

The Feminization of Labor and the DSM-5

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Abstract. *In the recently published iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, there is a new mood disorder called Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder. This paper will argue that this diagnosis is closely related to what has been called the feminization of labor and represents an ideological form of warfare on women's bodies. The paper will argue that under the current mode of production, such an attack is not designed to dismiss the force of the female body (as was so often the case under industrial capitalism) but to discipline and shape the affective force of women's sociability to the desires of new modes of immaterial production. Finally, it will argue for a "minor" psychology in response to such trends.*

Keywords: Labor, Women, DSM, Diagnosis, Psychology.

There is little doubt that the social and economic relations of late stage capitalism have entered a highly contentious and unsettled transition. The specifics, the scope, and the exact nature of this transition are both opaque and a question of considerable debate. However, the fact that modes of production, revolution, resistance, oppression, exploitation, and dominance are, at the very least, in flux seems self-evident. The precise nature of the crisis may be unclear, but the fact that it has spawned brutal repression, movements of liberation, flows of people, different modes of labor, and networks of international capitalist rule and revolutionary dissent, is not. I would assert that the crisis is manifest in the currently ongoing global warfare and insurrectionary struggle across the face of the planet.

This struggle is profoundly multi-faceted and affects us all, to varying degrees, in both common and divergent ways. For my purposes here, I would specifically like to address a shift in a particular mode of domination that is designed to affect women. As a feminist psychologist who has spent my career working with women who struggle to survive under the dual and largely integrated rule of capitalism and patriarchy, there are two trends that trouble me deeply. The first is what has been called the "feminization of labor" (Hardt & Negri, 2011) and the second is the complicit role of psychiatry and psychology in this

process. Before I engage in the particulars, let me make some general comments about the political stakes for women under the current regime of late stage global capitalism.

In her book, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*, Silvia Federici (2004) discusses the debates within the feminist movement concerning the roots of women's oppression and what sort of political strategies might be appropriate to achieve liberation. She discusses two basic positions, neither of which she finds adequate in theorizing the social and economic exploitation of women. The first is the position of what she calls the "radical feminists"; the second is the position of what she calls the "socialist feminists". She argues that the radical feminists miss the mark because they focus on sexual discrimination and patriarchal rule, but do not look at class and social relations.

The socialist feminists do recognize that there is a history of women that cannot be separated from the history of systems of exploitation and they give priority to women as workers but, she suggests, they do not look at the sphere of reproduction as a source of value creation and exploitation. The socialist feminists look at women as workers in the classic sense as in factories and in workplaces, but they do not look at the sphere of reproduction.

Federici turns her attention to the idea that women's exploitation has been a key factor in capitalist accumulation, as women have been the producers and reproducers of labor power. Following Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Federici claims that "women's unpaid labor in the home has been the pillar upon which the exploitation of the waged workers, 'waged slavery,' has been built, and it's the secret of its productivity" (p. 8). Marx (1978), in *The German Ideology*, also famously asserts that the origins of all forms of slavery and property can be found in the division of labor in the family, "property: the nucleus, the first form, of which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this early stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of disposing of the labor-power of others" (p.159).

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2011) articulate this relationship between gendered servitude and private property under the current mode of production as the feminization of work. The feminization of work is defined as the expansion of those affective, relational, and emotional tasks that are traditionally carried out by women throughout the work force. They argue that the economic distinction between productive and reproductive work is eroding and that greater weight than ever is falling on women across the globe. Women are expected to carry out emotional tasks both on the job and in the home, to "tend to hurt feelings, knit social relationships and generally perform care and nurturing" (p. 134).

This expansion of the labor of women, both in terms of the number of women in the waged labor market and the collapse of temporal distinction between private and waged time, has had an enormous effect on the ways in which women manage their daily lives. In particular, this shift has been profound for women dependent on waged labor for sustenance and survival. It has encompassed a diverse array of social sectors and classes from women involved in migrant labor, manufacturing, domestic work, and elder care to "professional women" in managerial roles within corporate structures. This transition is premised on the betrayals of women's liberation movements in which the struggles of women for economic parity and social justice were transmuted by capital into the necessity to integrate them into the waged labor force at lower wage scales.

The entry of women into the workforce has done little to modify the fundamental division of labor in the family described by Marx. In spite of drives for

wages for housework by Dalla Costa and James (1975) and others, the secret labor of women remains very much that. This is not to say that there has been no debate about the degree to which men should be involved in the management of the domestic sphere, but the fundamental colonial relation of capital to social reproduction remains obscured. Federici (2004) argues that this relation is a question of the way in which women's unpaid labor in the home is largely responsible for the reproduction of physical workers both in terms of social and cultural function and literal birth. She says that the power differential between men and women in capitalist society cannot be attributed to the irrelevance of housework for capitalist accumulation. An irrelevance which isn't irrelevant because of all the rules, laws, strictures and disciplining that go into trying to control women's reproductive rights, women's control of their bodies and how women raise children.

In our book, *Writing the Family: Women, Autoethnography and Family Work* (Skott-Myhre, Weima & Gibbs, 2012), Korinne Weima discusses what Donzelot termed the psy-complex. She delineates how talk shows and psychology play a role in taking over the private sphere and turning women into the disciplinarians of children on behalf of society. She argues that this can be seen in the juxtaposition of the incompetent single mother who is responsible for producing the criminals and delinquents and the successful soccer mom who is responsible for producing the lawful and the virtuous. All of these icons that have to do with being representative of the morality of the society and the morality of the state fall largely on women as parents.

The expansion of the private sphere through appropriating mothers as instruments of the state, in terms of moral and psychological hygiene, has metastasized under the new modes of production promoted and exploited by postmodern global capitalism. In this historical moment, both Michel Foucault (1995) and Gilles Deleuze (1995) tell us that the traditional disciplinary enclosures of modernity (the factory, the home, and the workplace) open up and begin to spread across the field of the social.

An example of such an enclosure of modernity spreading in this way can be found in the mental hospital. The mental hospital is, at first, an enclosed asylum for people living within. With the shift from industrial capitalism to global cyber-capitalism the old style asylums are closed and madness is spread across the face of society and called liberation. In reality what happens is that more people begin to be included

in the category of madness. We are then able to diagnose more people and give a greater number of people medications. So, indeed, there are still asylums, but they are driven by the needs of investors and are increasingly flexible in both intention and duration. What has happened is that the space of the asylum as a disciplinary enclosure has actually become a global state in which *everyone* is now in the asylum and *everyone* is a profit center for the pharmaceutical industries and corporately managed health care.

Correspondingly, the enclosed spaces of social reproduction in the home, in which women have always undertaken unpaid labor, opens up and its functions are spread across all sectors of society. Now, the management of affect, reproductive rights, bodies, and birth control cease to be a private affair (to the degree that it ever was a purely private affair) that happens in the home under the control of women. Instead it is now found everywhere as a sphere of capitalist exploitation, appropriation, and discipline. Of note is the relation of the asylum and the home as parallel sites of moral and psychological hygiene whose functions and functionaries are distributed across the social. What Foucault (1995) would call the social diagrams of the asylum and of the home are increasingly taken up by corporate structures and their marketing instruments. The affectual resonance of the fast food restaurant or chain motel is marketed as both a safe haven from the world (a home) and as a space of psychological respite where parents and children can come together in a morally and physically hygienic space (an asylum).

Not surprisingly, the predominant figure in the advertisements presented as most nurturing and caring in these mythical portrayals of capitalist paradise are women of childbearing age. Absent from the marketing of women as caregivers for everyone's family are those that Federici (2004) notes as "the heretic, the healer, the disobedient wife, the woman who dared to live alone, the obeha woman who poisoned the master's food and inspired the slaves to revolt" (p. 11). Women like these – who do not carry out their assigned affectual, emotional, and relationship tasks – are, as Hardt and Negri (2011) note, portrayed as "a kind of monster" (p. 134).

And who are the monsters? Federici (2004) notes attacks on migrant workers and the return of "witch hunting" in Central and South America as well as in Africa. She asks, "Why after 500 years of capitalist rule at the beginning of the third millennium are workers on a mass scale still defined as paupers, witches and outlaws?" (p. 11). Even in this period of the 21st century where we are moving to supposedly

immaterial labor, the populations that are most threatened are, once again, those who are poor and women. For evidence, one needs only to look at the Republican agenda in the United States and the legal attacks on reproductive rights and freedom from rape. In her analysis of this phenomenon, Federici (2004) draws a parallel between the social function of the witch-hunt in the transition from feudalism to capitalism and contemporary assaults on women:

It is generally agreed that that the witch-hunt aimed at destroying the control that women had exercised over their reproductive function and served to pave the way for the development of a more oppressive patriarchal regime. It is also argued that the witch-hunt was rooted in the social transformations that accompanied the rise of capitalism. But the specific historical circumstances under which the persecution of witches was unleashed, and the reasons why the rise of capitalism demanded a genocidal attack on women have not been investigated. (p. 14)

In our own historical period, the phenomenon of the witch-hunt, in either the literal sense or as in the media frenzies over various permutations of incompetent or bad mothering, includes shows like *The Nanny* and portrayals of neonaticide and filicide. Undeniably, the monstrous mother who kills her children is not as uncommon as we are told by reporter Trish Mahaffey in a newspaper article in 2010 (Mahaffey, 2010). Portrayals of women as insensitive and callous casual consumers of abortion are commonplace in North America with a recent meme showing feminist Gloria Steinem grinning and wearing an "I Had an Abortion" T-shirt, without any acknowledgment of the documentary film context surrounding the photo. Clearly, monsters and witches are on the rise.

Why is there this attack on women's emotions, on reproductive rights, and on sexual protections from rape and sexual assault? Why is there a rise in attacks on witches in the developing parts of the world and why is there a new genocidal attack on women in various forms around the world?

We might well argue that it is directly related to the desire to control the affective force of women as they enter into broader participation in the waged world economy. Federici (2004) argues that "the persecution of witches (like the slave trade and the enclosures) was a central aspect of the accumulation and formation of the modern proletariat" (p. 14). Likewise, and in this current period, women are responsible for producing a new kind of worker and a new form of proletariat. In this sense, women remain cen-

tral to the social reproduction of both physical workers as well as the social roles those workers will inherit. Clearly then, "Reproduction remains a crucial ground of struggle for women" (p. 14).

The ways in which this role has been disciplined and managed across various economic and social systems include mechanisms such as a rank ordering of human faculties and the conception of the body as a site of perversity and danger. Women's bodies and affects remain highly suspect and in need of remediation and discipline. If the current deployment of women across the world of waged labor includes, as Hardt and Negri (2011) propose, an expanded role for the traditional role of nurturer and caregiver, then what are the mechanisms to control and channel this set of functions? If women are released from the confines of the home, in what ways can this newly released affective labor be exploited?

We can see examples of this across the corporate environment with the expansion of social skills training and affective management. It's no longer just a matter of the production of goods and services, but literally the production of social relations. Social networking, for example, or the importance of teams at work and that it is necessary to take courses in anger management: all these previous functions that were once relegated to the home or the psychologist's office now arrive at the workplace. Workers now have to manage their feelings; learning how to be happy at work becomes part of your "job" and part of your evaluation. It doesn't matter how well you run a machine as long as you are a "team player", have good social skills and can effectively communicate. Moreover, the management of this falls increasingly to women both at the level of the shop floor and in middle management within Human Resource departments.

If affective labor becomes a central part of waged labor then it is not a big leap to assume that the pharmaceutical companies and their clinical allies in psychiatry and psychology will not be far behind. If historical precedent is followed, we can assume that it will be women and the poor that will serve as guinea pigs for new diagnosis and treatments. For women this will undoubtedly include the discipline and management of the social reproduction role both at home and in the work place.

In the recently published iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, there is a new mood disorder called Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder. The fact that it has been moved out of Appendix B of the DSM-IV and developed into a full category has been a point of

much controversy. The diagnosis includes a list of complaints, which include irritability or anger or increased interpersonal conflicts, marked anxiety, tension, and feelings of being "keyed up" or "on edge". In addition, there are symptoms that are associated with clinically significant distress or interferences with work, school, usual social activities or relationships with others (e.g. avoidance of social activities and decreased productivity or efficiency at work, school or home).

Of interest to us here are two components of this diagnosis: 1) the fact that it is aimed at women of childbearing age (potential mothers) and 2) that it pathologizes any affect that might interfere with work, school, usual social activities or relationships. These two aspects of the diagnosis intersect at the point of the feminine body. As Parker (2007) would point out, there is no consideration of the social genesis of these troublesome affects. The possibility that a woman living under the conditions we have been describing might experience some "irritability or anger or increased interpersonal conflicts, marked anxiety, tension, feelings of being 'keyed up' or 'on edge'" is eluded by the fact that this woman is having her period. This is a stunning reversion to the classic husbands-in-a-bar conversation about their wives' complaints – "well she's probably on the rag". Only, here we have a psychiatric diagnosis that takes this out of the domestic sphere and cynically acknowledges the new roles women play in work, school, social activities and multiple relationships. However, in order to be healthy a woman must sustain her primary role as a happy, nurturing caregiver, or, if that is not possible she must not let her dysphoria interfere with her job of social reproduction.

This kind of diagnosis reconfigures an old pattern in the relationship of psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis, and women. It is once again a new effort to silence the "heretic... the disobedient wife... the obeha woman who poisoned the master's food and inspired the slaves to revolt" (Federici 2004, p. 11). The question for me as a critical psychologist is how to challenge this narrative, how to proclaim my apostasy and disobedience and how to join with my sisters in calling for an end to the witch hunts and turn *psychology on its feet*. We must find the way to poison capitalism at the very source of its sustenance. Since we know that it is a parasitic system, then the very poison is our non-compliance and refusal to take on our new role of producing an even more brutal capitalist social. Instead, we must take on the healing ways of the obeha and inspire revolt and insurrection.

The relation of healing and poisoning can be at times a subtle and nuanced question of how ingredients are combined and administered. The same substance applied in one instance with a certain dosage can either lead to recovery or, with a different dosage, to death. The idiosyncratic corporeal strength or weakness of the patient must be taken into account and the dosage moderated accordingly. The unpredictable and contingent aspects of the combination between the organism and the administered substance have confounded both poisoners and healers across history. It is this complex set of relations that produces change and production as both unpredictable and unstable. The healer can become the poisoner both intentionally and unintentionally.

We might do well to heed the warning of Eugene Holland (2012) when he suggests that revolt and insurrection might best be thought of as the slow motion development of alternative forms of living rather than violent ruptures against the dominant form of governance. I would contend that this is particularly true of the role of women within the realm of social production.

The question of poisoning a parasite without damaging the host organism is a delicate matter. Capitalism and its ideological distributive mechanisms, such as psychology, function through producing a pseudo-symbiotic relation with the host. In the case of psychology, this is achieved through the assimilation of the actual mechanisms of social production traditionally carried out, as we have noted, by women. The functions of care, nurturance, and the inculcation of cultural habitus produced and sustained over millennia by women are appropriated by psychology and distributed back as a pseudo-mutual project.

In order for this to function, women must be assisted in coming to understand that they have always lacked competence in these areas and are in need of professional assistance. Certainly, psychology as a discipline has no on-the-ground experience with the actualities of women's day-to-day role in social production. The discipline is entirely reliant upon appropriating information about these processes by intruding into the living experience of women.⁶ The point of access for such an intrusion, like all parasitic attachments, comes through a process of weakening the host. For women, the cultural parasite of psychology

weakens the host through inducing self-doubt and profound insecurity. We can see this in the long tradition of producing women's activities as the root of pathology in psychoanalytical and psychological theories and practices.

What is important for our discussion is that the cultural parasite of psychology feigns a healing function, when in fact its activities are toxic to the wellbeing of its host. The pseudo-symbiotic relationship induces the host to believe that there is a necessity for an ongoing engagement with the parasite in order for the host to be healthy. Of course, the obverse is actually the case; much of the malaise of the host is due to the invasion by the parasite. We can see this in our example above of the latest iteration of the DSM and the diagnosis of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder. This medicalization of women's affective experience powerfully implies a lack of capacity on the part of women to manage their own bodies and affects.

Holland (2012) argues that one of the key elements in the expansion of capitalist regimes of control is the attack on all forms of self-provisioning. The powerful mediation of the money form can only be sustained if all capacity for self-sustenance is translated through wage relations and surplus value. There cannot be any element of the social that is comprised of use value without the mediation of the capitalist market. Increasingly, as I have argued above, this extends into all modes of social production including the feminization of labor. Even the most intimate affective physical experiences must be commodified and controlled. The capacity to provide care or healing must be translated into a monetary form. Self-care cannot be left to the self.

To assure that an appropriate pseudo-symbiotic relationship sustains this mediated set of relations, the self is individuated and alienated from collective possibilities of self-care. Women have collectively managed premenstrual and menstrual activities for countless generations in the same way we have collectively managed social reproduction.⁷ However, under the parasitic sets of relations we are following here, premenstrual dysphoria becomes the province of capitalized medical care for profit rather than the domain of collective self-provisioning. Each woman should deal with her "problem" alone in the privacy of the con-

⁶ This is not to say that there are not psychologists who are women and who have direct experience with these matters. It is to say that the discipline of psychology makes every effort to mute or divert any subjective accounting by female psychologists into objective scientific study.

⁷ The movement towards women's collective reproductive health was a hallmark of the emerging women's liberation movement in the late 60's and early 70's. See *Our bodies, Ourselves* (Marshall, 1996) and the ongoing work of planned parenthood (now under the kinds of attack and demonization discussed above).

sulting room with a trained professional and the possibility of “effective” evidenced based treatment and chemical mediation.

The force of this symbiotic enmeshment of psychology, capitalism, social production and women’s health has been relentlessly advanced and expanded over many years. To disentangle ourselves, so as to starve or poison the parasite, requires careful and strategic experimentation. How might we, as women, reclaim our capacity for self-provisioning and collectivity?

I would propose that women’s history of struggle, against both capitalist relations of force and the appropriative and exploitive mechanisms of primitive accumulation, clearly demonstrates that we are not limited to the social architecture of deferred desire promoted by what Marx (1978) referred to as the primal scene of all forms of slavery to follow. While women’s role in social production within the family might be seen as perverted and distorted by both patriarchal and economic discipline, the necessity for the levels of control they are subjected to would not exist if the force of women did not constantly exceed any attempt at domination. As we know from Deleuze (1995) and Negri (1996), in their writing premised in the Marx of the *Grundrisse*, all social forms hold a set of capacities for domination and control. Just as important, however, is that they also express a creative impetus that dominant systems attempt to harness. It is important to note that the ontological forces of production always exceed the capacity for dominant systems to contain them. The subversive role women play in continually producing the social, redolent with deviant subjects, inclusive of themselves, that must be both demonized and marginalized, exemplifies the revolutionary ontological force of the becoming other. Part of the strategy for disentangling ourselves from the parasitic engagement with capitalism and psychology is to engage a new form of the psychological that functions outside the regimes of capitalist logic. In the same way that Deleuze and Guattari (1986) call for the development of a “minor literature”, I would like to call for a “minor psychology”.

A minor psychology would have the same characteristics as a minor literature. First, it would not come from a minor set of conceptual frameworks or theories about human experience. Instead, it would be composed of the ways in which people construct their experience within a major system of dominance and control. To this degree it would be composed of “a high co-efficient of deterritorialization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 16). To re-think women’s role in

social production in this way is to engage a minor psychology as a mechanism to explore the ways in which women’s experience is constructed as a constitutive impossibility within capitalist patriarchal frameworks. In other words, a minor psychology would investigate the ways in which women continually produce an alternative social in the face of every effort to suppress and deny this very possibility.

Second, in a minor psychology “everything is political” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 17). In a “major psychology”, women’s struggles are individualized and contextualized against the background of normative social structures and expectations. The actuality of social relations and experience serve only as a background or environment that may, or may not, influence the psychology of the individual. In a minor psychology, all individual concerns “connect immediately to politics” (p. 17). Individual struggles and concerns “become all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it” (p. 17). A minor psychology would take seriously subjective accounts of experience and elucidate the ways in which these struggles connect to all other social systems that either valorize or suppress the validity of each individual story. The subjective accountings of experience, currently relegated to the realm of raw data to be processed into objective fact, would be valorized as essential to our understanding of ourselves not as facts, but as a living productive force.

This developing awareness of commonality, not through abstraction but through idiosyncratic and connected experience, brings us to the third characteristic of a minor psychology: “everything takes on collective value” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 17). In the simplest sense, this refers to an acknowledgment that there is no actual capacity to understand a body separated from other bodies. What happens to one has value for all. This is not to propose a subjugation of the individual to any collective will or identity such as the Party or the state or some form of identity politics. Nor is it to pursue the construction of systems or environments to see the way they impact on the development or wellbeing of the individual as is done by the major psychologies. Instead, a minor psychology would explore the rich web of interconnected life as a field of complex assemblages that hold both political and social force.

Here we are in the realm of what Hardt and Negri (2011) have referred to as “the common”. They define the common as being composed of all of the elements of the material world upon which we depend for sus-

tenance as well as all the elements of social production, such as “knowledges, codes, informations, affects” (p. viii). They suggest that the common does not rely on modes of separation but instead on “practices of interaction, care and cohabitation in a common world” (p. viii).

On these terms, a minor psychology would investigate ways in which we might subvert modes of command and control premised on division and hierarchy. It would acknowledge difference but not in abstract or hierarchical terms. Instead, difference would be understood in terms of differential and complementary productive capacities that might be put to common purpose. It would valorize and seek out forms of connectivity and collective self-provisioning in the realms of emotional and psychological well-being.

A minor psychology cannot be the province of any set of majoritarian practices, theories, or disciplinary apparatuses. It operates tactically below the surface of major psychology in the daily reconfiguration of new collectivities. It does not seek any universal concepts or a particular teleological trajectory. It is a nomadic project, as delineated by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and extended by nomadic feminists such as Rosi Braidotti (1994). The characteristics of a nomadic feminism have clear implications for the ways in which women might construct a minor psychology as what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call a rhizomatic structure: a set of social practices that spread in all directions at once under the surface with no central point of origin. As a rhizome, minor psychology is composed of an infinite number of acts of creative transgression by women everywhere and connected through a multiplicity of productive encounters and collisions. It is organizationally contingent and holds no stable form, but acts as a site of indeterminate collective enunciation of insurrectionary desire.

Braidotti’s nomadic feminism (1994) extends the notion of rhizomatic organization through a nomadic form of political transformation premised in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of the nomad. She calls for a tactical approach to identity that allows for subjects that can operate and move across occupied spaces while eluding capture through consistent violations of the dominant axioms of such spaces. What needs to be noted here is that tactical operations that undertake violations within a dominant regime of rule, such as capitalism, and that rely heavily on re-writing the axiomatic code of all its encounters, needs to account for what Deleuze and Guattari call passwords. Passwords constitute the production of an al-

ternative recoding of the fundamental capitalist axiomatic – the money form. Such recoding is premised on the failure of the capitalist axiomatic to fully capture the force of material living desire, and it is in this excess of force that new forms of sociability exceed the grasp of capitalist recoding. Furthermore, passwords need to be transient to avoid being recaptured and axiomatized into the ever-expanding domain of global capitalism.

For Braidotti (1994), the nomad functions through the kinds of contingent connections and constant social reconfiguration that I have delineated as rhizomatic. However, the nomad does not eschew

...those necessarily stable and reassuring bases for identity that allow one to function in a community. Rather, nomadic consciousness consists in not taking any kind of identity as permanent. The nomad is only passing through; s/he makes those necessarily situated connections that can help her/him to survive, but s/he never takes on fully the limits of ... fixed identity. (p. 33)

Tactically, Braidotti’s political proposal is founded on an acknowledgement of a minor politics with a significant resonance for the minor psychology we have been sketching. A minor nomadic politics engages the subject in both macro- and micro-political tactics. On the one hand, a broader politics of engagement with major politics – that aims to reconfigure and subvert dominant axioms by building solidarity across subjugated populations – is premised on the very definitions of exclusion that define these populations. On the other hand, it proposes to assemble a minor register where there is a

...figuration for the kind of subject who has relinquished all idea, desire or nostalgia for fixity... [It] expresses the desire for an identity made of transitions, successive shifts ... without and against an essential unity. (Braidotti, 1994, p. 23)

In terms of the minor psychology we have been describing, Braidotti’s (1994) proposal for a nomadic feminism suggests that our tactics in relation to major psychology must account for its capacity to recode our lived experience into capitalist vernacular. That is, that major psychology may seek to turn all of our activities into the axiomatic of waged labor. In this regard, the feminization of labor cannot be accounted for in terms of revolt by simply asserting the rights of women to be paid for the activities of social reproduction. While this is a reasonable macro-tactic to improve overall living conditions for women within the broader context of the capitalist social, it is only a partial tactic. The role of major psychology might well

be seen as opening a coding of women as social laborers operating within the vernacular of the good worker. As we have noted, the DSM-5's Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder appears to set the conditions by which women are seen as affectively and socially deficient at precisely the moment they become what Negri (1996) has called social labor. While a direct frontal assault on the majoritarian vernacular of this diagnosis through protests by feminist psychologists and their allies is both important and tactically necessary, it is also a temporary and partial measure.

The production of a minor psychology is the other part of the tactic. It is to subvert the dominant axiomatic through the living production of nomadic and rhizomatic social reproduction. It is through the production of alternative spaces premised upon experiments in new social forms. However, such work requires that the parasite within us be poisoned or expelled. Perhaps the most profound tactic here is to create an environment toxic to the parasite. I propose that this can be done by careful experimentation under the surface through the collective lived experience of women. It is in the discovered capacity for the collective self-provisioning of our physical and emotional wellbeing that we re-produce a social that poisons capitalism and its minion psychology and opens the social organism to new life, to new capacity, and to a world that is to come.

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