Working at the Borders: 
Reconstructing the History of Chinese Psychology from the Perspective of 
Critical Psychology

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Abstract

Following the Western academic discourse of psychology, there is no such thing as critical psychology (even if in its plural form) in China which aims to react against mainstream psy-sciences. But the development of Chinese psychology shares overlapping issues with critical psychology. And the possibility of an overall understanding of these issues lies in the articulation of Chinese modern political-economic and cultural-historical systems. Situated in the macro framework of the formation of Chinese modern knowledge system, I will attempt to reconstruct the history of Chinese psychology from the perspective of critical psychology, in order to find the consensus between the possible thoughts of Chinese critical psychology and its Western counterpart and on this basis to trace in detail the possible theoretical and practical threads of Chinese critical psychology.

Keywords: Chinese psychology, critical psychology, historiography, psychologisation, the modern governance of mind

When I was passing through Canadian customs in summer 2007 to attend the International Society for Theoretical Psychology (ISTP) conference in Toronto, an official seemed puzzled after hearing that I came for a “theoretical psychology conference.” He asked: “How could psychology be theoretical?” I smiled at him: “You hit the nail on the head, sir. Those whom you usually examine and question are not Canadians but foreigners at your borders – at the very frontier of what you recognize as your country. In the same way, theoretical psychology examines with equal scrutiny ideas at the frontiers through which new paradigms and new knowledge enter the field of psychology.” He seemed satisfied, and smiled, as he placed the seal of approval on my passport, adding: “Have a nice day!”

“Working at the borders”: this is also how I understand critical psychology (or critical psychologies). Critical psychology should be motivated by a philosophical ethos of limit-attitude, which means being at the borders. It brings to mind what Michel Foucault (1994/1997) said in “What is Enlightenment?”: “Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits.” Politzer (1928/1994) proposed more than 80 years ago that psychologists are scientists like evangelised wild tribes are Christians; and that psychologists “reject all control and all critique using as an excuse that ‘metaphysics’ has nothing to do with science”. Maybe it risks political incorrectness to repeat this claim, but there can hardly be a bolder assertion to expose the special feature of psychology which pretends to be a natural science and the dilemma of mainstream psy-sciences. Psychology, or to be accurate, mainstream psy-sciences, crossed the borders of legitimacy by claiming that it is a universal and neutral science. While this mainstream enterprise proceeded to psychologise society, critical psychology emerged as its symptom via making its universal claim problematic. The
etymological meaning of “symptom” is a departure from normal functioning or feeling, noticed by a patient, indicating the presence of disease or abnormality. In contrast to medical symptoms, the disciplinary symptom of psy-sciences is blocked speech wanting to be heard and emancipated. A core goal of critical psychologists was thus to transform psychology into an emancipatory, radical, social-justice seeking, or status-quo-resisting approach that understands psychological issues as taking place in specific political-economic or cultural-historical contexts (Teo, forthcoming). In addition, “critical” in its etymological sense has roots in a medical sense, that of the crisis of a disease as a frequently used alternate sense (Stam, 2006). We are thus critically engaging with the metapsychological issues in these precarious times of psychology. Heidegger (1989/1999, p. 8, p. 75, p. 83, p. 87, p. 166, p. 168) once characterized our present-day being as Not, which could be translated as “urgency” or “emergency”. Necessary is always grounded on Not. The lack of emergency is the greatest emergency. “The lack of emergency [Not] is the greatest where self-certainty has become unsurpassable, where everything is held to be calculable and, above all, where it is decided, without a preceding question, who we are and what we are to do” (Polt, 2001, p. 102). This is exactly the state of the psy-sciences—the preceding question, who psychologists are and what they are to do, lost its urgency. The very necessity of critical psychology lies in this present situation which is itself an emergency. Worse still, “capitalism's current worldwide system has erased any kind of ‘state of emergency’ able to prompt change or betterment” (Vattimo & Zabala, 2011, p. 41). Furthermore, the extent to which psy-sciences help maintain the status quo is also an important issue for critical psychology. Psychology is being immersed in the illusion of its unprecedented success, especially in China, if compared to the situation decades ago. It is the world's fastest-growing major economy, with growth rates averaging 10% over the past 30 years. The booming economy has created increasing demands in the psychological market. We can find that psychology is becoming more and more popular. It is trying to commensurate every aspect of people's daily life and mediate their life experience with psychological explanation and understanding. This process of psychologisation requires Chinese psychologists to put critical psychology on the agenda when they are busy importing Western psychology.

The direct counterpart of Western critical psychology remains absent in the matrix of existing Chinese psychology, and in its recent past Chinese psychology is overwhelmingly dominated by mainstream psychological narratives. As a result, the appropriate way out to articulate Chinese critical psychology is by tracing the development of Chinese psychology and working at the borders of various mainstream narratives. In this way we can read the symptoms of mainstream psychology and disclose its blanks, its silences and its absences veiled by mainstream historiography in order to uncover and elucidate the possible resources of Chinese critical psychology. Furthermore, the symptomatic reading itself is also a form of critical psychology. Some of those former historians of Chinese psychology treat the history of Chinese psychology as though it is either a dispensable supplement to mainstream psychological studies (a view held by the majority of mainstream psychologists) or a natural progressive procedure of knowledge accumulation during the dissemination of Western thought in China (Xu, 1979; Yang, 2000; Yan, 2005; Xue, 2006 & 2007). There is some justification for this; for it is the way the story was told even in the systematic texts of the Chinese psychologists themselves. But the reconstruction of the history of Chinese psychology from the perspective of critical psychology will make clear that Chinese psychology is more than a theory of mind or psyche; more even than a psychological system. Clearly, if we are to develop a broader psychological perspective, we must go beyond the mainstream historiography that the discipline of psychology has produced for its own consumption. Historiography is about how history is written and told. Historiography of
psychology centers, at the meta-level, on how the past of psychology is recovered and represented. History is never the recounting of a past that is “just there”, but the important development of a narrative about some past that is only ever partially understood, reclaimed or known. This does not mean that history is not tied to actual events in the past, but that those events do not make sense until we have articulated them as histories (Wang, forthcoming). Unfortunately, the historiography of Chinese psychology is dominated by mainstream narratives; namely, the knowledge of the past is restricted to the accumulation of mostly quantitative, “unquestionable”, “real” and non-critical knowledge, without the need for a reappraisal of the theoretical system, the anthropological bases, the philosophical foundations and their practical applications (Holzkamp, 1973). At the end of his career the neo-behaviorist Tolman realized that his research might not have amounted to much, but that he had fun whilst doing it. Of course, this is a sad criterion for a discipline that pretends to develop cumulative scientific explanations for human experiences and behaviors (Wang, 2011). However, this is the knowledge ideal which the mainstream narrative chose, which otherized alternative psychological approaches in China. Thus, a critical historiography which goes beyond the mainstream matrix and works at the borders of various narratives is necessary.

In line with Marx’s claim that religion and morality have no independent history, Chinese psychology has no its independent history either. The development of Chinese psychology is not an independent evolution of thought or theory, but is interwoven with the very fabric of Chinese modern political economy, the structure of which shapes all of our story-telling abilities about Chinese psychology. We think of ourselves using the conceptual tools available to us, and this knowledge serves a political function (Danziger 1997, p. 144, 184f.). It is through those concepts or categories that psychologists perceive political-economic reality. Moreover, constructed concepts can become a social reality and part of human identity (Teo, 2010). Psychological concepts are never innocent or free of hegemonic interests, but are always embedded in the dominant situation of political economy. Psychological knowledge is thus treated not as natural and fixed truths but as normative and historical results that have been shaped by the fabric of political economy and that should be suspended to be criticized and examined. This is how the story of Chinese psychology is told in the following parts to examine the encounter and exchange of Western psychological épistémè in Chinese cultural ecology.

### Historical Stages of Chinese Psychology

Psychologists should pay attention to people’s experience, and the experience of the Chinese people, which has been shaped by agricultural civilization for thousands of years and is now rapidly being industrialized, has its own unique nature. From the perspective of the disciplinary institutionalization, modern psychology, accompanied by industrial modernity, did not form part of the Chinese experience before the 1840 Opium War. Indeed, most Chinese psychologists recognize the viewpoint that there was no psychology, but only psychological thought, in China before 1840. However, the expression of psychological thought is actually problematic. The usage of psychological itself already implies the meaning of modernity. It would be an anachronism to define Chinese pre-modern thought before 1840 with a modern invention (“psychological”) as its attribute. This is also the reason why only the story of Chinese psychology after 1840 is told in this paper. The development of Chinese psychology is divided into the following five stages based on the critical moments in its

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1 For the chapters about the historical stages, critical debates and the future directions of Chinese psychology, I have used materials presented in the “history, critical debates and the future directions” (authored by Bo Wang) of the entry “Chinese psychology” published in Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology.
history and the recognition that psychology is a *modern* discipline, a *scientific* one which modernizes the experience of the Chinese people.

**1840-1927** The period from the first Opium War (the symbol of the beginning of Chinese modernization) to Guowei Wang's (1877-1927) suicide. Wang is considered, although on rare occasions, “the father of Chinese modern psychology” (Jiang, 1996, p. 713), in that he is the translator of Harald Høffding’s (1843-1931) “Outlines of Psychology” (first published in Danish in 1862 in English in 1891, and on whose Japanese edition Wang's 1907 translation is based), which is taken as “the first psychology book translated into Chinese” (Zhang, 1941/1983, p. 210; Jiang, 1996). At the same time, Wang is a Master of Chinese classics studies. However, his name is seldom mentioned in Chinese psychological textbooks because he did not conduct empirical studies. Moreover, although (and perhaps even *because*) he is frequently mentioned in the history of Chinese psychology, people get accustomed to several “facts” about him and ignore that these “facts” and his status require further elaboration in the context of Civilization conflict and the analysis of the nature of psychological knowledge. The main characteristic of this period was the first major conflict between Chinese and Western civilizations; or in Wang's (1906/2009) own words, “The lovable is not credible while the credible is not lovable”. By this he meant that the “lovable” traditional Chinese culture appeared to lose credibility as a result of its inability to resist foreign intrusion and aggression. The practical Western thought, although it may have promised to make China prosperous, was however extremely strange to the experience of traditional intellectuals. It finally triggered the Controversy between Science and Metaphysics (1923-1924) in which almost all the major intellectuals of the time were involved. To believe that Western science is omnipotent, or to stick to traditional Chinese moral values, that was the question. In essence, the controversy was about how to modernize China, including how to modernize Chinese experience. It means how to incorporate the “traditional mind” into the modern one, namely, how to make the “modern mind”. The traditional mind is shaped by the individual “immanent transcendent” which means the “immanent” nature of man has direct access to the transcendent “heaven” (*tian*); stated differently, the exercise of human immanence can be unified as one with the transcendent “heaven”. This conception of mind functions as the keystone of such Chinese traditional thought as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Mou, 1974; Yu, 1984; Tang, 1991). Psychology, as indicated in the Controversy, played a special and major role in the modernization of the Chinese traditional mind. Through this modernization of mind, the traditional experience of the individuals “immanent transcendent”, religious and aesthetic characterized, was re-organized into a modern governance of mind required by a variety of modern grand narratives (socialism, capitalism, nationalism, freedom, democracy, etc.). Thus the traditional mind was interpellated to be the modern subject (whether it is the capitalists, the proletariat, peasants, intellectuals, or citizen-subjects) manipulated by these grand narratives. Furthermore, this modern subject tends to identify itself voluntarily with the modern governance of mind and thus contributes to naturalizing it. In this way, the making of the modern subject in the history of Chinese psychology is articulated with the subject matter of critical psychology, namely the critique of psychologisation. Chinese intellectuals, whether conservative or radical, showed keen interest in Western psychology. Ironically, the majority of them were not psychologists. Early psychology books were translated and written by missionaries; the term “psychology” itself was introduced in 1898 by Kang Youwei (1858-1927), a prominent political thinker and reformer and a noted calligrapher of the late Qing Dynasty. This implies that psychology was not limited in the laboratories (although it should be said that the first psychology laboratory was opened in 1917 in Peking, supported by Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), who attended Wundt's classes for 3 years in Leipzig; and the first psychology department was founded in 1920 in
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Nanjing) but used to address the problem of the modernization of Chinese experience. Taking Guowei Wang as an example, he proposed the concept of “mental education” in 1906 as a national project to improve Chinese people's “mental abilities”. During the 1923-1924 Controversy the advocates for Metaphysics, argued that material sciences could not be on a par with spiritual sciences which study human mind and its result. Because of its ever-changing features, according to them, pure mind is not within the reach of scientific methods. Metaphysics is thus above science, leaving space for traditional mind and values. In opposition the promoters of science, most of whom held a doctoral degree granted by Western universities, criticized what they considered to be a secluding from the world resulting from turning a blind eye to the advances of modern psychology (Hu, 1923/2003, pp. 483-484). Some even claimed that all mental phenomena are dominated by the law of causality (Tang, 1923), and thus the idea of traditional mind and moral values as built on the freedom of mind disintegrated. Finally, Guowei Wang, a traditional Chinese literati and the pioneer of introducing Western psychology, ended up drowning himself in 1927 in Lake Kunming in the midst of torments of anxiety about finding a way out for the nation and civilization in the context of cultural agitation and state crisis. Using a very popular slogan of that time, the crisis was stated as “country destroyed, its people annihilated” (wang guo mie zhong). His death may be seen as a reminder that the questions “What is the nature of psychology?” and “What is its role in the conflict of Chinese and Western civilization?” remain unanswered. And that psychology, like its pioneers, would remain immersed in misery and separation.

1927-1949 Coincidentally, with Guowei Wang's death, Chiang Kai-shek established the Nanjing National Government. It meant the termination of the long and tangled warfare among warlords and the unification of the entire country. China, too some degree, was shaking off the yoke of colonialism. The systematic implementation of the political and economic reform created a stable situation for its further modernization. This relatively stable period was characterized by the overwhelming prevalence of scientific psychology, but at the same time Western psychology was adopted according to Chinese circumstances. Gradual awareness of indigenous psychology emerged, accompanying the introduction of Marxist psychology. The Chinese Psychological Society (1937), the Institute of Psychology in the Academia Sinica (1929), the Chinese Association of Psychological Testing (1931), and the China Association for Mental Health (1936) were established and a variety of professional journals published. With the establishment of professional societies, academic journals, research institutes and psychology departments, psychology completed its institutionalization and a solid community of knowledge took shape. When others were committed to bring industrial and organizational psychology into China, Siege K. Chou, who obtained a doctorate in the Department of Psychology at Stanford University, argued that, based on China's concrete conditions, “At present, there is no need to pay attention to this set of psychological techniques. The practicality of the new knowledge of industrial and organizational psychology is possible only if (1) the Chinese traditional literati's general fallacy to underestimate industry and commerce is rectified; (2) the government implements large-scale commercial and industrial construction plans and promotes state-owned and private industry and commerce competition” (Chou, 1945). This means Chou had realized that psychology as a modern discipline would be rootless without the soil of modernity. Dominated by the political economy of agriculture in his time, there was no soil of modern industry and commerce for psychology to grow. In Yaoxiang Zhang’s (1940) opinion, it was necessary to carry forward Chinese inherent psychology, especially the psychology about how to live one's life, expecting to contribute to world psychology. Chiang Kai-shek, the then President of China, underwent psychoanalysis by Hsiao Hung Hsiao (Xiao, 2002), who earned a masters degree.
in psychology at Columbia University and a doctoral degree in psychology at the University of California. However, Chiang Kai-shek soon gave up on psychoanalysis, because he considered it incompatible with the Yangming School of Mind in which he believed. This little-known fact reveals the cultural-social embeddedness of psychology, which will be further discussed below. The works of Pavlov among others were compiled in The Emerging Soviet Psychology, the earliest book to introduce Soviet psychology in China, published in 1934. But it cannot change the fact that “psychology in China before 1949 was almost entirely American in nature and in origin” (Chin & Chin, 1969, p. 5).

1949-1966 This period was characterized by the transition from imitating the West to actively learning from the Soviet Union. Marxism-Leninism began to dominate Chinese psychological studies. The Institute of Psychology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was established in 1951. The Chinese Psychological Society, founded in 1955, proposed to build and develop Chinese psychology with Marxist-Leninist philosophy as guide and Pavlovian doctrine of higher nervous activity as its basis. Chinese psychologists began to study Marxism-Leninism works, based on which the object, the nature, the tasks and the methods of psychology, and even the class nature of human beings, were widely discussed theoretically. Psychology was thus asked to serve socialist construction, and at the level of application engineering psychology, labor psychology and medical psychology were being furthered. However, affected by the “pull out the white flag” movement during the Great Leap Forward, Beijing Normal University in 1958 began to criticize the bourgeois direction psychology was taking, and to take position against psychologists with a bourgeois academic point of view, as carriers of “the bourgeois white flag”. This kind of criticism, namely that psychology is an “abstraction” and “biologized bourgeois pseudo-science”, was further spread through the “Guangming Daily”, which had broad impact and whose readers were mainly intellectuals. It is politically incorrect and untimely to estimate the extent to which this critique of psychology movement had promoted and inspired psychologists’ reflections on the nature and role of psychology. However, the possible consequences of the ideologization of psychology (although psychology is always intertwined with ideology) were never fully anticipated. While some historians (Gao, 1984/2005) claimed that the theoretical confusion caused by this movement was quickly basically clarified; however, the same critical discourse repeated itself soon with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, causing a devastating blow to Chinese psychology.

1966-1976 This was an era of interruption. During this period, psychology grew so critical that finally it was “killed”, in extreme ways, by its critics; both from inside and outside the discipline. With the publication of Yao Wenyuan's (1965/1966) “Is this the scientific method and right direction to study psychology?”, psychology was totally negated. Actually, his critique of psychology was almost no different from the critiques of 1958. However, as a result of the serious political situation during the Cultural Revolution, there was no chance for psychology to stand up again. Psychology was criticized as the “decadent” and “bourgeois” Western pseudo-science based on “idealism”. No psychological approaches, from psychoanalysis, behaviorism, Gestalt psychology to social psychology and experimental psychology, would survive the movement. With class nature of psychology infinitely exaggerated and the experimental method rejected, the method of class analysis was considered to be the only right way to study psychology. Psychology institutes were revoked, psychology courses were canceled, laboratories were closed, and psychology teachers and

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2 Yao Wenyuan (1931-2005), a Chinese politician, propaganda official, literary critic, and a member of the “Gang of Four”, a radical communist group that grabbed unprecedented political power during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and helped implement many of the revolution’s harsh policies.
research staff were forced to change their occupations or sent to the May Seventh Cadre School. But some of them still adhered in secret to the study of psychology (mostly theoretically, such as P'an Shuh). During the Cultural Revolution, psychology was used and criticized fully for ideological purposes, and thus the critique finally degraded itself to become a false one. Even the comment that Yao's critique of psychology assumed a revolutionary position is already far-fetched, not to mention the extent to which his critique really had a substantial revolutionary content. Compared to the contemporary German Critical psychology, Yao and his colleagues lacked intellectual honesty and moral conscience. But the critique exposed precisely the ideological content of psychology: how it could be used for ideological purposes and be compatible with capitalism. It reminded critical psychologists how complicated the relationship between political economy and critical psychology can be and that psy-sciences are not something necessary and inevitable. The way psychology was treated during this period, despite its notoriety, makes it clear that our psychological imagination should not be limited by psychology’s status-quo, a discipline that pretends to develop cumulative and neutral scientific explanations for human experiences and behaviors. Psy-sciences, to the degree that they are interwoven with capitalist ideological discourse, are not everlasting. With the end of the mode of capitalist production, the mental liberation promised by psychology will eventually be replaced by human liberation. It means that the kind of psychology that is shaped by the capitalist mode of production will end together with capitalism.

1976-present This is the current period of the revival of scientific psychology and the rise of indigenous psychology. During this period a large number of achievements of Western psychology are introduced to China. Chinese psychology, especially its mainstream components, produces a considerable amount of research findings, sufficient to dialogue with Western psychology. Chinese psychology in this period thus becomes an important part of modern international psychology. In 1980 the 22nd International Congress of Psychology unanimously receives the Chinese Psychological Society, on behalf of China, as member of the International Union of Psychological Science. The Ministry of Science and Technology of China in 1999 determines to give priority to the development of psychology as one of 18 key disciplines. In 2004 Beijing successfully holds the 28th International Congress of Psychology. The number of departments of psychology reaches more than 300, psychology courses are being taught at each university. The methodology of scientific psychology is vastly applied to study Chinese objects and data, producing results such as “the Seven-Factor Chinese Personality Model” (Wang, 2004). Resources of Chinese traditional culture are being constantly dug out to promote the development of indigenous psychology; theories like “the Double-Y Model of Basic Human Needs” were proposed to explain the unique mind and behavior of Chinese people (Yang, 2003a). It is worthwhile to ponder whether this kind of indigenous psychology in China is really critical psychology. I do not take indigenous psychology in China as “one important critical trend”, at least not as an important trend of the kind of critical psychology I clarified in the introduction. Indigenous psychologists did realize that Western psychological knowledge is not universal and that psychology is culturally embedded. In its place they are attempting to construct a psychology with Chinese characteristics. However, their critique of psychology is limited to one side of the coin. They ignore the other side, namely that Western psychology is also not neutral and that psychology to a considerable degree is intertwined with ideology. As a result, indigenous psychologists tend to simply change Western data into Chinese data, whilst still insisting on Western methodologism and Western-centered problems. There is a “Big Five personality theory” in the West; okay, we Chinese can propose “the Seven-Factor Chinese Personality Model” by employing the same Western methodology to study Chinese data. Sure, the Seven-Factor
model appears to be indigenous, but the term personality itself is a Western concept instead of an indigenous one. Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, we think of ourselves using the conceptual tools available to us, and such knowledge serves a political function. Moreover, constructed concepts can become a social reality and part of human identity, which implies that psychology produces and reproduces the phenomena which it purports to investigate. As a result, and ironically, a Western concept such as personality could become a truly indigenous one, namely it does become a real identity of the Chinese people. This sort of complicated narrative matrix of critical psychology remains, however, absent in indigenous psychologists in China. They talk about psychology within the discipline of psychology, taking psychology as such for granted. Thus perhaps indigenous psychology does grasp one side of critical psychology, and could in that sense be considered as “one important critical trend”; however, in my opinion, it is hard to maintain that indigenous psychology is critical psychology. Finally, it is worth noting that due to the influence of the Soviet textbook system, it is difficult for psychologists to return to Marx's original theoretical context, while Marxist scholars cannot skillfully master psychological research. As a result, Marxism, which is often touted as the guide of Chinese psychology, tends to remain in the prefaces of psychology textbooks (Wang, 2010).

To sum up, one finds a very interesting trend when considering how Chinese psychology is intertwined with specific political-economic situations. The more stable the situation, the more mainstream-oriented (dominated by Western psy-sciences) Chinese psychology is; the more turbulent the situation, the more critical Chinese psychology is. The former trend can be found in the period of 1927-1937 (during the 1927-1949 stage of psychology discussed above, excluding the severe destructive impact of the Japanese invasion of China after 1937). The 1927-1937 stage of psychology, “characterized by the overwhelming prevalence of scientific psychology” as mentioned above, coincides with the famous “golden” “Nanjing Decade” of 1927-1937, a time of consolidation and accomplishment, with a mixed but generally positive record in the economy, social progress, development of democracy and cultural creativity. The latter phenomenon can be found in the 1840-1927 stage, 1958 from the 1949-1966 stage, and the 1966-1976 stage. These periods were filled with hunger, poverty and death brought about by wars, economic crises or political movements, and at the same time the critique of psychology flourished. Such meta-psychological questions as what psychology is and what psychologists are to do were constantly being debated. With the present-day flourishing political-economic situation in China the significant trend in Chinese psychology is that mainstream psychology is once again restoring its overwhelming prevalence. As one of Marx's (1852/1963) most quoted statements said, history repeats itself twice, “the first time as tragedy, then as farce”. If Chinese psychology today repeats in the new environment full of opportunities the 1927-1937 “tragedy” by following Western psychology every step of the way, then it will really have to end up in “farce”. Furthermore, there is a main trend throughout the period from 1840 to the present day, namely, the traditional mind as the individual immanent transcendent is gradually incorporated into the modern governance of mind; that is, into the making of modern subjects. Thus, the process of psychologisation ran through the entire history of Chinese psychology, making itself the object of critical psychology.

It was necessary to repeat the historiography of Chinese psychology from the perspective of critical psychology, especially with with regard to dividing the history of Chinese psychology into several stages, because mainstream historiography has tended to be ambiguous and confusing and has not added to an understanding of the critical moments in the history of Chinese psychology. As already discussed, critical psychology works at the borders with a
clear limit-consciousness. It endeavors to judge the limits of knowledge which is produced by various psychologies. Critical psychology discloses the blanks, silences and absences in this knowledge by reading its symptoms. However, ignoring the limits of knowledge, mainstream historiography of Chinese psychology tends to adhere to a linear narrative of history and knowledge is considered to be a internally self-consistent cumulative system without contradiction, rather than a set of historical effects full of blanks, silences and absences subject to be critically examined and re-articulated. Actually, the fact is just the opposite: this cumulative system is not only self-inconsistent, but also full of contradictions. This is revealed in deciding which is the earliest psychology book translated into Chinese. There is a widespread view that “Mental Philosophy: including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will” (originally published in 1858) authored by Joseph Haven (1816-1874) is the first psychology book translated into Chinese (Zhao, 1983; Kodama, 1991; Blowers, 2000; Jing & Fu, 2001; Han & Zhang, 2007). A Chinese missionary named Yan Yongjing (Y. K. Yen, 1838-1898) finished the translation in 1889 under the Chinese title Xin Ling Xue. But as a matter of fact, it is a philosophical book, to be specific, a Scottish-fashioned philosophical book, instead of a psychological book³. By contrast, Harald Høffding’s “Outlines of psychology”, translated by Guowei Wang in 1907, because it is in accord with Wundtian scientific psychology, merits the name of the first psychology book translated into Chinese.

Haven's Mental Philosophy did talk about psychological topics. It focused on the faculty of simple thought, the faculty of feeling, and the faculty of voluntary action. However, because of the following three features it cannot be called modern psychology, namely, an experimental science. 1) According to Haven, “Mental Philosophy has for its object to ascertain the facts and laws of mental operation” (p. 15), but it cannot be “illustrated by curious instruments, and nice experiments” (p. 20). “For these curious and wonderful phenomena of the inner life there are no philosophic instruments or experiments, no charts or diagrams” (p. 21). This distinguishes significantly his mental philosophy from modern psychology, which is based on scientific experiments. 2) Haven did use the term psychology, but not in the sense of modern psychology. Instead, he used it as a “more definite term” to “designate the science of mind in distinction from these other sciences” such as “Logic, Ethics, Politics and Ontology”, “all which are properly embraced under the term Metaphysics” (p. 16). This is just like his use of the term science, but not in the sense of modern science, because in his opinion, “the very noblest of all sciences” is “theology” and “our (mental) philosophy underlines our theology, even as the solid strata that lie unseen beneath the surface give shape and contour and direction to the lofty mountain range” (p. 23). By science Haven means, at best, a set of knowledge. His understanding of science belongs to

³ Certainly we cannot deny the fact that mental philosophy of Haven’s kind had heralded modern psychology not only by structuring the general topics of psychological research, but also by creating the institutional and cultural spaces for psychology as a discipline and cultural phenomenon to develop in the form of researching, publishing, teaching, popularizing, etc. But modern psychology has so many sources, and mental philosophy can hardly be identified as the most immediate one. Besides, instead of a Whig interpretation of history, it is the historiography of critical psychology that is emphasized to address the formation of Chinese modern psychology. More attention was paid to the blanks, silences and absences rather than the seeming continuity and progress of psychological knowledge. Thirdly, mental philosophy did, to a considerable degree, play a role in the making of modern psychology in the West, but it was quite short-lived in the history of Chinese psychology. It disappeared as soon as German scientific psychology was introduced to China, leaving no successors. Finally, psychologists are too immersed in the illusion that psychological knowledge is a cumulative linear system. One of the aims of critical psychology is exactly to break these illusions. As for China, science re-enchanted China with “scientism” exactly as it dis-enchanted China of the above mentioned “metaphysics”. And the critique of the scientism of psychology is far from enough. So a historiography of critical psychology is necessary to examine the limits and borders of the so called scientific knowledge which, without the limit-consciousness, tends to include everything related to mind as psychology.
the early modern era, when the words “science” and “philosophy” were sometimes used interchangeably. 3). Haven's mental philosophy is so obviously indebted to Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796) that it is somewhat tedious to trace the connections. Haven's doctrine exudes a strong smell of Scottish haggis. As the founder of the “Scottish School of Common Sense”, on which the Scottish faculty psychology was to be built through the 18th and 19th centuries, Thomas Reid's mental philosophy is “strongly motivated by a desire to provide an alternative to a theory, one that he traces from Descartes through Locke and Berkeley to Hume, which he calls the ideal system, the ideal theory, or the theory of ideas” (Lehrer, 1989, p. 26). Reid saw that the answer to Hume's skepticism was to develop an elaborate theory of the faculties of human mind given by its fundamental constitution to account for our processing of sensory information. The fundamental constitution of the human mind “regulates the conscious experience of all human beings from birth” and requires “the presentation of appropriate objects in order to be called forth in mental action” (Wozniak, 1992), it is thus a realism compared to idealism. Despite the fact that “The Scottish school, as a whole, recognizes no mechanical or physiological aspect of psychological processes. It remains distinctively within the limits of ‘mental philosophy’” (Brett, 2004, p. 14), Haven inherited, both in structure and in detail, this sort of Scottish-fashioned mental philosophy (his book is simply entitled Mental Philosophy). Following Scottish “faculty psychology (which) is in essence a method of stating mental processes in a few main categories” (Murphy, 1930/1999, p. 226), Haven insisted that “every possible mental operation may be reduced to one of these three tings”, namely, “three grand departments or modes of mental activity: intellect, or the faculty of simple thought; sensibility, or the faculty of feeling; will, or the faculty of voluntary action” (p. 31). Although Høffding also talked about the type of mental activities, but not in the sense of “ultimate and distinct functions” but “merely useful labels for complex activities which require further analysis” (Murphy, 1930/1999, p. 227). He was “content to lump together many specific acts under one common name, and did not presuppose a formal potency by virtue of which the acts described took place” (Murphy, 1930/1999, p. 227) – as faculty psychology does. In addition, Haven employed some key terms such as power from Reid. Reid claims that “power is the quality that, when coupled with exertion, necessitates a particular effect” and “it is a contradiction to say that an entity has the power to do something, and exerts that power, and yet the effect fails to come about” (Yaffe, 2009). Haven imitated carefully the use of power by Reid, “In order to the actual doing of a thing, two things are requisite, namely, the power to do, and the inclination to exert that power; and that neither involves the other”, “Where the power alone exists, the thing can be done, but will not be; where both exist, it both can be and will be done”. Most importantly, like Reid, Haven's exploration of human mental faculties (no matter whether intellectual power, power of imagination or other powers as he mentioned) is directed to answer: “Have I the power, in all cases, to do what the divine will requires; powers to do right?” (Haven, 1858, p. 566; emphasis in original) More clearly, he said: “It has been our aim, simply, to show the relation of a true psychology to the system of truth revealed in the Scriptures”. “The perfect coincidence of the two is an argument in favor of each” (Haven, 1858, p. 569), added Haven. It should now be clear that Have's mental philosophy is incommensurable with the modern concept of psychology. “Reid is also much too fond of saying that he will countenance nothing that degrades the dignity of man, an attitude of mind that savours too little of science and bespeaks a prejudice in favour of sentimentalism” (Brett, 2004, p. 19). Haven shared with him the same idea about the dignity of man, “The soul that is thus born of God is made willing to do right. The inclinations are no longer to evil, but to good, and the man still doing that which he pleases is pleased to do the will of God” (Haven, 1858, p. 568). In this way Haven became a keen follower of Reid who “often speaks as if the shadow of the medieval theology was still upon him” (Brett, 2004, p. 15). No wonder Yang Yongjing, as a
missionary, chose to translate this book. What's more, Reid's mental philosophy had a strong influence on Haven’s theory of morals. He considered mental philosophy an introductory part of practical ethics: When we are confirmed in our common beliefs by mental philosophy, all we have to do is act according to them, because we know what is right. Briefly speaking, moral philosophy presupposes mental philosophy. It is for this reason that Reid wrote *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* in 1785 followed by *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* in 1788. In the same fashion, Haven, who taught first at Amherst (notice that his title is “Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy”, which is still a Scottish fashion), and later in a seminary in Chicago, published his *Mental Philosophy* in 1858 and his *Moral Philosophy, Including Theoretical and Practical Ethics* in 1859.

This way of dividing up the territory became fashionable. On the one hand, there was intellectual, or mental, philosophy, or ‘mental science.’ On the other side, there was ethics, the study of the ‘active powers’, or ‘moral science’. After about 1820, American philosophers tended to divide philosophy into these two parts. Many American philosophers, often college presidents, published a pair of books in accordance with this division. (Duncan, date unknown).

The first major American “local product in moral philosophy texts was the Elements of Moral Science, by the President of Brown University, Francis Wayland in 1835”. As a pair of book, “Wayland did publish the mandatory volume on mental philosophy, The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, in 1854” (Duncan). Actually, Wayland is also an author who is frequently cited in Haven's book. So far, we have given sufficient evidence to prove that Haven's mental philosophy is not so much a psychology of modern understanding as a Scottish-fashioned philosophy. In fact, some (Duncan; Benjamin, 1998), although without details, have identified the fact that Haven “was much indebted to the Scots in his Mental Philosophy”.

In sharp contrast to Haven's mental philosophy, Høffding's *Outlines of Psychology* stated clearly that “psychology in and for itself, then, is not a part of philosophy...nor is psychology philosophy”. He made a clear break with philosophy by asserting that psychology “has purely the character of natural theory”, although he advocated a view of psychologism like Wundt by claiming psychology is “a preparation for philosophy” (Høffding, 1891, p. 15). Where Haven was still trying to prove the legitimacy of philosophical speculation to observe the operations of the mind, Høffding had made clear that

pure subjective observation is soon seen to be much too imperfect a means of psychological analysis. The individual constituents of states of consciousness can be clearly distinguished only when it is possible to proceed by way of experiments. Experiments differs from observation in this, that it does not wait for the appearance of certain phenomena, but tries to produce them under certain definite conditions which can be easily kept in view. (Høffding, 1891, p. 21)

Employing experiments “to see how a phenomenon varies under different circumstances” is of course still the way modern experimental psychology works today. Breaking through the barriers of the qualitative analysis as Haven did (“the inquiry as to the constituents to which a phenomena of consciousness owes its origin”, as faculty psychology does), “the prospects of a quantitative analysis appears to be opened” (Høffding, 1891, p. 21). Even more commendable, Høffding did not agree to a mechanical and one-dimensional vision of
psychological approach. In his opinion, “the thoughts and feelings of the individual man at any given time are conditioned not merely by his inherited natural organization, but also by the atmosphere of historically evolved civilization in which he grows up” (Høffding, 1891, p. 26). The influence of his ideas are still felt in modern psychological studies.

Based on the analysis above, taking Mental Philosophy as the first psychology book translated into Chinese will lead to contradictions and confusion. In fact it has already caused such an embarrassing situation: Chinese psychologists cannot make an internally self-consistent articulation between Mental Philosophy and modern psychology, because the two belong to two sets of heterogeneous discourse matrices. The consequence is that, when Chinese psychology attempts to find its “father”, it turns out that there is no *family resemblance* (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001) between it and the one known as the father of its own. In fact, Scottish discourse has no successor in China, and its possibility to grow was very soon interrupted. And Haven's audience were confined to only a few old Literati (like Sun Baoxuan, Xu Weize (Zhou, 1996), etc., to name only some of the famous) exposed to Western new ideas, instead of the community of psychologists. On the other hand the Wundtian scientific and experimental psychology, as mediated by Høffding (His Outlines of Psychology “ran through ten editions in Chinese translation till 1935 and was enormously influential as a basic text” (Blowers, 2000)), has been thriving and prospering and has continued to be dominant right up until the present day in China. (In spite of the huge differences between various schools of psychology in China, there is consensus that psychology became independent from philosophy because of its use of the experimental method.). In short, Have's paradigm of psychology, a (Scottish) philosophical one, is not incommensurable with Hoffding's Outlines of Psychology, a (German) scientific one. By insisting that Mental Philosophy is the first psychology book that was translated into Chinese, to say how psychology made its independence from philosophy will no longer make sense. It is only when *Outlines of Psychology* is taken as the first psychology book translated into Chinese that the history of Chinese psychology appears to be coherent.

It is because of the absence of the *limit-consciousness* of critical psychology that the mainstream historiography of Chinese psychology tends to identify various sets of incommensurable knowledge talking about “mind” as “psychology”, leading its psychology to be a hotch-potch full of contradictions and confusions. The historiography of critical psychology noticed the boundaries of psychological knowledge. By reading the symptoms of mainstream psychology, its veiled blanks, silences and absences, critical psychology makes clear the borders of psychological knowledge. Thus it can identify the *critical moments* of the history of psychology based on which we get the legitimate approach to demarcate the history of Chinese psychology.

**Critical Debates of Chinese Psychology**

1. **Chinese or Western** How to deal with the role China and West play in Chinese psychology has historically been a vexed issue. This problem is exactly similar to the articulation of the tradition-modernity debate, the value-fact dichotomy, and the metaphysics-science controversy. Fundamentally speaking, it is about how to modernize Chinese experience, namely, how to incorporate the “traditional mind”, which is characterized by individual “immanent transcendent” rooted in Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism (Mou, 1974; Yu, 1984; Tang, 1991), into the modern governance of mind by making the new subject which is interpellated by the grand narrative embodied in various forms of political economy, whether
capitalism or socialism. In fact, from the heads of state to psychologists, they were all thinking about how to change the traditional Chinese national characters and modernize the population. For this Sun Yat-sen (1919/1981) proposed “mental construction” (xin li jian she) of new citizen-subjects and wrote a book with the same title. As a positive response, psychologists (lead by Hsiao Hung Hsiao) established a “Chinese Society for Mental Construction” (1942) and published the journal Mental Construction. The same kind of appropriation of psychology can also be found in the works of Mao Zedong (xin li shuo: mind power theory) (1917/1991) and Chiang Kai-shek (ge ming xin fa: mental methods for revolution) (1934/1935/1968). As one psychologist said, “Many people shared the belief that the reform of China must start from the transformation of the society; if you want to transform the society you must undergo a thorough research; psychology must be one of the tools of such research” (Wang, 1933, p. 13).

With regard to the general sciences both methods and problems are universal; they can be directly translated from the West to another, completely foreign territory. However, with regard to psychology, the legitimate West can only be the West as method, not the West as problem. In other words, the West as method can provide methodological reference for Chinese problems, but the problems of the West cannot directly replace Chinese problems to become the subject matter of Chinese psychology. It is precisely because globalizing capitalism continues to generate a globalizing psychology and “universal” “psychological laws” that the problems of the West have been turned into the problems of almost all Later Modern Countries. Japan and South Korea are five decades ahead of China in economic expansion and modernization, yet there has never been a significant contribution to Western psychology. India has had exposure to psychology via British colonialism for more than a century, but the influence of Indian psychology on the West is equally rare. Those nations do make contributions to medical science, to chemistry, to physics, to mathematics, to astronomy, to physiology, to biology and to other academic disciplines, but not to psychology. Taking the West as problem rather than method; being imitators of Western psychology: this is exactly the reason for the above phenomenon.

There is a famous cliché believed and promoted by a lot of scholars about how to deal with the Chinese or Western debate, namely the slogan proposed by Chang Chih-tung (a politician of late Qing Dynasty): “Chinese learning for fundamental principles and Western learning for practical application”. Does it make sense to say “Panda learning for fundamental principles and bald eagle learning for practical application”? This cliché suggests that, despite the heterogeneity of fundamental principles between different cultures, practical application is something that can be freely and neutrally appropriated inter-culturally. It neglects the fact that fundamental principles and practical application are prerequisite to each other and only in the context of certain fundamental principles can certain practical application be legitimate and understandable. The tendency to ignore the way fundamental principles shape practical application and to care only about the relations between different practical applications, will degrade cross-cultural academic exchanges to a far-fetched and superficial, sometimes misleading comparison. Based on this cliché, no wonder both the author of Oxford Handbook of Chinese Psychology (2010) and its reviewer (Leung, 2011) believe that CBT (cognitive-behavioral therapy) is compatible with Buddhism. Actually, Buddhism is not about how to think logically, but how things appear to us. This explains why phenomenologists (for

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4 Hsiao also published a book entitled The Scientific Basis of Mental Construction in 1946, which talks about the relationship between the fate of China and mental construction. It is an endeavor of psychologists to apply psychology to construct a new state and new citizen-subjects from various aspects through the mental construction of the “children”, “youth”, “national defense”, “politics” and “industry and commerce”.

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example, Kern, 1995; Lusthaus, 2002) are becoming interested in Buddhism, especially Wei-shih Lun (consciousness-only). It attaches importance to the religious practice of yoga as a means for attaining final emancipation from the bondage of the phenomenal world (Hattori, 1987, 2005, p. 9874). They attempt to ground insight into emptiness in a critical understanding of the mind and the world. To repeat it again, Buddhism is by no means about how to think logically or reasonably like CBT, nor is Taoism. The far-fetched understanding of Buddhism through CBT is just another instance of taking the West as problem rather than method.

2 Socialism or Capitalism Taking this as one of the critical debates is not for ideological reasons, but for the sake of a realistic theoretical problem. First, the question is how the socialist countries should deal with the psychological knowledge exported by the capitalist countries in view of the special nature of psychology. Second, although the critics of psychology in 1958 and 1966 were not academically sincere, their critique did lead to a good question: what is the relationship between psychology and ideology? These two issues will undoubtedly catapult us to the ontological battlefield of psychology: What is psychology? In the debate of 1966, using the experimental methods learned in the capitalist countries, psychologists concluded that the abstraction ability of children is not obtained through practice. However, they were immediately criticized by the standard-bearer of socialism for using isolated, abstract research methods to “prove” and “supplement” “the foreign bourgeois psychologist's point of view”, “brushing aside the impact of social life and social practice” (Yao, 1966, p. 32). To be honest, this criticism is not wholly inaccurate. Had it been a sincere academic discussion, it might indeed have been able to promote the resolution of this issue, and the debate would have been directed to in-depth discussion about what psychology is and what its relationship with ideology. But in reality, the debate did not address these concerns, and was put aside with the overall negation of the Cultural Revolution after 1976. As one of the participants commented in his later years, as this study involved a very complex problem, in fact, it has long been suspended (Yang, 2006). Thus, until now, a Chinese psychologist, if he is sincere enough, still has to think about the relationship between socialism and capitalism with Chinese psychology.

Psychology has profited from the failure of attempts to overthrow capitalism (Parker, 2011), and it presents itself now as the most flexible and comforting democratic solution to the biopolitical governance of citizen-subjects, creating the space for the reproduction of the capitalist system. As a discipline investigating human nature, the ideological role of psychology is not questioned by psychologists even in a socialist country which is against capitalism and guided by Marxism. Paradoxically, Marxism is committed to “change the world” and human nature, but today Chinese psychologists flaunting their insisting on Marxism as the psychology’s guiding principle have “outsourced” this task entirely to Western “capitalist” psychology. Worse still, Chinese psychologists are endeavoring to emulate in detail Western capitalist psychological studies and are eager to introduce them to China without sufficient critical reflections. And systematic reflections on the past critique of psychology remain absent because of the fear of extreme leftism and the current fervent pursuit of GDP in China. Finally, the child was poured out together with the dirty bath water.

“The science of psychology has had more than a decade to function and to grow in the new soil of Communist Chinese society, but it is still too young to have developed a distinctive school of thought” (Chin & Chin, 1969, p. 200). The Chins’ assertion in 1966 is still worthy of reflection today. Now four more decades have past, and it is still difficult for Chinese psychologists to claim unashamedly that they “have developed a distinctive school of
thought”. A possible “distinctive school of thought” requires critical discernment of how psychology, as a productive practice, produces and reproduces the citizen-subjects of capitalism, which it purports to investigate; and how it helps maintain the status quo by creating flexible space for the reproduction of capitalist system.

3 Minorities or the Masses Psychology has belonged to the minorities since its very beginnings. A narrow community of knowledge based on shared beliefs about what psychology should be produces psychological knowledge for public consumption and the shaping of the public’s identities. Chinese psychology, as was argued above, is increasingly focused on the introduction and replication of Western concepts and methods. Taking advantage of their exclusive access to knowledge as power, psychologists today seem to be the self-proclaimed intellectual elites who are responsible for the Enlightenment of the public. With a condescending manner, they teach the people how to live and the secret of happiness. However, more often they face away from the people, indulging in narcissism in the laboratory, produce a bunch of Chinese data based on Western problems and approaches, and then publish the findings in professional journals which even their colleagues rarely read. Psychology is becoming a bean-counting profession. What psychologists care about is how many papers they have published, rather than if they have actually studied the experiences of the Chinese people. Worse still is the widespread various pseudo-psychologies, science of success, notorious psychotherapies, and even astrology mixed with a little bit of psychology which incurred the serious public misunderstanding of psychology. At the academic level, psychology is becoming a publishing industry and an import and export trade; at the popular level, psychology is being used by those who have ulterior motives to manipulate the crowd to seek fame and fortune. Each level minds only its own business. Having been aware of the dual dilemmas, some psychologists reflect on academic psychology which recognizes only positivist scientific methods. They urge breaking methodologism from a strategic height and constructing “a psychology for the people” by contributing to the people's health, promoting their well-being, and encouraging to explore people's positive side (Zhong, 2009), by enhancing the social relevance of Chinese psychology. It means the concerns for the well-being of the society and the public interests at the academic psychology level. There is a need for psychology not only to be liberated from the strictly and precisely controlled laboratory, but also from a variety of pseudo-psychologies, with a reorientation toward the general public and the everyday experience of Chinese people. However, it is noteworthy that if this sort of psychology “for the people” remains focused exclusively on the “how” rather than the “what” of psychology, in other words if its concern remains the accumulation of natural and neutral knowledge instead of critical meta-psychological reflexivity, its eventual outcome will be but another kind of institutionalized power discourse.

Future Directions of Chinese Psychology

In China, psychology has long been regarded as the embodiment of progress and civilization, so that in a famous novel entitled Heavy Wings, which won one of the most prestigious literature prizes in China, namely the Mao Dun Literature Prize, psychology became synonymous with China's reform and its ideological emancipation, as well as the weapon to fight against the old conservative and rigid forces. In the novel, the Ministry of Heavy Industry reformists attempted to repeal the old politicized and ideologized way of working and business management dominated by “taking class struggle as the key link” and to replace them with scientific behavioral science and psychology through establishing the nation's first industrial psychology major jointly with some H University. This scenario vividly reveals the awkward double dilemmas of Chinese psychology. Firstly, for a long period of history
psychology in China has been an imported foreign science. Thus the soil whence psychology springs was limited. This “science” had to be borrowed from those so called advanced and developed countries, first Japan and later mainly the U.S. as a ready-made article. The theoretical expression of a foreign political and economic reality was turned into a collection of dogmas, interpreted in terms of a bizarre mixed world of pre-modernity, modernity and post-modernity around Chinese psychologists. Secondly, China is also a socialist country. If Western critical psychology is correct at this point that psychology benefited from the failure of the revolutionary attempt to overthrow the capitalism and as the most flexible agenda to replace revolution, and that it is unceasingly creating new spaces for the capitalist bio-politics, then the question become, how could psychology in its complicity with capitalism be articulated with socialism? This twofold predicament determines the two possible future directions of Chinese psychology.

For the short term: With the dramatic changes in China's economy and society, psychology has attracted more and more widespread public concern, and has begun to play an important role in both the public and the private sphere. The way people understand themselves, others and the world is mediated by psychology. How to deal with the possible future trend of psychologisation, is a question Chinese psychologists have to think about (Wang, 2012). Specific analyses of the historical development of material production and reproduction in China is required for Chinese psychology to reflect on Western psychology and to complete its indigenization. The consensus of the majority of Chinese psychologists has been that a systematical redefinition and planning of the basic theories and methodological principles of Chinese psychology based on its own social and value commitment is needed for the ultimate establishment of a Chinese psychology characterized by both scientific basis and value commitment.

For the long term: If, as critical psychology puts it, psychology at work is considered to be the observation and regulation of alienated activity and the obstacle to liberation (Parker, 2007), then the legitimacy of psychology deserves serious reappraisal. If psychology is the observation and disciplining of alienated human behavior during a specific historical period, then with the replacement of civil society by human society, such false mental liberation as false consciousness, namely the reversed “my relation to my environment”, will eventually be substituted by human liberation. By that time, the ghost of psychology sealed in the body and the capitalist mode of production as its shell which shaped it will be discarded together.

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