libidinous energy would have been a reason for melancholia” (Mitscherlich, A. and M. 1967, p. 37; transl. NR). The Mitscherlichs think of melancholia (a depressive breakdown) as a specific kind of mourning that would have slowly resolved the emotional attachment to Hitler. However, according to their working hypothesis, the Germans did not lapse into melancholy because they de-realized their past. In this process, one’s own history is denied and turned into something other that seems to have nothing to do with one’s own (collective) identity – it “sinks, oneirically,” into proverbial silence (ibid. p. 40; transl. NR).

The Mitscherlichs’ work has been controversially discussed for over forty years now, an astonishing time span for a book offering a commentary on its era (see for recent discussions Brockhaus 2008, Jureitz/Schneider 2011; see also the critique of Lübke 1983, 1989 and Moser 1992 as well as the responses in Dahmer/Rosenkötter, 1983, Perels 1999, and Schneider 1993). In particular, the trauma theoretical re-readings of the inability to mourn by Bohleber (2001) and Krovoza (2005), who both focus on the Germans’ experience of violence during and after the war, deserve mention. By concentrating on the relation between mourning and trauma, these approaches bring an important dimension to accounting for the past into view. However, they are rather vague when it comes to a historically and subject theoretically exact definition of this relation (see for a critique Lohl 2006; Brunner, 2011a). For many Germans, the “horrors that the population experienced in the later years of the war” are “ran together into a single picture of unarticulated terror” (Adorno, 1955b, p. 138) together with the NS atrocities. The claims that Germans were traumatized by the allied aerial attacks on German

\footnote{According to Adorno, the possibilities of such fundamental social change are restricted in post National Socialist times, and so the repetition of Auschwitz can only be counteracted from the side of the subjects (see Adorno 1967, p. 192f.). Against this background, Adorno sketched his concept of a democratic education (1962b, 1967).}
cities, by the expulsion of Germans, by war captivity, by rapes, and by war childhood have sparked much public and psychoanalytic echo.

Furthermore, there are publications that bring together the Mitscherlichs’ approach with Adorno’s empirical results and develop them further by means of more recent subject theories (Lohl, 2010; Brunner, 2011a). It must also be mentioned that Mihr (2007) has demonstrated the richness of the Mitscherlichs’ approach by means of a critical analysis of a current historic-political debate. The recent German victimization discourse that foregrounds German victims at the expense of the Germans’ victims. The persistence of the “post-fascist syndrome” (Brückner, quoted after Krovoza/Schneider 1989, p. 16f.; transl. NR) is owed to its existence within the alleged a-political sphere of the private, within the family. The particular significance of this sphere for intergenerational consequences of National Socialism has first been analyzed with children of Jewish victims of National Socialism (with the center of research being outside Western Germany). When they entered psychoanalytic treatment, they suffered from symptoms that would have been expected in people who had experienced the atrocities and inhumanity of the persecution by the Nazis first-hand. The traumas caused by persecution and in the camps, which were often aggravated by the lack of social acknowledgement in West Germany (Eissler, 1963; Kestenberg, 1982), infiltrated the lives of the later-born generations and took full psychological effects there (see Bergmann/Jucovy/Kestenberg, 1982; Kogan, 1995; see for the psychological and social situation of survivors and their descendants in West Germany Grünberg, 2000).

After the pioneering works by Jokl (1968), Rosenkötter (1979), and Simenauer (1978), increasing evidence for the intergenerational effects of National Socialism has been gathered since the 1990s also with children and grandchildren of NS-perpetrators and followers. The effect of a submissive relation between parents and Hitler as the National Socialist mass leader on the constitution of the children’s ego-ideal and super-ego has been established (Rosenkötter, 1979, 1981, Simenauer, 1978, 1982) as have the intergenerational effects of socialization processes in Nazi Germany across three generations (Schneider/Stillke/Leinsweber, 1996). Brockhaus shows that and how the fascination with the National Socialist experiential offers – “the desire for unconditionality, the turning away from the dependencies and restrictions of everyday reality, and the idealization of self-conquest and sacrifice” (Brockhaus, 1997, p. 311; transl. NR) – unfolds an intergenerational dynamic. A couple of works have reconstructed the development of National Socialist emotional heritage within the generation of children, and even grandchildren, of NS-perpetrators and followers and have highlighted the significance of destructivity as well as guilt and its defense within the intergenerational process (see Bohleber, 1998; Buchholz, 1990; Eckstaedt, 1989; Lohl 2010; Müller-Hohagen, 1994; Rothe, 2009). Research also focuses on family dialogues about Nazi Germany (Bar-On, 1989; Rosenthal 1997), showing that the very parts of the parents’ or grandparents’ histories that are not narrated have an even greater effect on later-born generations than a family-historic narrative.12

Publications that inquire the different political significance of the intergenerational transmission of National Socialism and the relevance of unconscious contents for concrete

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12 The intergenerational consequences of National Socialism in families of survivors on the one hand and in families of former perpetrators on the other hand were already compared in the book Generations of the Holocaust by Bergmann/Jucovy/Kestenberg (1982). Such comparisons have often led to problematic parallelisms between the destiny of the survivors’ and the perpetrators’ descendants. They all too often neglect differences and must be understood within the context of post-NS defense against guilt that has experienced an upheaval by recent debates about German war traumas. They have sparked criticism and efforts of differentiation (see Grünberg, 1997, 2002; Brunner, 2011b).
everyday actions deserve special emphasis. On the one hand, research has established that neither the severe National Socialist, anti-Semitic, and racist attitudes within the German majority population (Decker et al., 2008) nor the readiness to resort to violence of right-wing extremism among the National Socialists’ grandchildren can be understood without taking into account the aftermaths of National Socialism (see Bohleber, 1994; Ebrect 2003; Lohl 2010). Right-wing adolescents act out National Socialist emotional heritage in a specific way and think and place themselves back to the history of their grandparents, performing it in their current social reality (see Lohl, 2010). On the other hand, scientific inquiry has also shown that the “dynamic of the protest movement marked by the key year ‘1968’ needs to be contextualized within the aftermath of National Socialism (Schneider/Stillke/Leineweber 2000; Lohl, 2011; Winter, 2011b). The accusations against the parent generation are a first ambivalent step on the way to account for National Socialism in a progressive manner and to ‘spit out’ the National Socialist emotional heritage (see Lohl, 2009).

For a critical psychoanalytic social psychology, what is most remarkable about the (intergenerational) consequences of National Socialism is that despite changes in the political regime, the establishment of a constitutional state, and the integration with the West in the course of which democratic values were adopted, certain attitudes, affect dispositions, National Socialist identifications and propensities for projections have not only outlasted the ‘zero hour’ but also continue to have effects across generations and to influence the feelings, actions, and thoughts of the later-borns in different ways. By employing an intergenerationally extended notion of the subject, critical social psychology can (informed by Benjamin’s theses on the notion of history) reveal the unconscious flow of history and make cogent that the past is an effective part of the present (also) within subjects.

2.4. Subjectivity and gender

According to Adorno, “an analytic social psychology needs to reveal social forces within the innermost mechanisms of the individual” (Adorno, 1952, p. 27; transl. NR). Genuinely subject theoretical reflections, asking how society ‘enters’ the innermost parts of the subject or how the subject is constituted by specific historical conditions, build an integral part of the fundament of psychoanalytic social psychology. Freud’s questions in this regard are bold or downright scandalous, they are “avant-garde and provocative in their presuppositionlessness” (Gast, 1996, p. 101; transl. NR). From his radically subject-centered position he not only inquires into the development of the ego and bourgeois self-awareness, he deconstructs them as chimeras of a subject split in itself, but also interrogates the ontogenetic conditions of subjectivity, the conditions of the differentiation between inner and outer reality, subject and object, past, presence, and future. The meta-psychological encircling of notions like desire, fantasy, drive, sexuality, unconscious, body, reality, afterwardness, etc., is a central part of critical psychoanalytic social psychology as are the implicit and explicit meta-reflections on the subject matter, the logic, and the ‘truth’ of psychoanalytic knowledge. Debates on the development of gender identity are located within this grappling with the constitution of subjectivity, which has always given way to a clash between essentialist and constructivist perspectives and thus has always tackled the historicity of Freud’s insights.

Freud’s psychoanalysis causes controversies in critical gender studies up until today. Some authors praise Freud’s perspective on gender dualism as virtually constructivist while others condemn his teachings as a psychological legitimation and essentialization of bourgeois gender relations at the end of the nineteenth century. What is it with psychoanalytic subject theory that brings about such different evaluations of its (counter-) emancipative potential? Freud has described human drive structure as bisexual. Libido thus unites the contradictory features (e.g., active and passive orientation of sexuality) that are separated in bourgeois
society and constructed as either male or female (Freud, 1933). Only seemingly in contrast to this bisexuality-thesis of desire, Freud propounds the view that the “pass through the early phases of libidinal development in the same manner” (ibid., p. 117), but that the psychosexuality of girls until the beginning of the Oedipal stage exerts a “wholly masculine character” (Freud 1905b, p. 219), that is, that the girl is but a “little man’ and that the pre-Oedipal experience of infants only has one sex, the male one (key word: ‘phallic monism’). Freud understands the ‘male’ as general and primordial on the one hand, and as another side of sexuality on the other hand (Löchel, 1990).

Freud interpreted the gendered specificity of subjectivity as a conflictuous mental coping with the “knowledge” of anatomical difference which follows the bisexual/phallic monist phase and is not biologically determined (Freud, 1933). However, the anatomical difference in its binary form was a fundamental given for Freud: “penis” vs. “no penis.” He thus considered the psychological development of girls, in stark contrast to the development of boys, as characterized by the coping with deficiency and by the resulting “penis envy.” It supposedly was this penis envy that urged girls to heterosexually desire the phallus.

The contradictions in Freud’s concept of bisexuality versus phallic monism, which mirrors the androcentrism of the ideology of sex (human = man), and the biologicist interpretation of Freud’s notion of drives have repeatedly sparked feminist criticism, while his deconstruction of the “nature” of sex by reconstructing its psychosexual development has offered the starting point for an emancipative subversion of gender relations.

Freud’s views were harshly criticized already in the 1920s. Karen Horney, for example, insisted that “femininity” did not result from deficiency, i.e., from the absence of a penis. According to Horney, this view was the result of male presumptuousness. On a theoretical level, she blames Freud for having neglected biology. She sketches a model in which human nature, in principle developing femininity and masculinity along strictly parallel lines, was “repressed” by patriarchal education in late childhood (this model was targeted by Adorno when he criticized Horney’s sociologism and biologism; compare chapter 1.3.). She thus regarded female heterosexuality as an innate disposition rather than the result of “penis envy” (Horney, 1926).

When the National Socialists rose to power at the beginning of the 1930s, this controversial debate was disrupted and was not pursued further in exile. It was in the wake of second wave feminism during the 1970s that “sex” gained a place in psychoanalytic discussions again. Debates in West Germany were strongly influenced by the reception of US-American authors (Shulamith Firestone, Kate Millet, Juliet Mitchell, etc.). On the one hand, feminists were interested in methods of (collective) self-awareness and change (“consciousness raising”), but on the other hand, they also expressed reservations about psychoanalysis (Hagemann-White 1978; Koellreuter, 2000). The German-American sociologist Carol Hagemann-White explains this feminist discomfort with psychoanalysis. First, “a tendency for wishful thinking in order to avoid an ugly truth. Feminists accuse Freud, the man who describes reality, because he is in accord with this reality, but they deprive themselves from his insights by doing so” (Hagemann-White, 1978, p. 734; transl. NR) – but then again, the goals of psychotherapy more often than not consisted in adapting the patients to the cultural role models of “femininity” (Schwarzer, 1975, see Hagemann-White, 1978). Feminists finally called the drive model of psychoanalysis into question. Did it not start from a biologically given, monadic (male) subject that only uses the other as an object for its own purposes?
For academic Women’s Studies that developed at the time, for example for the “Munich approach” (Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Ilona Ostner, and others) or for the “Bielefeld approach” (Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, Maria Mies, Claudia Werlhof, and others), psychoanalysis played virtually no role. Instead, the authors drew upon learning theory (Scheu, 1977). However, there were attempts to adopt psychoanalysis for a feminist critique of society- The “Hannover approach” (Regina Becker-Schmidt, Gudrun-Axeli Knapp, and others) differed from others in its emphasis on the significance of mediation rather than deductive thinking. Contradictions in gendered subjectivity, which revealed the concept of a male and female social character as an ideology, became more evident (Liebisch, 1994): Actual women and men are not as is expected of them by social norms. The difference between description and legitimation that Freud had been blamed for shows when one pays attention to the rupture and contradictions that expose reality as conflictuous and as discordant with its ideology. Hannover feminists in particular have analyzed how the objective contradictions of women’s “double socialization” (Becker-Schmidt, 1987; transl. NR), i.e., women’s place in both paid labor and family, are reflected psychologically as subjective ambivalences.

In addition to these social theoretical adaptations of psychoanalysis, the internal debate developed further. Margarete Mitscherlich was received well by second wave feminists, because she had revised the Freudian concept of “woman as a deficient being.” For her, not only female but also male development was marked by losses. Male development could not be thought of as generically human but, like female development, as particular. Men, too, are now “gendered” (Behnke/Meuser, 1997). Ontogenetically, it was not “masculinity” but “femininity” that was considered primordial in the course of identification with the mother, the first significant other, and boys had to give up this identification in a painful process.

At the end of the 1980s, debates about the social psychological explanation of female perpetratorship during National Socialism took on central stage in the feminist advancement of psychoanalysis. Mitscherlich had proposed the thesis that female anti-Semites and National Socialist perpetrators developed their attitudes and committed crimes because they identified with the aggressor, i.e., anti-Semitic men who coped with the separation from their mothers with the help of projections. Thus, anti-Semitism was considered a “disease of the male” (Mitscherlich 1983; transl. NR). In the course of the “dispute between female historians” [Historikerinnenstreit] (Herkommer, 2005), Karin Windaus-Walser criticized this approach and called for the analysis of a distinctly “female logic” within the psychodynamic of female anti-Semites in order to avoid keeping National Socialism from one’s own gender by unconsciously avoiding guilt. Women, too, could project the repression efforts demanded of them in their socialization when cultural circumstances allowed them to (Becker/Stillke 1987; Hannemann, 2011; Prokop, 1995; Windaus-Walser, 1990).

Discomfort with the drive concept, widespread among feminists of the 1980s because it seemed to accord too much significance to biology, entered feminist advancements of psychoanalysis. Object relations theory and its successor, intersubjective psychoanalysis, were considered a valid alternative. These theories emphasized the ambivalent quality of (pre-Oedipal) relationship experiences between autonomy and dependency instead of the contradiction between drive realization and its refusal by the environment. The works of US-American theorists (Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin, and others) animated the discussion. Furthermore, the family-centered argumentation that had long put a special focus on the conduct of concrete caregivers was replaced by symbol and language theoretical approaches. While “penis envy” had been put aside with reference to an alleged “natural” heterosexuality (e.g., Horney) in the discussions of the 1970s, later and especially French writers (e.g. Janine
Chasseguet-Smirgel, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, Maria Torok) decoded “penis envy” as “phallus envy.” Thus, envy is not directed at the penis but at that which it symbolizes culturally, aggressive self-assertion and “access to the mother’s body (or to the body of a mother substitute)” (Rohde-Dachser, 2006, p. 962; transl. NR). Taking up Judith Butler’s interpretation of anatomical sex difference as a result of culturally preformatted patterns of perception as well as the analysis of trans- and intersexuality, “penis envy” was deprived of the last remains of Freud’s ontologizing self-evidence (Quindeau, 2008b).

In the context of new developments in socialization research (e.g. “self-socialization,” see Maihofer, 2002; ZSE 2002), feminists have emphasized that the acquisition of a gendered “grammar of desire” (Hagemann-White, 1984, p. 85; transl. NR) must be understood as a never-ending, active, and at times restive (mal)appropriation of cultural norms by subjects. The Foucauldian take on the mechanisms of discourse as both empowerment and constraint (Liebsch 2008) allowed for an understanding of affective attraction, but also of the suffering carved into these appropriations of gender “identities.” Gendered socialization does not result in a (passive and peaceful) »femininity« of women and a (autonomous and aggressive) “masculinity” of men, but always goes along with a “failure” in view of these norms (Villa 2006). “Masculinity” and “femininity” are not coherent personality traits but – as in Freud’s bisexuality concept – psychological “positions” (Quindeau, 2008b, p. 95).

As male development had been considered as the “normal” and generically human course of development for a long time, social psychological psychoanalytic masculinity research is still in its infancy. A paradigmatic new orientation has been developed by Ralf Pohl (2004), who distances himself from the “detachment paradigm” that was propounded already by Mitscherlich and elaborated by Robert Stoller and Ralph Greenson, and who argues (with recourse to Fast) that the idea of a “dis-identification” of boys from the primary-narcissistic mother-child-symbiosis, as well as the resulting proto-femininity, is a retroactive (male) fantasy in the light of binary gendered re-categorization. “Detachment” can only be experienced as such after it has happened and the past can only appear as a devouring intimacy from the perspective of the present. “Regression” into femininity is now feared by boys and contrasting desires are done away with by means of projection, resulting in a misogynous “paranoid defense-battle-attitude” as a core element of “normal masculinity” (Pohl, 2004, pp. 295ff; transl. NR).

As constructivist and discourse analytic approaches have triumphed in gender studies since the early 1990s, psychoanalytic approaches only play a marginal role in German gender studies (Liebsch, 2008). Nevertheless, its lively and promising advancement can be seen especially in its dialogue with poststructuralist approaches.

The feminist critique of the drive model did not lead to the abandonment of the model altogether, but to its reformulation in interaction theoretical terms. In addition to French Lacanian psychoanalysis (e.g., Löchel, 1987; Rendtorff, 1996; Soiland, 2010), Lorenzer’s critical theory of the subject (see chapter 1.4.) has proved an important inspiration. Various authors, sometimes also taking up poststructuralist approaches, have employed Lorenzer’s concept of symbolic interaction forms that express (embodied) experience in culturally allowed (and distorted) ways – as male or as female (König, 2011; Liebsch, 1994; Rohde-Dachser 1991; Quindeau, 2008b). Recently, Jean Laplanche’s re-conceptualization of drive theory has been adopted by psychoanalytic gender theories (Koellreuter, 2000, 2010; Quindeau, 2004, 2008b; Reiche, 1997). Koellreuter explains this recourse explicitly as a counterbalance to the impending “evaporation of the sexual in the theory and practice of feminist psychoanalysis” (Koellreuter, 2000; transl. NR; see Quindeau, 2008b).
3. Psychoanalysis as a method in social research

Various among the above mentioned authors have also made attempts to seize psychoanalytic approaches systematically and methodologically for empirical social research. Important impulses came from the context of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, for example, the studies on Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, et al. 1950), in which quantitative, psychoanalytically inspired research on prejudice was combined with psychoanalytically oriented interviews, or the “group experiment,” one of the largest social scientific studies of the post-war era, in which attitudes and behaviors of the German population were examined with the help of group discussions (Pollock, 1955; see chapter 2.3.).

Of central importance for a psychoanalytically inspired methodology is the so-called depth-hermeneutical culture analysis, an approach that dates back to Alfred Lorenzer. His pointed emphasis on psychoanalysis as a theory of interaction and socialization is of special significance in this regard (see chapter 1.4.). Departing from psychoanalytic practice, he conceptualizes the psychoanalytic process of understanding as a “scenic understanding” (Lorenzer, 1977). In the psychoanalytic situation, the analyst not only aims at capturing what is actually said but enters the “scenes” unfolding between his/her and the analysand in the moment of interaction, taking part in them. The shared interaction, the play of transference and counter-transference, makes it possible to reconstruct a layer of meaning that evades a mere content analysis. The analysand’s conscious and unconscious conceptions of life, his or her tabooed and repressed fantasies and desires are reconstructed. This reconstruction is social scientific in outlook already in the clinical practice, because “the conceptions of life that are performed within the text are thought of as the results of primary socialization processes – as reflections of family structures of interaction – and secondary socialization processes – as a consequence of socialization by school, work, spare time, etc.” (König, 1997, p. 215; transl. NR).

Lorenzer transfers psychoanalytic method into the realm of psychoanalytic literary interpretation, conceptualized as a reception analysis. The core of Lorenzer’s method transfer is marked by the analysis of the effect a text (or a film or a work of art) has on the reader. This reception analysis opens up the possibility of producing “exemplary – not representative!” (Haubl 1995, p. 28; transl. NR) interpretations of the latent meaning of a text but not, however, of analyzing the authors’ unconscious. In his method transfer, Lorenzer emphatically stresses the difference between clinical psychoanalysis and culture analysis, which is of utmost importance and cannot be over-emphasized (Lorenzer, 1986). The differentiation between manifest and latent text level is pivotal. “The existence of an autonomous level of meaning beneath the very language symbols that produce meaning must be acknowledged. While the manifest meaning of a text is located on the level of socially acknowledged figures of consciousness, a level of meaning that is effective without language, the level of unconscious interaction forms urges into consciousness with the latent meaning of a text” (Lorenzer, 1986, p. 29; transl. NR). Lorenzer understands these unconscious interaction forms (see Chapter 1.4.) as conceptions of possible social interactions in which socially tabooed and repressed ideas, wishes, and affects find their expression. Even if these conceptions do not enter the manifest text via language symbols, they still have an effect on it. This effect shows as ambiguity and imagery of the text but also as a destruction of language: as abrupt changes of subject, slips, gaps, and verbal unsoundness. Such inconsistencies provide a particularly productive access to the latent meaning of a text.
Bereswell et al. (2010) offer the following argument for using depth-hermeneutics not only for literary texts and other cultural products like films, images, and sculptures, but also for interviews and group discussions. Everyday social interactions, as well, have an unconscious layer of meaning that gains expression outside of consciousness. When researchers collect empirical data in which people interact, these interactions contain traces of unconscious meaning (see Löchel, 1997). Scenic understanding aims at these traces. Following Lorenzer (1986), who emphasizes the differences between scenic understanding in the clinical setting and in culture analysis, Morgenroth (1990) calls for using a modified form of scenic understanding for social research the core of which is collective interpretation in interpretation groups. This group interpretation moves back and forth between a detailed and standardized reading of the empirical material and the reflection of irritations, affects, and conflicts the material effects on the group. Morgenroth (2010b) defines these reactions with a broader notion than counter-transference. As the interpreters’ inner reaction to the unconscious meaning that arises and is reproduced in the interaction between researchers and participants in the course of the collection of data, i.e., in group discussions or interviews. The “scene,” that emerges in the primary research relationship, […] will be ‘housed’ in the interview data and will then reappear in the secondary research relationship. In other words, a depth-hermeneutic perspective assumes that, as the data are read and discussed by an interpretation panel, so the scene will re-emerge in the feelings of and the relations among panel members” (ibid., p. 277). When these interactions are taken as serious and reflected carefully, they offer insight into the latent meaning structure of the empirical material. For psychoanalytic social psychology, aspects that are – not always, but often – neglected in social research are of vital importance: reflecting on the research relationship, the subjectivity of researchers, their emotional reactions to the research topic, irritations and conflicts in the interpretation group. Since the 1980s, and mostly thanks to the efforts of social researchers like Rolf Haubl (1991, 1993, 1995, Haubl/Liebsch 2009), Hans-Dieter König (2001, 2006, 2008), Thomas Leithäuser and Birgit Volmerg (1988; Leithäuser; Volmerg/Volmerg, 1983), Elfriede Löchel (1997), and Christine Morgenrot (1990, 2010a and b), depth-hermeneutic culture analysis has been developed to a methodical instrument within qualitative social research. A special feature that critical social psychology shares with therapeutic psychoanalysis is certainly its emancipative aspiration. What is at stake is “enlightenment and the abolition” of those constraints “that impair people’s lives and hinder them from living their lives according to their own needs” (Volmerg, 1988, p. 36; transl. NR). Against this backdrop, psychoanalytic social psychology can further develop as a kind of action research that would as such have methodical affinities to Brückner’s political psychology (see chapter 1.4.). Taking back research results into the research field and reflecting on the results together with the participants is, however, still an exception rather than the rule.

Parallel to, and partly in overlap with depth-hermeneutics, ethno-psychoanalysis, too, has been established as an instrument of qualitative research. Ethno-psychoanalysis has been taken up by researchers who conduct field research and/or interviews in particular, because it directs its attention even more decidedly on the process of data collection and the researcher’s own role within the research process (see chapter 1.5.). An important venue, especially during the 1980s, was the Ethnological Seminar at the University of Zurich, where Maya Nadig and Mario Erdheim lectured. Their criticism, which aimed at the neglect of human relations and libidinous and aggressive drives in science and the “destruction of scientific experience by the academic milieu” (Nadig/Erdheim, 1988; transl. NR) going along with it, caught the interest of younger researchers. Ethno-psychoanalytic research starts from the assumption that unreflected counter-transferences influence both the research process and theory construction, thus, reflecting on the research process and one’s own experience by means of participatory observation, e.g., by using research journals and group reflections, is an integral part of ethno-
psychoanalytic study designs. In this context, the works of Hans Bosses (1994) deserve mention. With his ethno-hermeneutic, Bosses developed an empirical approach of ethno-psychoanalysis that combines ethnographic, sociological, psychoanalytic, and group-analytic methods of interpretation in a productive method.

Maya Nadig and Johannes Reichmayr (1997) have argued that ethno-psychoanalysis can readily be taken up by and fit in with recent discussions in ethnology, cultural studies, the social sciences, and the arts and humanities, which are influenced by the poststructuralist paradigm change. This holds for much psychoanalytically inspired research. Methodical aspects that have been pivotal for psychoanalytic approaches all along, have gained increasing relevance: Qualitative research (drawing on exemplary reconstructions of cases and narrative meaning, among others), transparency within the research relationship by means of reflecting dynamics of transference and counter-transference and the situatedness of knowledge, integrating subjective and emotional dimensions into the research process, contextualizing and specifying instead of categorizing, and drawing on the sequentiality and process-oriented nature of research and the research relationship. The lack of the necessary multiple qualifications among researchers is still a problem that could be solved by cultivating inter- and transdisciplinary collaborations especially in the realm of method training.

4. Concluding remarks

In this overview, we have reconstructed the history of critical social psychology on the one hand and have discussed exemplary important topics on the other hand. We want to repeat that we make no claims of having offered a complete overview. A more detailed overview would have to integrate other important topics of critical psychoanalytic social psychology (for example, studies on the class consciousness of workers, on the German unification and on German nationalism, on the past of East Germany and its consequences, and the field of psychoanalytic analysis of organizations and institutions, etc.). Furthermore, the overview of developments since the 1980s would have to be extended – a requirement we could not fulfill in this paper. The places at which psychoanalytic social psychology could get institutionalized at universities during the 1960s and 1970s were a fruitful soil on which psychoanalytic social psychological research could flourish. We will name only a few as representatives of many others: Lilli Gast in Berlin, Rolf Haubl, Hans-Joachim Busch, and Hans-Dieter König in Frankfurt, Heiner Keupp and Gudrun Brockhaus in Munich, Thomas Leithäuser and Birgit Volmer in Bremen, and Alfred Krovoza, Regina Becker-Schmidt, and Rolf Pohl in Hannover. The generation of researchers who are pursuing their PhDs and habitations at the moment have hardly succeeded in getting institutionalized by now – not least because of changing power structures at universities. Psychoanalytic social psychology shares the ‘fate’ of many critical scientific endeavors; it has been increasingly marginalized and excluded from universities. Certainly, this also has to do with the fact that German speaking critical psychoanalytic social psychology has been rather separatist and self-referential up until the 1980s: Only occasionally did it take up new psychoanalytic, sociological, and critical theories that could have been productive for the answering of its questions but also for the generation of new research questions. Furthermore, it restricted itself to debates and topics that were carried out in the German language or were accessible in it – international reception was lacking for the most part. This does not only come as a disadvantage. First, it allows for a discussion of certain core issues that is carried out under ever new historic circumstances. Second, the “outmoded” psychoanalytic social psychology maintained a critical potential in the face of the “Zeitgeist,” but also in regard to other and newer critical approaches in subject theory and social theory. It is especially the – according to changing historical conditions and problems – ever renewed reflection on psychoanalytic subject theory and the question of how
to conceptualize the embedding of subject formation within social relations, the interrelation of individual and social history, and the dialectic of individual and society that always has been and still is productive.

The future of critical psychoanalytic social psychology will depend on whether it succeeds in staying or becoming visible, scientifically, politically, and socially, with its theories, methods, and topics, and on the borders and transitions between other (critical) approaches and disciplines. It is not only the re-establishment of psychoanalytic social psychologies at universities that is at stake here, but also the continuation of its political potential. Its aspiration of working towards an emancipative restructuring of the societal status quo must not be abandoned. For this end, psychoanalytic social psychology also needs to stay in critical dialogue with political and social agents, with people acting, hoping, and suffering.

The currently precarious institutional situation of psychoanalytic social psychology is not only a disadvantage. First, with the younger generation of psychoanalytically oriented social psychologists, it also has an activating and (re-)politicizing effect that becomes visible in a multitude of new co-operations, conferences, and publications. In the realm of science politics, it aims at making visible the knowledge potential of psychoanalytic social psychology and at interfering with public discourses and political struggles. Second, the institutional eradication revealed the lack of inclusion of other advanced strands of critical theories. It is no wonder, then, that the desire to open up and to create dialogue, discussions, and alliances, as well as to transgress the boundary of the German language and to establish international exchange is very evident at the moment. With our overview of the history of critical psychoanalytic social psychology in the German speaking countries, we hope to have made its potential accessible to non-German-speaking critical psychologists and to have helped realize this desire for international exchange.

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